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Abstract   
 
 
 This research investigated the market conditions caused by IPO advertising by examining 
the impact of IPO advertising, based on the US stock market from 1986 to 2009. The 
relationship between advertising intensity in the IPO year and the degree of IPO underpricing 
was examined. It was found that IPO advertising is an inappropriate way to convey a firm's true 
value of IPO to market participants. An increase in advertising intensity around an IPO event 
increases the degree of initial returns. Simultaneously, however, advertising intensity around an 
IPO event also increases the post-IPO initial-return uncertainty, which raises the question as to 
whether advertising serves primarily as a mechanism to convey a firm's true value to investors. 
The theoretical valuation of IPO, the relation between IPO advertising and the degree of stock 
overvaluation and the relation between IPO advertising and long-run performance of IPO are 
discussed. Based on the Peasnell (1982)'s residual income valuation framework (henceforth 
RIV), IPO advertising was proved to cause stock price to be more overvalued in the secondary 
market: a positive relationship was found between advertising and the degree of stock 
overvaluation relative to its theoretical value. The stock price tends to revert back to its 
fundamental value in the long run a few years after IPO. The link between advertising intensity 
and long-run performance was investigated. The Fama French 3-factor model and Carhart 4-
factor model were employed, with investment horizons of one, two, three and four years.  
  
 While advertising is relevant to a firm’s value in the IPO year, the degree of advertising in 
the IPO year is unrelated to its value two and three years following the IPO event. The view that 
advertising serves primarily as a form of intangible asset that enhances future earnings (i.e., a 
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firm's value) is unable to account for the degree of underpricing. Accordingly, an alternative 
hypothesis, that advertising inflates the short-run stock price, was proposed. The results of this 
study are consistent with the view of Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), namely that the 
stock price of newly listed firms can be overvalued. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
 One of the most controversial issues regarding IPO underpricing is whether the presence 
of anomalies is caused by systematic underpricing or stock overvaluation. While it is tempting to 
conclude that IPO underpricing is simply a form of systematic underpricing that attracts 
investors to buy shares, such a conclusion assumes that the fair value of an IPO is some notion 
of first-day market price. Prior to the years of the ‘dot-com-bubble period’1, there seems to have 
been a consensus among scholars that IPO underpricing was a direct result of information 
asymmetry (Rock, 1986, Welch, 1989 among others). However, this does not explain the 
extreme positive initial return of 65 per cent during the ‘dot-com-bubble period’. This event 
resurrected interest in IPO underpricing and led many researchers to challenge the theory of 
information asymmetries (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003, Ritter and Welch, 2002). Notable 
among them were Ritter and Welch who argued, in their seminal paper in the Journal of 
Finance (Ritter and Welch, 2002), that asymmetric information is unlikely to explain the first-day 
return. Their argument was that the IPO underpricing phenomenon is either caused by 
aftermarket inefficiencies or has behavioural explanations, rather than being due to information 
asymmetries. Two years later, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) suggested that IPOs could 
be overvalued and underpriced at the same time (p. 814). The notion that IPO underpricing 
could be caused by aftermarket inefficiencies (i.e., the stock price could be overvalued) 
underpinned this research. Although short-run stock overvaluation is understood, little is known 
                                                     
1
 Loughran and Ritter (2004) reported that the average first-day return of IPOs reached an astronomical level (65 
per cent) during 1999-2000.  This period has come to be known as the ‘internet bubble period’ or the ‘dot-com 
bubble period’. 
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about the possible factors that cause stock to be overvalued. 
Since 2009, when Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) reported  that the degree of advertising 
intensity peaks in the IPO year and is related directly to the decision to go public, scholars have 
debated the nature of the relationship between advertising and the IPO event. Several existing 
theories have been developed to explain the peak level of advertising during IPO, such as the 
alternative signalling hypothesis (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009a) and the overvaluation hypothesis 
(Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004). Despite competing theoretical explanations, the true 
reason behind IPO advertising remains a matter of debate and there has not yet been an 
empirical study that successfully demonstrates a link between market observations and existing 
theories. 
The idea that advertising has a direct relationship with the IPO event and the 
subsequent market price is not new. The degree of advertising around the IPO event is known to 
relate directly to the degree of initial return:  IPO advertising increases a firm’s visibility and thus 
investors’ awareness of it (Merton 1987), and the degree of advertising intensity peaks in the 
IPO year (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009a). The implication of earlier research is that IPO 
advertising has an impact upon the initial return, however little is known about the true 
rationale for the practice of IPO advertising. In particular, the reason why firms choose to 
maximise their level of advertising in the IPO year is still a matter of debate. The primary focus 
of this research study was to shed some light on the issue. 
Two main approaches to IPO advertising are apparent in the literature. One school of 
thought has linked IPO advertising with the information asymmetry theory. It has been well 
documented that the positive initial return is a direct result of information asymmetry (see 
Rock 1986, Welch 1989, among others). Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) developed the alternative 
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signalling hypothesis by proposing that IPO advertising acts as an information carrier to convey 
the value of the firm to investors. According to Chemmanur and Yan (2009a), firms maximise 
their level of advertising in the IPO year in order to convey information about the IPO to public 
investors. 
Another approach to gain an understanding about IPO advertising is to consider the 
possibility that IPO advertising can cause media bias around the IPO event. This drives the stock 
price up in the short run, followed by a long-term price revision when the price reverts back to 
its fundamental value. This prediction is based on Miller’s (1977) overvaluation theory that 
divergence of opinion can lead to asset overvaluation and subsequent underperformance in 
markets with restricted short selling (such as the IPO market). That is, optimistic investors are 
more likely to show their opinions by buying shares, because of the short-sales constraint, 
whereas pessimistic investors will tend to stay out of the market. In addition, some pessimistic 
investors are restricted by regulations/contracts from short-sell shares during the initial period 
(see Houge, Loughran, Suchanek and Yan, 2001). Since IPO advertising is used to convey good 
news rather than bad news, it is plausible that advertising can cause media bias that drives the 
stock price upwards. In this context, Gurun and Butler (2012) have asserted that positive media 
bias strongly relates to firm equity values. They also identified advertising expenditure as a 
possible cause of media bias. This view predicts that a higher intensity of advertising around IPO 
will be associated with larger initial returns for its equity in the short run, followed by a negative 
relationship with long-run performance as stock prices converge to their intrinsic values. Due to 
this prediction, the long-term performance of IPO was also investigated. To the best of my 
knowledge, no literature has reported that stock overvaluation is caused by IPO advertising. In 
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order to address this lacuna in the research, this study explored the possibility that stock 
overvaluation is caused by IPO advertising, and in particular that IPO advertising causes media 
bias that drives the stock price up.  
There are, thus, a number of questions to be considered in relation to IPO advertising:  
1) Does advertising have an impact upon the underpricing of IPOs? 
2) Does advertising cause short-term stock overvaluation?  
3) Does advertising impact upon the long-term performance of stock in any way?  
4) Is the level of advertising in the IPO year correlated with future stock price? 
I address the first question in Chapter 2; questions two and three in Chapter 3, and the 
final question in Chapter 4. It was the first question that led me to undertake research into the 
systematic link between IPO advertising, initial returns and the initial return dispersion. 
Research into IPO advertising is in its infancy; as yet, little has been written about it. The true 
reason for the practice of maximising advertising intensity in the IPO year remains unclear. The 
existing literature suggests that advertising is either a mechanism that conveys the true value of 
a firm to investors (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009a) or it causes media bias and thus inflates stock 
prices (Gurun and Butler, 2012). According to Chemmanur and Yan (2009a), advertising around 
an IPO event helps to reduce the degree of information asymmetry. If advertising acts as a 
mechanism that conveys the true value of a firm to investors, then one would expect higher 
advertising intensity to reduce the uncertainty of stock prices (i.e., initial return dispersion) due 
to the increased amount of information provided. The empirical tests, which are reported in 
Chapter 2, were conducted in order to test this supposition.  
However, the results do not support the aforementioned prediction. Rather the 
empirical evidence suggests that advertising causes higher dispersion of initial returns (i.e., 
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initial-return uncertainty). These results are entirely at odds with the prediction that higher 
advertising intensity should reduce the degree of initial-return uncertainty (i.e., initial return 
dispersion). Therefore, an alternative explanation, namely that IPO advertising causes short-
term stock overvaluation, was investigated: the link between advertising and the degree of 
stock overvaluation is discussed, as is the relationship between IPO advertising and long-run 
performance.  
There is some suggestion in the literature that investors might consider advertising to be 
a form of an intangible asset that increases a firm’s future revenue/value. Lev and Sougiannis 
(1996), for example, have suggested that the R&D capitalisations generate information that is 
value relevant to investors, while Barth, Clement, Foster and Kasznik (1998) have noted that 
brand value estimates capture information that is relevant to investors and is sufficiently reliable 
to be reflected in share prices and returns. They also found that brand value estimates are 
strongly related to advertising expenditure. Accordingly, the value relevance of both advertising 
and R&D was investigated, and the results reported in this thesis. Since Peasnell (1982) and 
Ohlson (1995) have shown that the earnings and book value of equity are value relevant, these 
items were also included in the analysis. Based on a modified version of the valuation model of 
Barth et al. (1998), with the R&D augmented as an additional variable on the right-hand side, it 
appeared that earnings, book value, advertising and R&D are relevant to a firm's value. An 
alternative model based on abnormal earnings (Hand and Landsman, 2005) was also examined 
and showed consistent results.  
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1.2 The significance of the study 
The evidence presented in this thesis shows that IPO advertising significantly increases 
the initial return and that the price appreciation caused by advertising is a result of stock 
overvaluation. Additionally, it was found that the IPO advertising also increases initial-return 
uncertainty. In other words, it can be said that IPO advertising drives the stock price upwards 
while simultaneously making the stock price less informative. Thus, the notion that IPO 
advertising serves primarily as a form of information carrier, was not supported by the research. 
An alternative hypothesis, that advertising causes media bias, which drives the stock price 
upwards, was accepted. The findings were largely consistent with the overvaluation theory 
proposed by Miller (1977) and also complement earlier empirical research undertaken by 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004).  
Based on cross-sectional examination (using Peasnell (1982)'s RIV framework), there 
appeared to be a positive relationship between advertising intensity and the price-to-value 
ratio. This relationship was observable within the first three months post IPO.  The result was 
robust against the inclusion of popular IPO control variables such as underwriter reputation, 
firm size, VC-backed dummy, NASDAQ dummy and offer price revision. The results from the 
alternative measure such as price-to-book ratio also reveal the same trend. The results from 
long-term abnormal returns also support the overvaluation hypothesis: the results indicated 
that firms in the high-advertising portfolio earned less than those in the low-advertising 
portfolio in the long run, over 2, 3 and 4 years holding period, regardless of whether the Fama 
French 3-factor model or the Carhart 4-factor model was applied. The cross- sectional 
examination of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR), over 2, 3 and 4 years holding period, also 
revealed the same trend. The Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) reveal weaker test 
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statistics but the sign of the coefficients remain consistent throughout all holding periods tested 
and are in line with the other three methods conducted. So, based on the residual income-
valuation and long-run abnormal returns study, the suggestion that IPO underpricing is driven 
by systematic underpricing was rejected, and an alternative hypothesis - that IPO advertising 
causes stock to be more overvalued - was accepted. 
From the investigation into the value relevance of advertising and R&D it appeared that 
earnings and book value are relevant to a firm's value and that advertising and R&D are relevant 
to a firm's value in the first fiscal year that they are reported (i.e., the IPO year). Although 
supporting evidence was found to suggest that both intangibles are relevant to a firm’s value in 
the IPO year, the value relevance of neither advertising nor R&D were found to persist beyond 
the first year following the IPO event. The degree of IPO advertising (and R&D) were found to be 
irrelevant to a firm's value, two and three years after the IPO event. That is, the evidence 
suggests that the advertising in the IPO year is irrelevant to the future value of a firm.  
Therefore, the hypothesis that investors use current advertising expenditure to predict future 
stock price was rejected. This result was consistent with the view that stock overvaluation, 
which is caused by advertising, exists only in the short term following the IPO event.  
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 This thesis is formed of five chapters: Chapter 1, Introduction; Chapter 2, The impact of 
advertising on IPO returns and IPO return variability; Chapter 3, The intrinsic value of highly 
advertised IPOs; Chapter 4, The value relevance of R&D and advertising in newly listed firms, 
and Chapter 5, Conclusion. The data set is the US IPO issued during 1986-2009, inclusive. 
Chapter 2 starts with the systematic link between IPO advertising, initial returns and the 
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initial return dispersion. Initial public offerings are discussed in the context of initial return and 
initial return dispersion. Specifically, cross-section regression is conducted with initial return (or 
initial return dispersion) on the left-hand side against IPO advertising and a host of popular IPO 
controls on the right-hand side, such as underwriter reputation, firm size, VC-backed dummy, 
NASDAQ dummy and offer price revision. The relationship between initial return dispersion and 
IPO advertising was examined in a similar manner with the same set of control variables, 
whereas the initial return dispersion was computed as the standard deviation of the first 14, 21 
or 28 daily returns right after the IPO, excluding the initial return. This method is similar to that 
utilised by Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2010). An alternative volatility measure such as market-
adjusted volatility is also discussed. This chapter utilises the Fama-French 49 industry 
classification. Since each industry shows different average levels of advertising, the tests used in 
this study were sensitised by using the industry-adjusted advertising intensity instead of 
advertising intensity. However, it appears that both measures of IPO advertising yield consistent 
results.  
 In Chapter 3, the theoretical value of IPOs, the relationship between stock intrinsic value 
and IPO advertising, and the long-run abnormal return are examined. The cross-sectional 
examination of price-to-valuation ratio is documented in order to establish the relationship 
between IPO advertising and the degree of stock overvaluation. In order to detect the degree of 
stock overvaluation, the intrinsic value of stock is needed. For each IPO sample, the price-to-
theoretical-value ratio was computed to see if the stock was overvalued. Lee, Myers and 
Swaminathan (1999)’s approach of residual income valuation model (RIV), developed by 
Peasnell (1982), was utilised to examine the theoretical value of stock. This was for two main 
reasons: first, this approach provides superior ability to explain cross-sectional variation of US 
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stock prices - close to 70 per cent of cross-sectional variation of US stock prices can be explained 
by this model (Lee et al. 1999 p.1700, see also Frankel and Lee, 1998), and second, this 
approach avoids the use of ex post realisation of earnings and relies solely on publicly available 
information such as consensus analysts’ earnings forecasts. In addition to price-to-theoretical 
value, an alternative approach (such as price-to-book ratio) was also included in the analysis for 
robustness. This is followed by the analysis of long-run abnormal returns in order to test for 
Miller (1977)’s prediction. Initial public offering is discussed in the context of long-run abnormal 
stock performance. Due to the ongoing debate about the correct method used to detect 
abnormal returns (see Barber and Lyon, 1997, among others), all popular methods used to 
measure long-term performance were included in the analysis: this chapter covers Buy-and-
Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR), Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR), Fama-French 3-factor 
model and Carhart’s 4-factor model (Carhart 1997). 
In Chapter 4, the value relevance of book value, net income, R&D and advertising is 
discussed. Intangible assets (such as advertising and R&D) are known to be relevant to the value 
of a firm (see Barth et al., 1998; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996, and Franzen and Radhakrishnan, 
2009, among others). Barth et al. (1998) have reported that brand value is relevant to firm’s 
value. They also found that estimates of brand value are strongly related to advertising 
expenditure. It is logical to consider that advertising might be relevant to a firm’s value because 
advertising can increase both consumers’ and investors’ awareness of it, both of which enhance 
the value of a firm. Since Peasnell (1982) and Ohlson (1995) have shown that the earnings and 
book value of equity are value relevant, these items were also included in the analysis. 
Accordingly, a modified version of the valuation model of Barth et al. (1998), with the R&D 
augmented as an additional variable on the right-hand side, was employed in order to obtain a 
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direct estimate of the value the market credits to advertising and R&D  - the ‘intangible assets’. 
In this case, the intangible assets in question (advertising and R&D) were recognised as the 
other value-relevant information parameter in the Ohlson (1995)’s framework. An alternative 
valuation model based on abnormal earnings (Hand and Landsman, 2005) is also examined in 
this chapter. This is followed by a discussion on the test for the persistence of the value 
relevance of advertising and R&D. This test was conducted in order to see if the advertising and 
R&D can be used by investors to ‘forecast’ future stock price.  
In Chapter 5 the empirical findings are summarised, the limitations of the study are 
discussed, and further potential research topics arising from the study are identified. 
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Chapter 2 The impact of advertising on IPO returns and IPO return variability. 
2.1 Introduction 
 Since the early 1990s, there have been many academic reports of a significant positive 
abnormal return on the first day of trading. This phenomenon is commonly known as IPO 
underpricing. Several theories have been developed to explain the cause of the observed 
positive initial return. The traditional view is that these abnormal returns are compensation for 
risk or for the cost of providing information. Those who take this point of view consider them to 
be the result of asymmetric information (see Rock, 1986; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Benveniste 
and Spindt, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989, 1992; and Aggarwal, Krigman, and 
Womack, 2002). Common among this literature is the conclusion that, on average, IPO is 
undervalued at the offer price. According to this viewpoint, the first-day market price is some 
notion of ‘fair value’; therefore the observed positive first-day return is a result of asymmetric 
information. If observed initial returns are significantly positive, it is then concluded that the IPO 
is underpriced at the offer. This is a view that has been popular and extensively documented for 
more than two decades. 
More recently, the extreme underpricing of the ‘dot-com bubble’ period (that is 1999–
2000) has resurrected interest in short-run underpricing (see Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003). 
Many researchers at this time challenged the theories of information asymmetries as they 
considered that they unable to explain the extreme amount of IPO underpricing during this 
period. Ritter and Welch (2002) argued strongly that asymmetric information is unlikely to 
explain the first-day return, especially the huge amount of first-day return in the internet bubble 
period. Rather than information asymmetries, they argued that the IPO underpricing 
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phenomena is either caused by aftermarket inefficiencies or has behavioural explanations. 
Much of the literature on IPO long-run underperformance supports this view (see Ritter, 1991; 
Loughran and Ritter, 1995, 2000; see also Levis, 1993; Espenlaub, Gregory and Tonks, 2000, and 
Gregory, Guermat and Al-Shawawreh, 2010 for the UK studies). It is also worth mentioning the 
work of Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), who used many price multiples to study the 
offer price of US IPOs relative to their matching peers. According to their results, the offer prices 
of IPOs are actually overvalued, which is entirely inconsistent with the notion of undervalued 
IPOs.  In addition, the overvaluation result is consistent with many IPO long-run 
underperformance studies. To some extent, these results also support the view that consensus 
analyst forecasts tend to be over optimistic (see Rajan and Servaes, 1997; Easterwood and Nutt, 
1999 and Hong and Kubik, 2003 for the upward bias in analyst forecasts).  
IPO underpricing is one of the most documented research areas in finance. Despite the 
ongoing disagreement about the true reason behind this phenomenon, one common view that 
is shared among researchers is that IPOs are, on average, underpriced. The secondary market 
trading price of the stock is, on average, higher than the offer price. There is a vast body of 
literature on IPOs, in addition to those already mentioned. For example, Bradley, Jordan and 
Ritter (2008) studied the behaviour of analysts following IPOs; Schultz (2003) looked at the 
ability of managers to time the market for an IPO decision, and Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) 
investigated the impact of product market advertising on a firm’s decision to go public. Despite 
the fact that IPO returns are well documented, little is known about the uncertainty (variability) 
of IPO initial returns. This is presumably due to the difficulty of observing the volatility of IPO 
returns. Although it is not possible to directly observe the volatility of IPO returns for a 
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particular firm, one still can examine IPO return variability during a short period of time by 
examining IPO returns relative to matching peers. This method was utilised by Lowry, Officer 
and Schwert (2010) to examine monthly IPO returns between 1965 and 2005. They identified a 
relationship between various firm-specific conditions and IPO returns/returns variability. Their 
results remained robust when controlled for the timing of IPOs. This research provides a 
reasonable and simple way to observe the variability of IPO initial returns and thus contributes a 
significant part to this study.  
 
2.2 Chapter outline 
The research on the impact of product market advertising on IPO decisions is still in its 
infancy. However, some of the literature broadly relates to this research. Chemmanur and Yan 
(2009b), for example, provided a considerable amount of knowledge about the relationship 
between IPO advertising and long-run stock return as well giving insights into the impact of IPO 
advertising intensities on first-day IPO relative valuation. Recent work by Lowry et al. (2010) has 
contributed to our knowledge about IPO returns volatilities. They analysed the relationship 
between IPO timing and initial returns volatilities in some detail. Nevertheless, their results 
cannot provide exact information about the statistical link between IPO advertising and initial-
returns volatilities. Up to the time of writing, no known published literature has addressed the 
relationship between IPO advertising and its subsequent IPO-returns volatilities. The current 
research focused on the relationship between IPO advertising and initial-returns volatility, 
whereas Lowry et al. (2010) focused upon the impact of IPO timing and initial-returns variability. 
The absence of such research calls for the in-depth analysis of the impact of IPO advertising on 
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its subsequent IPO-returns volatilities. Consequently, the purpose of this research was to fill this 
gap and shed some light on this puzzling area as a whole. In order to solve this puzzle, both the 
impact of IPO advertising and first-day IPO-returns volatility were addressed, and also the 
relationship between IPO advertising and first-day abnormal returns. In this chapter, three 
issues are addressed regarding the relationship between: 1) initial return vs. IPO advertising; 2) 
Initial return dispersion vs. IPO advertising, and 3) excess volatility vs. IPO advertising. In 
Chapter 3, the theoretical value of the IPO, as well as long-run performance, is discussed.  
Chapter 4 reports on the value relevance of advertising and of R&D (research and 
development).  
The purpose of this chapter is to shed some light on the impact of firms’ advertising on 
IPO underpricing, both in the context of the volatility of initial returns and the returns to IPO 
stocks. Unlike the study by Lowry et al. (2010), this research focused mainly on the effect of 
advertising on the variability of initial returns. To the best of our knowledge, this relationship 
has never been documented before.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section I reviews the literature and 
sets out the reasons for undertaking the research, the research motivation and the research 
questions. Section II explains the data and methodology, defines the variables, describes the 
sample selection procedure, and analyses the unconditional variability of IPO initial returns. 
Section III provides summary statistics, presents the results and analysis. Section IV summarises 
the results, presents concluding remarks and discusses the contribution that the research has 
made to the field. 
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Section I  
2.3 Literature Review    
2.3.1 Overview of IPO underpricing 
 For more than three decades, much has been written by academics on positive first-day 
IPOs return. Since 1975, when Ibbotson (1975) first documented the underpricing of initial 
public offerings, the true reason behind these abnormal returns has been debated. Discussion is 
ongoing regarding the correct method to measure abnormal returns. IPO underpricing is 
recognised by both academics and practitioners as one of the most extensively documented 
anomalies in finance.  
 Despite the vast amount of literature on IPO underpricing, the true reason for it remains 
a topic of debate. It has been noted that the equity in private companies with uncertain 
prospects is inherently difficult to value, and the conclusion drawn that underpricing is a 
systematic response to the complexity of this valuation problem. In contrast, others have 
questioned whether the IPO price-setting process results in excess underpricing of IPO stocks: 
some suggest that IPOs could be overvalued and underpriced at the same time (Purnanandam 
and Swaminathan, 2004, p.814).  
 In general, the literature can be broadly categorised into two groups in terms of possible 
explanations for this phenomenon. One traditional view is that IPOs are systematically 
underpriced at the initial offering. The observed first-day return is a direct result of asymmetric 
information. Rock (1986) has suggested that the offering firm systematically underprices its 
shares in order to guarantee that uninformed investors purchase the issue. This view has gained 
a significant degree of support from within academia, as many researchers have proposed ideas 
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to support the view of information asymmetries. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) documented the 
theoretical literature that explains IPO underpricing by signalling models (see also Allen and 
Faulhaber, 1989).  Welch (1989) studied a sample of 1028 US IPOs in the years 1977-1982 and 
concluded that firms underprice their IPOs in order to obtain a higher price at a seasoned 
offering. Aggarwal et al. (2002) examined US IPOs in the years 1994 to 1999 and concluded that 
managers strategically underpriced IPOs in order to maximise personal wealth from selling 
shares at lock-up expiration. Recently however, this view has been criticised on the grounds that 
theories based on asymmetric information are unable to explain the average first-day returns of 
65 per cent during the internet bubble period. 
 The alternate explanation is that IPOs are not priced at their intrinsic value during early 
aftermarket trading. In other words, investors tend to bid IPOs price up in the immediate 
aftermarket. Many long-run IPO underperformance studies reveal results consistent with this 
view. A vast amount of literature has documented these long-run underperformance 
phenomena, as it seems to have occurred in almost every capital market in the world (see 
Ritter, 1991, Loughran and Ritter 1995; Levis, 1993; Jog and Riding, 1987; Uhlir, 1989; and 
Aggarwal, Leal, and Hernandez, 1993, for the US, UK, Canada, German and Latin America, 
respectively). Ritter (1991) examined a sample of 1,526 US IPOs in 1975-1984 and found that in 
the three years after going public these firms significantly underperformed a set of comparable 
firms matched by size and industry. Loughran and Ritter (1995) studied a sample of 4,753 US 
IPO (and a sample of 3,702 SEOs) during the years 1970 to 1990. They showed that companies 
issuing stock, whether IPO or SEO, underperformed significantly relative to non-issuing firms for 
five years after the offering date. This literature has inspired many articles in the popular press 
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about the danger of investing in IPOs. Academic research has shown that this 
underperformance is also apparent in countries other than the US. For example, similar 
evidence also exists for the UK: Levis (1993) found that a sample of 712 UK IPOs in the years 
1980 to 1988 underperformed in terms of a number of relevant benchmarks in the three years 
of public listing following their first day of trading. He also suggested that, ‘the long-run 
underperformance extends beyond 36 months’ (p.41). This view was later confirmed by 
Espenlaub et al. (2000), who found long-run underperformance extending beyond 36 months in 
a sample of UK IPOs launched between 1985 and 1992. A more recent study, reported by 
Gregory et al. (2010), found a similar result of underperformance among a sample of UK IPOs 
launched between 1975 and 2004. 
 Apart from the studies into long-run returns, other literature supports the view that IPOs 
are mispriced. One work of particular interest is that undertaken by Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2004), who utilised price multiples to examine a sample of 2,288 US IPOs from 
1980 to 1997. They found that IPOs are actually overvalued at the offer price, tend to run up in 
the aftermarket, and revert to fair value in the long run (see also Kim and Ritter, 1999 for the 
valuation of IPOs based on comparable IPO transaction multiples). The view that, ‘IPOs can be 
overvalued and underpriced at the same time’ (Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004 p. 814), 
suggests that there may be more than one cause of the observed initial returns. 
 In summary, IPOs underpricing is a well-known phenomenon among scholars, and has 
been for more than two decades. IPO underpricing is one of the most important anomalies in 
finance; however, the reasons behind this phenomenon still remain unclear.  This study 
investigates IPO underpricing from different perspectives:  the efficacy of IPO advertising; the 
30 
 
theoretical value of IPOs; and the value relevance of some intangible assets. These are discussed 
in detail in the following chapters.  
 
2.3.2 Research into advertising expenditure in the IPO year.  
 Chemmanur and Yan (2009b) have pointed out that firms that go public with a greater 
extent of product market advertising in the IPO year, experience a more negative long-run stock 
return subsequent to their IPOs. These studies provide some theoretical grounding for the 
relatively new area of research of IPO advertising. Their contributions provide a strong 
foundation for this research. The detail of these findings is discussed below. 
 Chemmanur and Yan (2009b) studied the impact of product market advertising on IPO 
valuation and long-run post-IPO stock returns in the US stock market. Based on their sample of 
US IPOs during 1990-2000, they found evidence that, controlling for the average IPO long-run 
underperformance, firms going public that spend a lot on advertising in their IPO year earn a 
significantly lower long-run post IPO stock return. The average Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
(BHAR) in the two-year post-IPO window was found to be -27.2 per cent for the high advertising 
intensity firms and 1.2 per cent for the low advertising intensity firms. These findings yield a 
difference of -28.4 per cent between these two portfolios of IPOs (the difference is statistically 
significant at 1 per cent significance level). It is worth noting that their findings are robust in 
terms of various methodologies used to calculated returns. In the three years following IPO, IPO 
firms with high advertising intensity earn an average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of -
36.4 per cent if adjusted by the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ return, and -37.8 per cent if adjusted by 
the S&P 500 return. Both abnormal returns are significant at the 1 per cent significance level. In 
31 
 
contrast, IPO firms with low advertising intensity experience an average abnormal return of -6.3 
per cent if adjusted by the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ return, and -8 per cent if adjusted by the S&P 
500 return.  Similar to their results based on CARs and BHAR, their results based on Fama and 
French 3-factors model also show that IPO firms with high advertising intensity experience more 
negative post-IPO long-run stock returns than the IPO firms with low advertising intensity. 
Although the current study reports the long-run abnormal returns, unlike Chemmanur and Yan 
(2009b) it focuses primarily on the intrinsic value of IPOs rather than the difference in long-run 
abnormal return. Furthermore, Chemmanur and Yan (2009b) utilised relative valuation metric 
whereas this research employed an absolute valuation model (RIV) to examine the degree of 
overvaluation. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
 There is some evidence to suggest that IPO firms with a greater extent of advertising in 
their IPO year are valued higher than others, both in the IPO as well as in the immediate after 
market. Chemmanur and Yan (2009b) have stated that an IPO firm could increase its offer price 
to gain a valuation premium of 1.5 per cent to 3 per cent relative to its intrinsic value for every 1 
per cent increase in advertising intensity2 (see also Purnanandam and Swaminathan 2004 for 
the valuation of IPO). They found that, ‘Such an IPO firm [that is, a firm that undertakes heavy 
advertising in its IPO year] is also characterised by a greater upward price revision from the mid-
point of its filing range during its book-building period’ (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009b, p.1).  
 
 
                                                     
2
 Chemmanur and Yan (2009b) defined the intrinsic value at the time of IPO based on either a matching firm 
(matched by industry, sales, and EBITDA margin) or the median firm of an industry-sales-EBITDA matched portfolio 
for both (P/V)sales and (P/V)EBITDA ratios 
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2.3.3 Plausible causes of stock over valuation: short-sale prohibited market and the 
heterogeneous beliefs of investors’ 
 Houge, Loughran, Suchanek and Yan (2001) have suggested that institutional controls 
and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation in the IPO market significantly restrict 
short selling in the early post-offering period. For instance, members of the underwriting 
syndicate generally do not lend shares for short sale in the first 30 days. As a result, initial 
aftermarket IPO prices may be inflated because they reflect the sentiment of optimistic 
investors:  
 
From the results of this research, it is concluded that institutional controls 
make short sales difficult in the early post-offering period. National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Rule 3370 requires brokers to 
guarantee delivery of borrowed shares before allowing customers to sell 
short, and few brokerage firms or institutional investors will lend IPO shares 
to short sellers. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also bars 
firms in the underwriting syndicate from lending allocated shares until 30 
days after the IPO. Therefore, initial aftermarket IPO prices may not reflect 
the sentiment of the most pessimistic investors.  (Houge et al. 2001, p.6) 
 
  
This overvaluation theory, first proposed by Miller (1977) and further formalised by Morris 
(1996), predicts that greater divergence in investors’ beliefs about the firm’s true value will lead 
to short-run overvaluation and long-run underperformance. IPO firms provide an ideal setting 
for testing this hypothesis since short selling is not possible prior to the offer, some portion of 
short selling is muted after trading (due to SEC regulations, IPO lockup and price stabilisation), 
and IPO firms face greater uncertainty and divergence of opinions than non-issuing firms. 
Despite its intuitive appeal, however, this theory has received relatively limited attention until 
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recently. 
 The view of stock overvaluation is now the focus of much attention and is supported by 
many recent research studies. For example, Ritter and Welch (2002) argued strongly that 
asymmetric information was unlikely to explain first-day abnormal returns, especially the huge 
amount of first-day returns during the internet bubble period, and specifically that the 
information asymmetry model was unable to explain 65 per cent of initial returns observed 
during the years of 1999-2000:  “we argue that asymmetric information is not the primary 
driver of many IPO phenomena. Instead, we believe future progress in the literature will come 
from non-rational and agency conflict explanations.” (Ritter and Welch, 2002, p.1795) 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) have noted that IPO prices are actually overvalued 
relative to intrinsic values, and that more overvalued IPOs tend to underperform both the 
market and other IPO firms for up to five years after the offer. However, the theoretical 
underpinning and the economic reasons for the initial overvaluation remain unknown. 
Chemmanur and Krishnan (2008), in their study of the role of underwriters in promoting IPO 
overvaluation, document a similar pattern of IPO prices that are set too high on average and 
tend to converge to their intrinsic values in the long-run. Indeed, strong believers of the efficient 
market hypothesis argue that all mispricing will be eliminated by arbitrage. However, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) show that this  may not hold true for some stock, for example in the case of 
volatile stocks (such as highly advertised IPOs) in which there is a high level of risk.  They argue 
strongly that the riskiness associated with an arbitrage position prevents arbitrageurs taking 
such a stance. As a result, there will be some stock mispricing left in equilibrium because not all 
arbitrage positions are taken by arbitrageurs. Further discussion of the overvaluation theory and 
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the relevant literature can be found in section 3.2. 
It has been suggested that advertising is positively related to investors’ heterogeneous 
beliefs. Chemmanur and Yan (2009b), for example, reported a positive relationship between 
advertising and IPO valuation. They conjectured that the positive link between advertising and 
IPO valuation is due to the effect of advertising on the heterogeneity of beliefs held by investors 
in the IPO market about the prospects of a firm going public. This increases both IPO valuation 
and immediate aftermarket valuation, and lowers long-run stock return. The “heterogeneous 
beliefs hypothesis” was tested by Chemmanur and Yan using the dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and the stock turnover in the IPO aftermarket as proxies for the degree of 
heterogeneity in investor beliefs. Consistent with the heterogeneous beliefs hypothesis they 
found that: 1) advertising increases both analyst forecast dispersion about the firm going public 
and stock turnover in the IPO aftermarket; 2) A greater extent of advertising is associated with a 
smaller fraction of equity holdings in the IPO firm’s stock by institutional investors; 3) The higher 
IPO valuation induced by advertising is related to the higher analyst forecast dispersion and the 
higher stock turnover. Chemmanur and Yan (2009b) used the analyst forecast dispersion as a 
proxy for heterogeneous beliefs, whereas this chapter focuses on the initial-return volatility; 
nevertheless, Chemmanur and Yan’s inference that advertising is related to the degree of 
heterogeneous beliefs is an important contribution.  
 The number of potential investors is irrelevant to the extent of the heterogeneous 
beliefs of each individual investor. However, as the equilibrium price of the stock is derived from 
the highest bidder in the market rather than any single investor’s projection of stock price, and 
if investors are not informed perfectly and equally, the number of potential investors will affect 
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stock price. In theory, if every potential investor is perfectly and equally informed, then the 
number of them is irrelevant because all investors, including the highest bidder, would price the 
equity exactly the same. However, in practice, not all investors are perfectly informed; investors 
price a stock differently, based on their different information. This heterogeneous belief induces 
trade, which results in fluctuations of stock prices (stock returns) observable in the market. One 
important prediction based on this view is that, if firms undertake more advertising around their 
IPO, one can expect an increase in observable initial return volatility. This prediction is 
important, as it allows a testable hypothesis to be developed based on observable market data. 
It is thus an important research question, which is addressed in this chapter.   
 It is worth noting here, that information asymmetry, due to insider information, is not 
resolved after the first trading day. Specifically, investors still lack insiders’ information about the 
firm’s prospects prior to the lock-up expiration date (usually 180 days post IPO in the US). Brav 
and Gompers (2003) have noted that the average abnormal return around the lock-up 
expiration is 2 per cent. This abnormal return is potentially consistent with downward-sloping 
demand curves or investors’ incorrect prior beliefs regarding the extent of insider sales.  In 
short, their finding is inconsistent with rational expectations on the part of investors. 
 
2.3.4 IPO advertising and initial return 
 Chemmanur and Yan (2009a, p.40) have suggested that, ‘firms choose a higher level of 
product market advertising when they are planning to issue new equity, compared with 
situations in which they have no immediate plans to do so’. Hence, we hypothesised that 
advertising relates to the IPO event. However, it is unclear why a firm would want to raise its 
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level of advertising around IPO. There is much debate about the rationale of the association 
between high IPO advertising intensity around an IPO event and initial return observable in the 
market. One economically meaningful explanation about the systematic linkage between initial 
return and advertising is that advertising itself can be a form of a company’s intangible assets. 
Prior marketing research, conducted by Srivastava, Shervani and Fahey (1998), found that a 
firm’s advertising creates intangible market-based assets and that these assets strengthen 
shareholder value (see also Rao, Agarwal and Dahlhoff, 2004). In a similar way, research and 
development (R&D) can be considered as the firm’s ‘knowledge asset’, while advertising reflects 
the firm’s marketing activities and can be considered as a ‘brand enhancement asset’.  Among 
scholars, it is generally accepted that a large part of a firm’s value might reflect its market-based 
assets, which could be classified as either (a) firm-specific factors, such as research and 
development (R&D) expenditures, or (b) brand equity, such as advertising. These ‘assets’ affect 
IPO performance both in the short term and the long term after the IPO period. Guo, Lev and 
Shi (2006) also noted that R&D activities significantly affect both the initial underpricing of IPOs 
(R&D is positively correlated with underpricing) and their long-term performance (R&D is 
positively related to long-term performance). If advertising can be considered to be a form of 
intangible asset, then we should expect a positive relationship between an IPO’s long-term 
performance and advertising intensity because the firm’s intrinsic value should incorporate the 
extent of the market-based asset. However, although R&D does positively relate to long-term 
performance, some research into advertising has found contrary evidence, which suggests that 
advertising does not relate positively to long-term performance. Specifically, Chemmanur and 
Yan (2009b) have noted that advertising intensity positively affects the initial underpricing of 
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IPO and relates negatively to long-term performance of IPOs. Therefore, the relationship 
between advertising and long-term performance is investigated in Chapter 3. 
 Other researchers believe that the causality works the other way around; that it is the 
increase in sales growth itself that is the true cause of the higher advertising intensity around 
IPO. Based on this view, a firm could undergo an increase in sales growth that causes it to 
increase its level of advertising. This increase could also prompt the firm to go public, as 
demonstrated in the empirical literature on decisions to go public (see Pagano, Panetta, and 
Zingales, 1998). However, one major problem with this explanation is that it is entirely 
inconsistent with the empirical finding that advertising intensity peaks in the IPO year. 
Chemmanur and Yan (2009a, p.63) have argued strongly against this view based on their 
empirical findings: “If sales growth were really causing the firm to increase advertising, one 
would expect the firm to continue to increase advertising at least for one or two years after the 
IPO year”. In addition, they also stated that their results continued to hold even after controlling 
for sales growth in their multivariate analysis. 
There is another plausible cause that is derived from behavioural explanation: 
advertising around an IPO event may cause media bias that attracts the attention of uninformed 
investors, thereby inducing them to buy the IPO firm’s equity at a high price on the first trading 
day (thus generating excess demand and further driving up its price). Research studies have 
shown that advertising is a determinant of a firm’s visibility (see Grullon, Kanatas and Weston 
2004, among others), and that advertising is related to initial returns (Chemmanur and Yan 
2011). Since stock demand is directly related to the visibility of a firm (an investor can buy 
security k ‘only if the investor knows about security k’, Merton, 1987, p. 488), it is plausible that 
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stock demand is related to advertising. In addition, Gurun and Butler (2012) have reported that 
positive media bias strongly relates to a firm’s equity values. They also identify advertising 
expenditures as a possible cause of media bias. Thus, it is plausible that advertising may play a 
major role in the pricing process. Miller (1977) has suggested that divergence of opinion can 
lead to asset overvaluation and subsequent underperformance in markets with restricted short 
selling (such as the IPO market). Optimistic investors are more likely to show their opinions by 
buying shares. In contrast, pessimistic investors will tend to stay out of the market because of 
the short-sales constraint.  Some pessimistic investors are restricted by regulations/contracts 
from short-sell shares during the early post-offering period (see Houge et al., 2001). In addition, 
the investment bank usually requires that the firm's management and pre-public investors agree 
to refrain from selling their stock in the aftermarket for a period of time after the IPO. This 
agreement is usually referred to as a ‘lock-up’ (usually 180 days post market in the US) and this 
practice exists for most IPOs. As long as there is sufficient stock demand this tends to push share 
prices up. As short-sales constraints are relaxed over time, the IPO market price can converge 
freely to its fundamental value, producing underperformance in the long-run. This view predicts 
that a higher intensity of advertising around IPO will be associated with larger initial returns for 
its equity in the short run, followed by a negative relationship with long-run performance as 
stock prices converge to their intrinsic values.  
 The links between advertising in the IPO year, initial return and long-term performance 
are very important as they allow us to investigate the rationale of positive first-day abnormal 
returns generated by advertising around an IPO event. The convergent scenarios predicted by 
these models allow us to develop a testable hypothesis based on observable market data. If 
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long-term performance is positively related to a high level of advertising around IPO, then we 
can infer that investors are rational about the firm’s future prospects and value advertising as a 
form of ‘brand enhancement asset’, hence stock prices are raised. However, if advertising 
intensity is negatively related to long-term performance but positively related to initial return 
dispersion, then it can be inferred that advertising may cause media bias that attracts the 
attention of uninformed investors, and thereby generates short-term excessive demand for 
stock (and increase the uncertainty of stock prices). Therefore, price reversion in the long run 
can then be expected as stock price reverts to its fundamental value.  
 It has been said that an investor can buy security k ‘only if the investor knows about 
security k’ (Merton, 1987, p. 488). If this statement is extended to IPOs, the demand for shares 
in a newly issued firm should relate directly to investors’ awareness.  That is, if advertising 
increases investors’ awareness then advertising should be correlated with stock turnover (and 
stock returns). This theory has received a considerable amount of support in the recent 
literature (see Lo and Wang, 2000 and Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam, 2007). In particular, 
Grullon, Kanatas and Weston (2004) have noted that firms that spend more on advertising 
attract a significantly larger number of both individual and institutional investors. They present 
evidence that advertising has a direct effect on the liquidity of its common stock and on a firm’s 
breadth of ownership. A firm’s advertising not only serves to inform potential consumers of its 
products but also serves to increase its visibility among capital market investors. This result is 
consistent with the ‘investor recognition hypothesis’ proposed by Merton (1987).  As he noted, 
a potential investor must at least be aware of a firm before deciding whether to acquire 
additional information about it and deciding whether to buy its stock. Although Grullon et al. 
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(2004) focused on a different aspect of firm’s advertising, they too pointed out that the extent 
of advertising positively affects a firm’s value and attracts broader investors. Based on their 
recent work, which investigated the implication of Merton’s (1987) investor recognition theory 
in the context of the association between stock returns and advertising, Chemmanur and Yan 
(2011) have suggested that the increased degree of investor recognition attracted by advertising 
leads to an increase in stock returns in the contemporaneous advertising year but a decrease in 
stock returns thereafter. Specifically, they have argued that a higher level of advertising growth 
is associated with higher contemporaneous stock returns and lower ex-post long-run stock 
returns. The effect of advertising growth on future stock returns exists even when controlled for 
other price predictors (such as size, book-to-market, and momentum), and product market 
considerations (such as sales and profitability), as well as sample selection concerns. This work 
thus complements our empirical finding of a positive association between stock return and 
advertising, which is discussed in this chapter.  It also supports the empirical evidence that there 
is a negative association between long-run stock returns and advertising, which is presented in 
Chapter 3. Chemmanur and Yan (2011) also examined Merton (1987)’s theory in the context of 
advertising and reported on the positive association between advertising and the number of 
attracted investors3. Since the number of attracted investors and the initial return are related to 
advertising, as Chemmanur and Yan (2011) have pointed out, it was decided to develop the 
testable hypothesis that advertising and initial return is positively related. This is the hypothesis 
that was tested and that is reported in this chapter.  
                                                     
3
 “The increase in advertising expenditures would increase the number of investors who become aware of the 
firm’s stock (in the sense of Merton (1987)), and thus attract more investors to hold the stock.” Chemmanur and 
Yan (2011, p.1). 
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2.3.5 Overview of IPO returns volatilities 
 For decades, academics and practitioners have known about the phenomenon of 
positive first-day returns of IPO firms. The possible reasons for IPO under pricing, as it is 
commonly known, have been debated in the literature since the early 1990s4. IPO underpricing 
is one of the popular areas in event-study finance literature. The phenomenon is observable in 
many stock markets, not only in the matured markets but also in various emerging markets 
around the world (see Ibbotson, 1975; Ritter, 1991; Rock, 1986; Welch, 1992; Aggarwal et al., 
2002; Loughran and Ritter, 1995, 2000; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003; see also, Levis, 1993, 
Espenlaub et al., 2000; Gregory et al., 2010 for the UK studies;  Ritter, 1991; Jog and Riding 
1987; Uhlir, 1989, and Aggarwal et al., 1993 for US,  Canada, German, and Latin America, 
respectively). 
 It can be seen that various contexts of IPO initial returns have been extensively 
investigated in a great level of detail by researchers around the world. Despite this fact, 
however, little is known about the variability of IPO initial returns.  To date, this is still far from 
clear, presumably due to the difficulties of observing the volatilities caused by the IPO event. In 
other words, while the quantity of IPO returns has been extensively researched, the quality 
(variability) of IPO initial returns remains elusive. Although a number of papers have been 
written about the volatility of stock returns, most research in this area has focused upon the 
volatility of return on common stocks rather than short-term volatility triggered by corporate 
                                                     
4
 It is worth noting that research by J. Ritter, during the 1990s, inspired many further studies about IPO around the 
world. However, the 1990s should not be seen as the beginning of research into this area as Ibbotson published his 
paper in 1975, thus his work is one of the oldest contributions to IPO research. 
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decisions (see Harris, 1989 among others).  Only a few researchers seem to have been 
interested in the volatility of initial IPO returns. Recent research conducted by Lowry and 
Schwert (2002, 2004) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) found that the 1998-2000 period 
exhibited an unusual dispersion of IPO returns. However, their work did not focus directly on 
the statistical linkage between specific IPO characteristics and its subsequent initial return 
variability. A more recent paper by Lowry et al. (2010) showed evidence of the relationship 
between the timing of IPOs and its subsequent monthly initial return variability. Their work 
provides a strong foundation for this research and makes a significant contribution to the 
knowledge of IPO returns variability as a whole. 
 Lowry et al. (2010) studied the US IPO return data and found evidence that the monthly 
volatility of IPO initial returns is substantial, fluctuates dramatically over time, and is 
considerably larger during ‘hot’ IPO markets (see Schultz, 2003 for the IPO hot market issues 
and pseudo market timing hypothesis).  Consistent with IPO theory, the volatility of initial 
returns is found to be higher among firms with a value that is difficult to estimate, that is, 
among firms with higher information asymmetry (see Rock, 1986; Beatty and Ritter, 1986, and 
Benveniste and Spindt, 1989 among others for the view of asymmetric information). Based on 
their US market data, they found an average monthly initial return of 22 per cent and a large 
standard deviation of over 55 per cent. Interestingly, although the average returns of their 
sample was 22 per cent, only a relatively small portion of offerings have underpricing that is 
close to this average: only about 5 percent of the initial returns are between 20 per cent and 25 
per cent. Moreover, almost one-third of the initial returns are negative. Thus, this high return 
dispersion yielded a very high standard deviation of 55 per cent. Lowry et al. (2010) also pointed 
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out that both the level and the dispersion of IPO initial returns follow persistent cycles, with 
high average IPO initial returns and high standard deviations within a month occurring at 
roughly the same time. Although, the implication of IPO returns is not new to scholars (Ibbotson 
and Jaffe (1975) and Lowry and Schwert (2002, 2004) have noted this ‘hot issues’ phenomenon 
in term of the number of new issues per month and also in the average initial return per month) 
nevertheless, the strong and similar pattern in the dispersion of initial returns over time is one 
of the contributions of Lowry et al.’s research. While the existence of this dispersion is evident 
and clearly observable, the reason for this uncertainty remains unclear.  This research 
investigated the rationale behind this uncertainty in detail and then looked further into the 
statistical linkage between IPO advertising and IPO return volatilities. 
 If IPO initial return volatility is considered to be the extent of the difficulty of pricing 
IPOs, then one could reasonably expect this volatility to change over time with changes in the 
complexity of the pricing problem.  Consistent with this notion, Lowry et al. (2010) found that 
the volatility of initial returns fluctuates over time. While several earlier works (e.g., Ibbotson, 
Sindelar, and Ritter, 1988, 1994) showed the existence of hot IPO markets characterised by 
extremely high initial returns, Lowry et al. (2010) extended this by suggesting that hot markets 
are also characterised by a very high variability of initial returns as well. There is evidence to 
suggest that the IPO initial return variability is considerably higher when the fraction of difficult-
to-value companies going public is higher. This fluctuation relates not only to the timing of IPO 
but also to some specific characteristics of IPO firms as well. That is, if firms possess many 
characteristics that issuers find difficult to value (for example, small, young, and technology 
firms with high uncertainty in future growth), then greater pricing errors can be expected than 
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for firms that are easy to value.  
 
2.3.6 Information dynamics of IPO advertising and its relationship to IPO returns variability 
 There has been some recent research about advertising in the context of IPO initial 
returns. However, to the best of our knowledge, the relationship between the extent of IPO 
advertising and its subsequent initial return variability has never been investigated. Although 
the underpricing of IPOs has been well explored, this current piece of research contributes 
significantly to the literature by linking advertising with post-IPO return volatility. Some recent 
literature broadly relates to this research.  
 Ritter (1984) suggested that the initial returns volatility would be related to the amount 
of information available about the firm. Ritter (1984) noted that IPO firms that are characterised 
by higher information asymmetry have both greater mean initial returns and a greater 
variability of initial returns. This suggests a relationship between the amount of information 
asymmetry and IPO initial return variability. 
 In a recent work, Lowry et al. (2010) noted that the level of uncertainty surrounding IPO 
firms and, correspondingly, underwriters’ ability to value these firms, varies over time, and that 
information asymmetry about the aggregate demand for stock causes initial return variability to 
be higher. They found that IPO initial return volatility is higher when the portion of difficult-to-
value firms going public is higher. Also they discuss the dynamics of the information content 
around an IPO event: 
 
The pricing of an IPO is a complex process. Although the issuer and its 
investment bank know considerably more about the firm’s own prospects 
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than any single market participant does, market participants as a whole 
know more than the firm about one critical input in the IPO pricing process: 
the aggregate demand for the firm’s shares (see, for example, Rock, 1986). 
Aggregate demand uncertainty is one of the principal problems facing 
issuers and their investment banks when attempting to price an IPO. By 
definition, the initiation of trading resolves this information asymmetry 
between the issuing firm and the market; that is, trading resolves the firm’s 
uncertainty about the market’s aggregate demand. At this point, the 
information of all market participants becomes incorporated into the price. 
Uncertainty about aggregate demand for IPO stocks varies in both the time 
series (it is higher at some points in time than others) and the cross section 
(it is higher for some types of firms than others). (Lowry et al., 2010, p. 426)   
 
 
 Ritter (1984) and Sherman and Titman (2002) noted that information asymmetry should 
also affect the precision of the price-setting process. Specifically, it should be more difficult to 
precisely evaluate the value of a firm that is characterised by high information asymmetry. 
Based on legacy information theories, advertising should reduce the extent of information 
asymmetry between issuers and investors because advertising is a carrier that potentially 
conveys information from issuers to investors. However, it is also plausible that a firm that 
undertakes more advertising can actually be more difficult to value than a firm with lower 
advertising intensity. To understand this possibility, it is crucial to understand the dynamics of 
the information content of IPO advertising.  
 By definition, uninformed investors have heterogeneous beliefs about a firm’s prospects 
(that is, its stock price). These heterogeneous beliefs induce trade, and trade results in an 
observable fluctuation of stock price (that is, return). We conjecture that the IPO advertising 
effect is two-fold. On the one hand, advertising reduces information asymmetries between 
issuers and investors about the firm’s prospects thus, allowing investors to price the firm’s 
equity correctly in equilibrium. This view predicts that the higher level of IPO advertising would 
cause a decrease in the amount of information asymmetries and the subsequent IPO initial 
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return volatility. On the other hand, advertising can increase information asymmetries about the 
aggregate demand between issuers and investors; therefore it could increase volatility of initial 
returns. In short, it is highly plausible that advertising is related to initial return volatility. As 
noted by Lowry et al. (2010, p.426): 
 
... although investment banks and issuers and know a lot more about the firm 
future prospects, investors as a whole know a lot more than the firm about one 
critical input to the IPO pricing process: the aggregate demand for the firm’s 
shares (see Rock 1986). Aggregate demand uncertainty is one of the principal 
problems facing issuers and their investment banks when attempting to price an 
IPO.  
 
 In addition, advertising may also attract more uninformed investors and thus 
simultaneously accumulate more heterogeneous beliefs about the firm’s prospects (see Grullon 
et al. 2004). Although in the long run, investors acquire all information about stock, investors 
need some time during a short period after trading to acquire information about many aspects 
of newly listed firms. For example, past information about the firm stock price does not exist 
prior to the trading date and is very limited during a short period after trading, also, the practice 
of share ‘lock-up’ forbids insiders conveying ‘bad news’ (i.e., sell shares) about a firm’s future 
prospect to investors (see Brav and Gompers (2003) for the negative price correction after the 
lock-up period). In addition, some regulations forbid certain market participants from short-
selling IPO stock during the first 30 days, further preventing them from signalling bad news 
about the company (see Houge et al., 2001). In summary, during a short period after trading, 
not all information is perfectly and equally understood by investors. Advertising may attract 
more of these semi-informed investors, simultaneously accumulating investors’ heterogeneous 
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beliefs proportionally as the number of attracted investors increase (since the price of IPO stock 
in the early regulated market is driven by the highest bidder). Accordingly, advertising intensity 
could relate positively to short-term return volatility followed by lower long-term performance. 
Because, in the long run, all of the information is realised by investors (and some short-term 
constraints are relaxed), the stock price reverts back to its fundamental value. In contrast, if 
advertising is not related to the heterogeneity of beliefs, then there should be no relationship 
between advertising and initial return volatility. Based on this notion, one can rationalise 
advertising as a proxy for heterogeneous beliefs. Thus, it can be hypothesised that advertising 
should relate positively to post-market price fluctuations: this is one of the hypotheses that was 
tested and is reported here. 
To summarise, advertising may play two roles in the financial market: one role is to 
convey information about a firm’s true prospects to uninformed investors; the other is to 
produce more information asymmetry between investors and issuers by means of increasing 
investor’s heterogeneous beliefs. However, it is unclear which of these is dominant in its effect 
in the stock market shortly after IPO. Nevertheless, we can still  investigate the relationship 
between advertising and the initial return volatility (the proxy for an investor’s heterogeneous 
belief) in order to reveal what the dominant effect of advertising is in the market since both 
effects predict entirely different scenarios about the IPO initial return volatility. That is, if higher 
initial return volatility is associated with a higher level of advertising, then advertising is actually 
causing more information asymmetry between investors and issuers by means of accumulating 
investor’s heterogeneous beliefs and accumulating uncertainty in aggregate demand. Thus it is 
more difficult to accurately price IPOs, and advertising attracts the less-informed investor to bid 
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for the stock in the open market. In contrast, if lower initial return volatility is associated with a 
higher level of advertising, then it can be inferred that IPO advertising mainly acts as a carrier 
that conveys information about the firm’s true prospects to uninformed investors. Thus it 
enables investors to price the stock more accurately because they are provided with more 
information. In this scenario, the primary role of advertising is to convey information about the 
firm’s prospects to potential investors, thus reducing the information asymmetry and 
subsequent uncertainty of stock prices. 
 To the best of our knowledge, there is no known literature that directly addresses the 
relationship between the extent of IPO advertising and its subsequent initial return variability. 
This study addresses this in detail and fills this gap in the research. Unlike earlier research by 
Lowry et al. (2010), which concentrated on the relationship between the time clustering 
analysis of IPO event and its subsequent cross-section initial-return variability, this chapter 
primarily focuses on the relationship between the level of a firm’s advertising and its 
subsequent dispersion of after-trading returns. This research contributes further to the 
literature by documenting the systematic linkage between IPO advertising, IPO return volatility 
and its subsequent long-term performance, as well as providing the rationale behind this 
phenomenon.  
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2.3.7 Price stabilisation and its adverse effects on IPO initial return research. 
 Common practice among most IPO events is the association of price stabilisation. Price 
stabilisation is the practice of investment bankers going into the secondary market to support 
the price of newly issued stocks. This practice is one of the most common causes of systematic 
biases in IPO initial return observed. In theory, the initial return should be measured at the 
immediate after market (that is, the first day post IPO), and, ideally, the initial returns should be 
measured free of the price stabilisation bias. In practice, however, most investment banks offer 
the first day price stabilisation as part of their service. This practice positively biases the 
observed initial return. 
 An important role of investment bankers is to provide price support for newly listed 
stocks and prevent the stock price from falling below a target level in the immediate after 
market. This practice results in the somewhat positive biases in initial returns observed in the 
immediate after market. Thus, price stabilisation adversely affects the accuracy of any IPO initial 
return study because it could lead to a positive bias in initial return observable in the market. It 
is also worth noting that the evidence of the effect of price support is easily observable, as there 
are larger than expected portion of IPOs which have first-day return equal to zero per cent. In 
summary, scholars recognise that the IPO price stabilisation positively biases the measurement 
of initial returns (see Hanley, Kumar and Seguin, 1993; Ruud, 1993; and Chowdhry and Nanda, 
1996, among others). 
 There has been much debate within academic research as to the extent and the 
rationale of this practice. For example, is it a means of helping the syndicate sell shares? Or 
perhaps it is a reward to institutional investors, as some previous scholars have suggested 
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(Benveniste, Erdal and Wilhelm, 1998). One common problem with these studies, however, is 
that there is little publicly available data on the stabilisation activities. While the rationale and 
the extent of price stabilisation are still debatable, scholars do acknowledge that this practice 
exists in almost all new equity issues. For example, Ruud (1993) and Hanley et al. (1993) found 
that underwriter price stabilisation activities influenced the trading prices of IPO stocks in the 
days immediately following the offering. Since price stabilisation adversely affects the accuracy 
of the measurement of IPO initial returns, extra care should be taken when defining the ‘initial 
returns’ to be used in any study. Fortunately, the destructiveness of the price stabilisation bias is 
quickly degraded over time. That is, price stabilisation inflicts highest damage to the accuracy of 
initial-return measurement during the first days of trading and the effect dissipates quickly 
afterwards. Specifically, Hanley et al. (1993) have suggested that the effect of price stabilisation 
on stock return decays after the tenth day after IPO. 
 By definition, the initial return should be measured immediately after trading. Most 
researchers who conduct legacy research are aware of the effect of price stabilisation bias but 
continue to use the first-day post-IPO returns read out as a proxy for initial return. However, 
some IPO researchers recently decided to address the price stabilisation bias. For example, 
Lowry et al. (2010) utilised the 21st day return as their measurement of initial return, since 
Hanley et al. (1993) provided some evidence that the price stabilisation effect decays after day 
10. For robustness, this chapter reports return on the first day of trading and cumulative return 
over 14 days post IPO, as an alternative proxy for initial returns. This will be mentioned again 
later in the data and methodology section.  
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2.3.8 Unusual dispersion of returns during the internet bubble period 
 IPO underpricing reached astronomical levels during the period from 1999 to 2000. This 
period was characterised by extremely high initial returns and an unusually large number of 
IPOs issued. The literature has identified and documented strange IPO characteristics that 
occurred during this period. For instance, Loughran and Ritter (2004) observed that the average 
first-day return on IPOs was ‘jumping’ to 65 per cent during 1999-2000 and then reverted to 12 
per cent during 2001-2003. Similar findings were reported by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, (2003):  
in 1999, first-day returns averaged 73 per cent (with a median of 40 per cent) before tapering 
off to 58 per cent (median of 30 percent) in 2000. Internet-related IPOs averaged 89 per cent 
(median of 57 percent) during 1999 and 2000. Following Loughran and Ritter (2004), a lot of 
work was published about this period, which came to be known as the ‘bubble period’ or ‘the 
internet bubble’.   
 The surge of IPO initial returns during the internet bubble caused many researchers to 
seek the reason for this phenomenon. Loughran and Ritter (2004) examined three hypotheses 
for the change in underpricing: 1) the changing risk composition hypothesis, 2) the realignment 
of incentives hypothesis, and 3) a new hypothesis, the changing issuer objective function 
hypothesis, which is comprised of two components - the spinning hypothesis and the analyst 
lust hypothesis. Although Ljungqvist et al. (2003) showed that the regime shift in initial returns 
and other elements of pricing behaviour can be at least partially accounted for by marked 
changes in pre-IPO ownership structure and insider selling behaviour over the period, it is still 
debated among scholars as to the true cause of extremely high initial IPO returns during the 
internet bubble. 
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 Although the true reason behind this phenomenon still remains unknown, it is agreed 
that this period exhibited an unusual high return and unusual return dispersion. These 
observations of stock returns during the bubble period can produce odd results from a study 
into an IPO event. That is, if the internet bubble IPOs were included in the sample of this study, 
it would cause a positively biased initial return as well as unusually high return dispersion 
results. Lowry et al. (2010) noted that, based on their IPO sample, the average IPO return 
omitting the bubble period is only 15 per cent, about two-thirds the size for the complete 
sample (mean initial IPO return of the complete sample is 22 per cent), and the standard 
deviation is also about one-third lower at 34 per cent, compared to 55 per cent derived from 
their complete sample. Both skewness and kurtosis are similarly much lower when omitting the 
internet bubble period. In addition, they also noted that omitting the data from September 
1998 - August 2000 makes the remainder of the 1991-2005 period look very similar to the 
earlier sample periods (that is, 1965-1980, 1981-1990, and 1991-2005) in terms of the mean, 
dispersion, and autocorrelations of both initial return averages and standard deviations. Having 
acknowledged the advantages of, and the rationale for, omitting the IPO sample issued during 
the internet bubble period, the observations observed from this period were omitted in order 
to minimise the ‘outliers’ effect. Throughout this chapter the bubble period is defined as 1999-
2000, following Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2008). 
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2.3.9 First-day performance of IPOs: are IPOs underpriced or overvalued? 
 It is commonly accepted among scholars that IPOs generally underperform in the long 
run. However, voluminous research about positive first-day returns (IPO underpricing) has not 
necessarily provided direct evidence of IPO undervaluation. To illustrate this, Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2004) studied the US IPO offer price by using several price multiples. Contrary to 
asymmetric information theory, they believed that the US IPOs were actually overvalued at the 
offer price relative to valuations based on industry peer price multiples. This overvaluation 
ranged from 14 per cent to 50 per cent depending on the peer matching criteria. Purnanandam 
and Swaminathan (2004) theorised that overvaluation is the result of investors paying too much 
attention to over-optimist analyst growth forecasts rather than to current profitability. This view 
is consistent with the theory of investors’ overconfidence proposed by Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998).  
 Although their overvaluation result is inconsistent with the notion of undervalued/under 
priced IPOs, Purnanandam and Swaminathan acknowledged that underpricing possibly still 
exists if the ‘fair value’ is not equal to the first-day market price but rather derives from some 
notion of the long-run fair value, thus they concluded that ‘IPOs could be both overvalued and 
underpriced at the same time’ (Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004 p. 814). They explained 
that the market may be inefficient in the short run because the issuers and investment banks 
may underprice IPOs relative to the maximum price they could have charged given the observed 
demand at the time of issue. Therefore, they concluded that the underpricing can be real and 
may co-exist with overvaluation. Having acknowledged this contribution by Purnanandam and 
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Swaminathan (2004), the research reported here has produced some evidence that stock price 
may be inflated in the short run due to the effect of IPO advertising. The stock valuation will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3; this chapter focuses primarily on the systematic linkage 
between the extent of advertising in the IPO year and its subsequent IPO initial 
returns/volatility. 
 
2.3.10 Advertising intensity in the IPO year  
The impact of advertising towards its return characteristics immediately after trading 
was studied for this research. The primary focus was the extent of advertising around the IPO 
event. The proxy used for this was the advertising intensity in the IPO year, for two main 
reasons: 1) As pointed out by Chemmanur and Yan 2009a, advertising in the IPO year relates 
more directly to the IPO event compared to the year preceding the IPO, and 2) the actual 
advertising activities, which are reported at fiscal year ended, usually take place before the fiscal 
year end date. That is, investors should already perceive the extent of advertising around an IPO 
event prior to fiscal year end date. Accordingly, the advertising in the IPO year should be more 
relevant to the IPO event.  
 Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) noted that advertising peaked in the IPO year compared to 
non-IPO years around that time. Firms increase their product market advertising in the years 
when they plan to issue new equity (this holds true for both IPO and SEO). Their results were 
robust even when controlled for market considerations and matching firms. In particular, they 
suggested that such increases are related to firms’ decisions to issue IPO, instead of being driven 
by product market considerations. Therefore, advertising in the IPO year should explain the 
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source of stock valuation/dispersion and long-run performance behaviour. 
 In addition, if the trading date is before the fiscal year end date, then the advertising 
figure from the IPO year is more suitable as a proxy for IPO advertising. For example, if an IPO 
started trading on 1 March 1990 and the company’s fiscal year end date was 31 December 1990 
then, since the trading date was before the fiscal year end date, the advertising figure from the 
IPO year (1990) would be used. We used data from Compustat, which identifies the date on 
which a company ends its fiscal year. According to our sample, most IPOs were issued before 
fiscal year end date5. Therefore, the nature of the sample supported the notion that advertising 
expenditure in the IPO year is a better proxy of IPO advertising than advertising in the preceding 
year. Therefore, only the advertising in the IPO year was examined in the long-run return study. 
 Having acknowledged the above advantages, the advertising intensity in the IPO year 
was used as the primary measurement of advertising intensity around an IPO event. Advertising 
in the IPO year produces more reliable inference due to the above reasons (it relates more 
directly to return characteristics; it offers a larger sample and it better reflects the sample). 
Regardless, the preceding year’s advertising continued to be reported alongside advertising in 
the IPO year in the short-term studies, for robustness. It is worth noting here, however, that 
advertising in the IPO year and preceding advertising intensity produced identical results in the 
                                                     
5
 The vast majority of the firms in the sample (86 per cent) issued IPO before the end of their fiscal year (1079 out 
of 1254 IPOs). It is worth noting that the fiscal year end for firms differs but for most it ends on 31 December: the 
fiscal year of 70 per cent of the sample ended on 31 December, followed by 8 per cent in June, and 6 per cent in 
March and September; other minorities combined account for the remaining 10 per cent. 
It is assumed that market participants perceive the advertising activities before the fiscal year end date. For 
example, the expense in advertising activities during an IPO road show would show in the financial statement at 
the fiscal year end date. Therefore, the media bias generated by advertising would already affect market 
participants before the fiscal year end date. For this reason, the advertising in the IPO year is used. 
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study, hence the choice of either proxy did not affect the hypothesis testing.  
 
2.3.11 Underwriter’s promotion and relevant market regulations 
Following Derrien (2005), our analysis is based on a model in which the price of newly 
listed firms depends on the investor sentiment. Derrien show that IPOs can be overpriced and 
still exhibit positive initial return. While we focus on the role of issuer’s advertising in our 
analyses, we are aware of the role of the underwriter in marketing IPOs to investors (promotion 
by underwriter). Cook, Kieschnick and Van Ness (2006) have examined the promotional activity 
by the underwriter.  They also discuss the relationship between the marketing of an IPO, its 
offer price valuation, its initial return, and how different parties (issuers, underwriters, 
institutional investors) benefit from these relationships.  
Cook et al. (2006) have made the observation that: “an investment banker’s ability to 
promote an issue to retail investors should influence the issuer’s decision to use the same 
investment banker in subsequent equity offerings. So investment bankers have an incentive to 
create demand for an IPO by promoting it.”(Cook et al., 2006 p.36) and “issuers remain with 
lead investment bankers when the bankers are effective at generating pre-offer publicity, but 
when they are not, issuers tend to switch to lead investment bankers that can generate more 
pre-offer publicity for their subsequent seasoned equity offerings.” (Cook et al., 2006 p.37). To 
summarise, it can be inferred that the underwriter‘s incentive to promote stock is to attract 
issuers to use their service. The underwriter can achieve this by means of generating pre-offer 
publicity, which ultimately attracts the issuers to use their service and/or remain with them. 
Although we understand the underwriter’s incentive to promote stocks, the true role of 
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promotion as a substitute for (or complement to) advertising is still unclear. Specifically, Cook el 
al. (2006) did not state whether the underwriter’s promotion was a substitute for advertising or 
whether it complemented it. However, given that the issuer’s incentive to advertise an IPO is to 
maximise share prices in the secondary market, while the underwriter’s incentive to promote 
IPO is to secure business deals with the issuers, we believe that the most direct way to study the 
rationality of over-valued stocks is to look at the issuer’s activity (namely, advertising). 
Nevertheless, the work of Cook et al. (2006) is of relevance to this study because both 
advertising and promotion are targeted at market participants. It may be the case that the 
observed link between advertising and initial return are not solely driven by advertising but 
rather by the combined effect of advertising and promotion. Therefore, this possible limitation 
is addressed as a limitation of the study and discussed, as such, in Chapter Five. 
 
 In discussing the role of the issuer in advertising and that of the underwriter in 
promotion, it is worth mentioning the regulations, namely the Blue Sky laws and the Securities 
Act of 1933, which regulate security offerings. The basic purpose of these laws is not to prohibit 
the promotion of securities, but ‘‘to assure the availability of adequate reliable information 
about securities which are offered to the public’’ (Cook et al., 2006, p.38). In brief, the 1933 Act 
is based upon a philosophy of disclosure:  the goal of the law is to require issuers to disclose all 
material information that a reasonable shareholder would require in order to make up his/her 
mind about the potential investment. This legal regime created three phases to securities 
registration: the pre-filing period, the waiting period, and the post-effective period. While 
different rules apply to each of the periods, none of the rules prevents the issuer, or his or her 
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investment banker, from generating publicity about the firm.  Although the form and content of 
publicity are somewhat restricted, firms and investment bankers can promote awareness of a 
firm by communicating with potential investors, including retail investors.   
Gurun and Butler (2012) have noted that positive media bias strongly relates to firm 
equity values. They also identified advertising expenditure as a driver of media bias. Thus, it can 
be hypothesised that advertising and stock prices are related. This is the hypothesis we tested in 
this chapter. Underlying this hypothesis is Gurun and Butler’s notion that advertising and media 
bias are related. Although we did not conduct a test about the association between advertising 
and media bias, Gurun and Butler (2012) have documented that advertising expenditure is 
related to media bias. As noted by Gurun and Butler (2012 p.561) “one reason for this positive 
slant (bias) is the firms’ local media advertising expenditures. Abnormal positive local media 
slant (bias) strongly relates to firm equity values.”  They also made the following observation:  
 
when local media report news about local companies, they use fewer negative 
words compared to the same media reporting about nonlocal companies. We 
document that one reason for this positive slant (bias) is the firms’ local media 
advertising expenditures. Abnormal positive local media slant strongly relates to 
firm equity values. Gurun and Butler (2012 p.561).  
 
As we did not conduct a test to investigate the relationship between advertising and 
media bias, this issued is addressed as a possible limitation of the study and discussed in the 
appropriate section later. 
Tetlock (2007) also reported that media bias and stock prices are indeed related.  Based 
on an analysis of  the affect of the ‘‘Abreast of the Market’’ column in the Wall Street Journal 
(2003), Tetlock found that either the media report investor sentiment before the sentiment is 
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fully incorporated into market prices or the media directly influence investors’ attitudes toward 
securities6. Altogether, these findings are important as they contributed to the formulation of 
our hypothesis.  
 
2.3.12 Dual role of advertising in the financial and product markets 
 
 Any discussion about the dual role of advertising in the financial and product markets 
has to acknowledge the contribution to the field by earlier researchers. Chemmanur and Yan 
(2009a), for example, in their consideration of a firm facing asymmetric information in both the 
product and financial markets that needed to raise external financing to fund a growth 
opportunity observed that “Any product market advertising undertaken by the firm is visible to 
the financial market as well” (p.40). It was thus suggested that advertising can be thought of as 
playing two different roles: 1) advertising in the financial markets and 2) advertising in product 
markets.  
According to Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) the first role played by advertising is to 
convey product quality to the product market, thereby enabling consumers to price the firm’s 
products correctly in equilibrium. This role of advertising is similar to that noted in the literature 
on industrial organisation, which has reported that product market advertising helps to convey 
information about product quality to consumers (Nelson, 1974; Kihlstrom and Riordan,1984; 
                                                     
6
 Tetlock (2007) discussed the relationship between media and stock prices and argued that, “First and foremost, I 
find that high levels of media pessimism robustly predict downward pressure on market prices, followed by a 
reversion to fundamentals. Second, unusually high or low values of media pessimism forecast high market trading 
volume. These findings suggest that measures of media content serve as a proxy for investor sentiment or 
noninformational trading”, Tetlock (2007 p.1140). These findings are consistent with our prediction in this chapter. 
60 
 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1986).  
However, it is the second role of advertising that is of relevance to this investigation, 
namely the generation of media bias, which affects stock market participants and stock prices in 
the short term. It is also useful to consider Chemmanur and Yan (2009a)’s conjecture that the 
role of advertising may serve as a mechanism to convey the true value of a firm’s projects to 
potential stock market investors. If this prediction is correct, we should observe that advertising 
allows investors to price the stock more accurately because of more information provided. 
However, this prediction is inconsistent with our empirical finding that higher levels of 
advertising are associated with higher levels of initial-returns uncertainty. Nevertheless, the 
work of Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) is important as it provides a theoretical foundation for the 
study of advertising and initial returns. Our hypothesis in this chapter builds upon their work, 
which established that the peak level of adverting is attributable to the effect of advertising in 
the financial market rather than to the firm’s demand to advertise in product market. (That is, 
the peak level of advertising is driven by the IPO event itself rather than the firm’s demand to 
promote its products in products market). Specifically, Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) found that 
“firms choose a higher level of product market advertising when they are planning to issue new 
equity, compared with situations in which they have no immediate plans to do so”. (p.40). It was 
found that in the five-year span around the equity issue year(from two years before the equity 
issue to two years after), the peak advertising level is reached in the equity issue year. In 
addition, they also found that IPO firms experience a greater increase in their advertising 
expenditure in the IPO year compared with matching firms (matched by industry, firm size, and 
sales revenue). As they found that IPO firms maximise their advertising in the IPO year (and that 
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this relationship holds true even when controlled for industry, firm size and sales revenue), they 
reached the conclusion that the peaked level of advertising in the IPO year is primarily 
attributable to the effect of advertising in the financial market. In other words, it is unlikely that 
the observed peak level of advertising (after controlling for industry, firm size and sales) in the 
IPO year is caused by the effect of advertising in the product market.  
In this study, advertising intensity as well as industry-adjusted advertising intensity is 
reported, and the variables are carefully constructed in order to control for the effect of product 
market advertising7. Later in the chapter it is shown that the observed results are consistent 
with the view that advertising and initial returns/initial return volatility are related.  Since the 
variables reported in this study are carefully constructed in order to control for the effect of 
advertising in the product market, it is unlikely that the inferences from this chapter are 
significantly biased by the effect of product market advertising. However, the effect of 
advertising on the product market is not entirely ruled out; this is discussed in the section on 
                                                     
7
 We investigated all firms listed in Compustat between 1986 and 2009 and found that, in general, firms in the 
same industry exhibit a similar amount of advertising intensity. For example, firms in the entertainment sector 
spend a lot on product market advertising but invest little to nothing on research and development (R&D). The 
situation is reversed when firms in the technology sector were considered: these invest heavily in their R&D and 
spend little in product market advertising. Some industries, such as Pharmaceuticals, invest heavily in both product 
market advising and R&D.  
Since the incentive to advertise in IPO is not applicable to most samples (most firms in the universe are non-IPO 
firms), we believe that the different level of advertising intensity in each industry is due to the effect of product 
market advertising. That is, the surge in advertising around the IPO event does not apply to these non-IPO firms, 
thus, it can be inferred that the different level of advertising intensity observed for each industry portfolio 
primarily represents the industry’s expected degree of product market advertising. Therefore, the industry-
adjusted advertising intensity, which measures the difference between firm’s advertising intensity around the IPO 
event and the average industry’s advertising intensity, should indicate the degree of advertising attributable to the 
IPO event. In short, the industry-adjusted advertising intensity should capture the effect of advertising in the 
financial market (attributable to IPO event) rather than the effect of advertising in the product market. (Our 
samples are too small to be categorised by industry-year portfolios.) See also Footnote 8 for further information on 
eliminating the effect of product market advertising. 
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the limitations of the study in Chapter Five.   
 
2.3.13 Advertising, voluntary disclosure and sample selection bias. 
 Simpson (2008) has suggested that there are fundamental differences between firms 
that reported their advertising expense before 1994 and firms that reported their advertising 
expense after that date. Before 1994, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required 
industrial and commercial firms to supply information regarding advertising expense. The SEC’s 
Financial Reporting Release No. 44 (FRR44) from 1994 eliminated the requirement to furnish 
this schedule. Since advertising expense was one of the items previously referenced by this 
release, FRR44 effectively made separate disclosure of advertising outlays optional. According to 
Simpson (2008), firms disclosed their advertising expense voluntarily when they earned the 
valuation benefit, and chose not to disclose their advertising when they earned no valuation 
benefit. Since the sample we examined was naturally limited to those firms that reported their 
advertising expenditures, our sample represents a portion of the full IPO sample (1254 out of 
5758 IPOs reported their advertising expenditures). In order to address the concern that the 
sample selection might have affected our results, we ran the Heckman (1979) selection model 
to correct for the sample selection bias. The specification of the selection equation is discussed 
in section 2.4.5.  
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Section II 
2.4 Data and methodology 
2.4.1 Variables construction 
 Earlier research has shown that IPO returns are significantly related to several issue-
specific variables, for example, demand for IPOs, VC-backed dummy, issue size, underwriter 
reputation and the specific market within which the IPO is listed. In order to establish a clear 
relation between advertising around an IPO event and IPO return/return dispersion, it is 
necessary to control for these variables. Accordingly, several control variables were included to 
explain IPO returns. Advertising intensity is the amount of advertising in the IPO year scaled by 
total sales in the relevant year8. Advertising in the preceding year before IPO in short-term 
studies was also reported, for robustness. In this case, advertising intensity was defined as 
advertising in the preceding year scaled by sales in that year. Advertising expenditure and total 
sales were observed from Standard and Poor’s Compustat. 
 Offer price revision was defined as the difference between the offer price and the mid-
point of the original filing, divided by the midpoint of the filing price. The Offer price revision 
was defined as (Offer price–Midprice)/ Midprice. Initial Return was measured as the percentage 
change from offer price to the first-day market closing price (first day closing price). NASDAQ 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was listed in NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise. First-day closing 
                                                     
8
  We followed Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) and constructed advertising intensity in the IPO year as ADVt/Salest, 
the advertising expenditures in year t (ADVt) scaled by the sales revenue in the same year (Salest). In theory, 
another advertising variable could be used, namely ADVt/Salest-1, the advertising expenditure in year t scaled by 
sales revenue in year t-1. However, “The difference between ADVt/Salest and ADVt/Salest-1 is that ADVt/Salest 
(partially) excludes the advertising in the IPO year t related to the product market purposes (e.g., to maintain or 
increase sales revenue Salest) while ADVt/Salest-1 captures the level of advertising in the IPO year t related to both 
the product market and the financial market purposes.” (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009a, p.48).  
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price and stock market were obtained from CRSP daily files. Issue size was the total amount of 
IPO proceeds, measured in millions of dollars. Proceeding amounts are expressed as natural 
logarithms, ln(Proceeds). The Customer-Facing dummy equals 1 if the firm is a customer-facing 
IPO, and 0 otherwise. The detail of firm categorisation can be found in Appendix A. The VC-
backed dummy (VC-backed) equals 1 if the firm was a VC-backed IPO and 0 otherwise. 
Proceeding amounts, VC-backed dummy, and filing range were observed from SDC platinum. 
Underwriter reputation (reputation) was defined as the rank score of Carter and Manaster 
ranking (ranging from 0 to 9). The ranking score allocated to each underwriter followed the 
methodologies of Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998). The 
underwriter prestige rankings are on a 0 to 9 scale, and are based on the pecking order seen in 
‘tombstone’ advertisements. The ranking score was later updated by Jay Ritter, thus, it was 
taken from Jay Ritter’s website9.  
 Early-market excess return volatility was the proxy for firm-specific divergence of 
opinion. Excess return volatility was computed as the difference between the stock return 
volatility and the market return volatility (Equation 1.7). The stock return volatility was defined 
as standard deviation of the first 14, 21 or 28 daily stock returns right after the IPO, excluding 
the initial return. The market return volatility was the proxy for market-wide divergence of 
opinion. It was defined as the standard deviation of the first 14, 21 or 28 daily market returns 
right after the IPO, excluding the initial return. The daily market returns, in this case, was 
computed from the daily return of CRSP value-weighted index. Initial return was defined as the 
percentage change in stock closing price relative to offer price. Both first-day returns and 21-day 
                                                     
9
 Available online at http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. 
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Buy-and-Hold Returns are reported, for robustness (to avoid the potential bias from price 
stabilisation). All stock return and stock market data (NASDAQ dummy) were observed from the 
Centre for Research for Security Prices (CRSP). 
 
 
2.4.2 Financial data sources 
 Table 1.1 presents databases that are relevant to this research. Please note that the 
following list of databases mainly provides US market data, which is used for the purpose of this 
research. Databases for other financial markets may vary. 
 
2.4.3 Sample selection of IPOs 
 The offering data of the IPOs of ordinary common shares were observed as well as the 
book value of equity (after the offer) during the period from January 1986 to December 2009. 
The data source was Thomson Financial Securities Data Company (SDC Platinum) new issues 
database. To ensure that the results were not disproportionately affected by extremely small 
firms, the analyses restricted the sample to firms with an offer price of at least $5. Finally, from 
these samples unit IPOs, closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), and American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) were excluded. In summary, the IPO data collected from SDC 
Platinum had to satisfy at least the three following criteria: 
1. Stock price data must be available on the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database. 
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2. The IPO should issue ordinary common shares and should not be investment trust 
offerings, Close end funds, or ADRs (these financial instruments have different 
characteristics from common stock IPOs). 
3. The IPO should have a value of $5 or more (those with smaller price per share have poor 
market liquidity; earlier research into IPOs  has usually excluded those with a value of 
less than $5) 
 
Of the 7,092 IPOs that satisfied the above criteria, 551 firms that were not covered by 
CRSP (those firms with missing first-day closing price, 14-day closing price or missing firm 
identifier) were excluded.  In addition, 783 IPOs from the ‘internet bubble period’ (January 1999 
to December 2000) were excluded because Ritter and Welch (2002) have noted that standard 
long-run return risk adjustment techniques can produce very odd results for internet bubble 
IPOs. Lowry et al. (2010) also noted that the bubble period exhibited an unusual dispersion of 
IPO returns; therefore, such observations were also excluded from the sample to avoid ‘outlier’ 
effect. Thus, the final sample consisted of 5,758 IPOs between 1986 and 2009. Table 1.2 
presents the final IPO sample.  
 
2.4.4 Unconditional IPO initial return 
 To calculate initial return requires two pieces of information: IPO offer price and first-day 
closing price. As mentioned earlier, IPO initial return base on both first-day return and 14-day 
Buy-and-Hold Return are reported in this research. IPOs prices at the offer were collected from 
SDC Platinum, and IPO stock closing prices at the first day of trading were collected from the 
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CRSP database. If the first-day closing price on any particular trading day was not available from 
CRSP, the average bid/ask for the trading day was used instead. CRSP denote this bid/ask 
average by putting a minus sign in its corresponding price field. However, this negative sign is 
only a symbol for bid/ask average. The actual values of bid/ask are not negative. All IPOs that 
did not have any price information from CRSP were excluded, the IPO first-day return (RIPO) were 
then calculated as: 
  
RIPO = 
offer
offerclose
P
PP 
      Equation 1.1a 
   where Poffer = IPO offer price 
   Pclose = Stock price at closing of the first day of trading 
 
For robustness, 14-day post-IPO cumulative Buy-and-Hold Return (BHR14d)
10 is also 
reported: 
 
  
offer
offerday
d
P
PP
BHR


14
14      Equation1.1b 
  where  P14day = closing price 14 days post-IPO 
   Poffer = IPO offer price 
    
                                                     
10
  In much of the literature, the term Buy-and-Hold Return (BHR) is typically adjusted by the market return. 
However, the term BHR used throughout this chapter is not adjusted by market return, and more closely adheres 
to the term “initial return” commonly used in the literature. In this context, Lowry et al. (2010, p.428) also used the 
term “initial return” to describe the aftermarket price on the 21
st
 day of trading and the offer price.  
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The sample of 6,541 IPOs, which contain observations during the internet bubble period, 
was examined. It was found that the first-day return computed from our complete sample of 
IPO issued during the period January 1986 to December 2009, including the internet bubble, 
was 18.38 per cent on average. The standard deviation of initial return was relatively high at 
41.24 per cent. For robustness, the 14-day Buy-and-Hold Return (BHR) is also reported 
alongside the first-day initial return. The distribution of both initial returns is presented below: 
Figure 1.1: Initial returns distribution (including internet bubble) 
  
 
   
As can be seen, the initial return is skewed positively: a larger portion of initial returns 
lies within the positive range (return > 0 per cent) for both first-day and 14-day Buy-and-Hold 
Returns. Initial return dispersion was found to be relatively high at 41.24 per cent and 47.60 per 
cent for the first-day return and 14-day Buy-and-Hold Return, respectively. The total sample size 
was 6,541 observations, 783 observations larger than the actual sample used throughout the 
chapter because, in this particular case, IPOs issued during the internet bubble were included.  
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Ruud (1993) and Hanley et al. (1993) noted that underwriter price stabilisation activities 
influence the trading prices of IPO stocks in the days immediately following the offering. 
Consistent with their notions, it was found that 13.2 per cent (865 observations) of the IPOs in 
the sample had zero per cent initial return - a far greater portion of the sample than would be 
expected in a random draw. In addition, the negative first-day return observations accounted for 
approximately 13.9 per cent (910 observations) portion of the IPO sample. This portion of 
negative return was significantly smaller than that observed from the sample of 14-day Buy-
and-Hold Returns. 
To increase the probability that the measure of the after-market price was a true 
reflection of market value (and to avoid the adverse effect of price stabilisation), 14-day 
cumulative Buy-and-Hold Returns were employed as a measurement of initial returns. It was 
found that the negative portion of 14-day Buy-and-Hold Returns accounted for 26 per cent 
(1703 observations) of the 14-day cumulative return sample. This figure is about double the 
results from the first-day return (13.9 per cent) previously presented. Consistently, 7.2 per cent 
(472 observations) of the IPOs in the sample had zero percent 14-day Buy-and-Hold Return, 
which was about half of the 13.2 per cent (865 observations) previously calculated based on 
first-day returns. The skewness derived from the distribution of 14-day return was also lower at 
4.96, compared to 5.55 derived from the distribution of first-day returns. Accordingly, using 14-
day BHR return instead of first-day return significantly reduced the portion of IPOs that had a 
zero percent return (proxy for the magnitude of price stabilisation effect). 
In summary, the use of the 14-day BHR instead of first-day returns dramatically reduced 
the effect of price stabilisation, thus increasing the accuracy of measuring the true market value 
70 
 
of stocks. The result, that the price stabilisation effect is diminished by day 10, is consistent with 
earlier research conducted by Ruud (1993), Hanley et al. (1993).  It is worth mentioning here 
that, traditionally, research has favoured the first-day abnormal return over its 14 day BHR 
counterpart. Accordingly, both first-day return and 14-day Buy-and-Hold Return (BHR) are 
reported. It is worth noting that the use of long-period Buy-and-Hold Returns instead of first-day 
is less desirable, as it would accumulate the market returns over the longer period of time. 
According to Hanley et al. (1993), the price stabilisation effect is very pronounced in the market 
during the first ten days, therefore, this research chose 14-days BHR as an alternative to first-day 
returns. This holding period was neither too short to mitigate the effect of price stabilisation nor 
too long for the initial returns study. 
The next investigation used the final sample of 5,758 IPOs, which excluded the 783 
internet bubble observations. Initial returns were calculated in a similar way to that described 
earlier (equation 1.1a): the results are shown below: 
Figure 1.2: Initial returns distribution (excluding internet bubble) 
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As can be seen, the shape of the distribution of the final sample without the internet 
bubble was similar to the distribution of the sample including the internet bubble counterparts. 
The skewness is similar, and the distributions are positively skewed. However, the mean initial 
return is dramatically reduced. Average first-day return is 12.13 per cent, approximately two-
thirds of the mean initial return derived from the IPO sample with the internet bubble 
observations. Return dispersion was also significantly reduced. The standard deviation of first-
day returns was almost halved from 41.24 per cent to 22.95 per cent. The same trend persisted 
for the standard deviation of 14-day Buy-and-Hold Return, which was reduced significantly to 
27.23 per cent compared to 47.6 per cent. To summarise, by excluding observations during 
1999-2000, the average initial return and the standard deviation of initial return are 
dramatically reduced (see Loughran and Ritter 2004). In other words, excluding the internet 
bubble observations increases the quality of the data. Thus, it is clear that the exclusion of IPO 
samples during the internet bubble far outweighs the drawbacks of losing small samples.  
 
2.4.5 Heckman selection model 
 Advertising intensity is observable when firms disclose their advertising figure, and is not 
observable otherwise. Therefore, our advertising sample represents only a subset of the 
universe of IPO firms. To address any concern that the sample selection might have affected our 
results, we ran the Heckman (1979) selection model to correct for the sample selection bias. 
The Heckman selection model consists of a selection equation and a response equation. As can 
be seen in the following section, the determinants on whether a firm reports advertising or not 
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were analysed. This was in order to make the selection of the sample more concrete, so that a 
test could later be conducted to determine whether the sample selection affected our inference 
regarding advertising and stock returns.  
 The dummy variable for the advertising disclosure (Disclosure) was constructed: 
Disclosure equals 1 if the firms disclose their advertising expenditure and 0 otherwise. Following 
Chemmanur and Yan (2011) we estimated the selection equation using a probit regression with 
Disclosure as the dependent variable. In discussing prior knowledge about the possible 
determinants of advertising disclosure, the literature on industrial organisation suggests that 
sales are an important consideration in corporate advertising decisions; therefore, we included 
sales in our analysis. The following variables are the plausible determinants of advertising 
disclosure: sales, firm size, book-to-market ratio, and profitability (defined as the EBITDA scales 
by book value of assets), according to Chemmanur and Yan (2011) (who established these 
determinants by running a probit regression of reporting versus non-reporting firms based on all 
Compustat firms). This led us to include these variables in equation 1.2a. They also noted that 
“the effect of the book-to-market ratio on advertising becomes somewhat less significant (in the 
Heckman selection model)” (p.20). To put this in context, we constructed a probit model in such 
a way as to accommodate these determinants. Following Chemmanur and Yan 2011, we 
calculated Salet as the log value of sales revenue in year t
11. Sizet is the log of market 
capitalization in year t. Prftt is operating income before interest, tax, depreciation, and 
                                                     
11
 Following Chemmanur and Yan (2011) we calculate Salet as the log value of sales revenue in year t. We also 
experimented with pre-IPO year variables (t-1). However, some variable such as pre-IPO market capitalisation 
(Sizet-1) cannot be observed prior to IPO; nevertheless, the results, based on our probit regression, are in line with 
the results reported by Chemmanur and Yan (2011). 
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amortisation (EBITDA) in year t scaled by the book value of assets in year t. BMt is the ratio of 
the book value to the market value of equity. NASDAQ, is a dummy variable, equals 1 if the firms 
are trading in NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. After each variable was constructed, we ran the 
following probit regression: 
 
NASDAQBMSizeSalesPrftDisclosure tttti  54321   
          Equation 1.2a 
   
Table 1.14 reports the regression results. Column 1 reports the results from the whole 
sample. The IPO universe includes all IPOs issued during 1986-2009, regardless of whether or 
not firms report their advertising12. It can be seen from the table that Profitability, Sales and 
NASDAQ dummy are determinants of advertising disclosure. The coefficient of profitability (β1) 
was found to be negative and statistically significant at 5 per cent significance level (p-value 
0.04). This result, which suggests that firms with higher profitability are less likely to report 
advertising to Compustat, is consistent with Chemmanur and Yan (2011). The coefficient of sales 
(β2) and the coefficient of NASDAQ dummy (β5) were also found to be significant. The coefficient 
of sales (β2) was positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 
0.00). The coefficient of NASDAQ dummy (β5) was positive and statistically significant at 1 per 
                                                     
12
 We employed the IPO universe because our analysis involved the study of initial returns. We also experimented 
with the universe of all firms that were in Compustat during the same period (1986-2009: 26,660 firms). However, 
the probit-regression results, based on the universe of all firms in Compustat, are in line with the results from the 
IPO universe studied here. In both cases, the regression results are also in line with those of Chemmanur and Yan 
(2011) that profitability and sales revenue are relevant to firm’s decision to disclose advertising to Compustat and 
that the book-to-market ratio is somewhat less significant in the Heckman selection model. 
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cent significance level (p-value 0.00). These results suggest that firms with higher sales and 
firms in NASDAQ stock market are more likely to disclose their advertising to Compustat. 
Altogether, the results suggest that profitability, sales revenue and NASDAQ dummy are relevant 
to a firm’s decision to disclose advertising to Compustat. Accordingly, we adjusted our probit 
regression to include only the significant variables. Thus, the final probit regression can be 
expressed as: 
 
NASDAQsalesPrftDisclosure tti  321     Equation 1.2b 
 
 We ran regression equation 1.2b again to see if all RHS variables explain the decision to 
disclose advertising. The regression results of equation 1.2b are reported in column 2 of Table 
1.14. Overall, the results in column 2 are in line with the results from column 1: that 
profitability, firm size and NASDAQ dummy are relevant to a firm’s decision to disclose 
advertising to Compustat. Therefore, this probit model was used as the selection equation in 
Heckman’s selection model. 
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Section III 
2.5 Results and analysis 
2.5.1 Advertising intensity and its relationship to IPO initial returns 
 The sample consisted of 5,758 IPOs (January 1986-December 2009), excluding the 
internet bubble period. Excluded from the sample were those firms with missing data on 
advertising expenditure in the IPO year (where advertising expenditure is the cost of 
advertising, media, and promotional expenses from Standard and Poor’s Compustat item #45). 
Thus the final sample consisted of 1,254 IPOs during the period 1986-2009 excluding the 
internet bubble period. For each IPO, the initial return was calculated in a similar way to the 
above equation (equation 1.1a and 1.1b). The distribution of the final sample is illustrated 
below. Again, both 14-day Buy-and-Hold Return and first-day day returns are reported, for 
robustness. 
 
Figure 1.3: Initial return distribution (n=1254) 
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 Consistent with earlier findings, the shape of the above distributions is similar to the 
distributions of the complete sample presented earlier in Figure 1.2. Initial returns were 
positively skewed for both first-day and 14-day cumulative return samples. There were 148 
observations (which accounted for 11.8 per cent of the sample), which had initial returns equal 
to zero percent in the sample of first-day returns. This amount was much larger than would be 
expected in a random draw, and almost double that of the 86 observations (6.85 per cent) 
found in the sample of 14-day Buy-and-Hold Returns. Consistently, the extent of price 
stabilisation in the 14-day Buy-and-Hold Return was also dramatically reduced compared to the 
first-day return counterpart. In summary, the similarity between the distribution of the smaller 
1,243 sample and the distribution of the larger 5,758 sample suggests that no bias was caused 
by the sample selection based on advertising data. 
The amount of advertising intensity that firms invested during their IPO year was 
calculated. This was started by collecting two pieces of income statement items: net Sales 
Revenue (SALE) and the cost of advertising media (that is, radio, television, and periodicals) and 
promotional expenses (Standard and Poor’s Compustat item #45) from Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat database. Then, for each firm, the intensity of advertising (Adi) was calculated by 
dividing the cost of advertising by the sales revenue in its IPO year.  
  
i
i
i
Sales
Adv
Adi        Equation 1.3 
where  Adii = advertising intensity of firm i 
Advi = the advertising expenditures of firm i in the IPO year (in millions) 
 Salesi = net sales revenue of firm i in the IPO year (in millions) 
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The corresponding first-day return and 14-day Buy-and-Hold Return were calculated 
based on the price given in the CRSP database, in the similar way to equation 1.1 described 
above. In order to establish a clean relation between IPO advertising and IPO returns, it was 
necessary to include a group of firm specific factors to account for its explanatory power 
towards initial returns.  Following earlier IPO research, the following variables in the RHS of the 
regression model were included to control for various IPO characteristics: underwriter 
reputation (Carter and Manaster ranking); offer price revision; VC-backed dummy; issue size 
(proceeding amounts), and NASDAQ dummy. Finally, the advertising intensity was included to 
test the hypothesis. There were 43 firms with missing values, thus the final sample consisted of 
1,211 IPOs. (Table 1.3 reports the sample description and Table 1.4 reports Pearson correlation 
matrix. ) 
 After each variable was constructed, the following regression was estimated:  
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          Equation 1.4 
 where 
IRi   = initial return of firm i (either 1
st day return or 14day BHR) 
advertising  = advertising intensity express as advertising/sale (either in the IPO year or in the 
preceding year) 
reputation  = underwriter’s reputation, measured by Carter and Manaster score [0,9] 
price_revision = percentage offer price changed relative to its mid-point of their original filing. 
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VC_backed  = a dummy variable for VC-backed IPO, equal to 1 if IPO is VC-backed IPO and 0 
otherwise 
ln(proceeds)  = proceeding amounts of IPO, expressed as natural logarithm 
NASDAQ = dummy variable for NASDAQ listed IPO, equal to 1 if IPO is listed in NASDAQ, 
and 0 otherwise. 
α   = intercept 
βi   = response coefficient 
  
In order to test for robustness, the results from the first-day returns are reported as well 
as results from one 14-day cumulative Buy-and-Hold Return. Also, as a further check for 
robustness, both advertising in the IPO year and advertising in the preceding year prior to the 
IPO were examined. Please note that 239 IPOs did not report their preceding year’s advertising 
expenditure and were not included in the sample. Thus, the sample size of preceding year 
advertising intensity was reduced from 1211 to 972 observations. Table 1.5 presents the 
regression results. 
It can be seen from Table 1.5a that the intensity of advertising in the IPO year is a strong 
predictor of the initial return level. The coefficient of advertising intensity is found to be positive 
(β1>0) and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level for all models tested. The 
coefficient of offer price revision (β5) was positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent 
significance level (p-value 0.00), suggesting that pre-market demand for stock is a significant 
determinant of initial performance. The coefficient of VC-backed dummy (β3) was found to be 
positive, and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level for both first-day and 14-day-
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BHR models. This result suggests that investors tend to value VC-backed IPOs more highly in the 
early market. While the NASDAQ dummy statistically explained the first-day return at 5 per cent 
significance level, it was unable to predict the 14-day Buy-and-Hold Return. The coefficient of 
issue size (β4) and the coefficient of underwriter’s ranking (β6) were positive but statistically 
insignificant. Both variables exhibited p-value well above 10 per cent. The t-statistics of the 
advertising intensity coefficient calculated from first-day initial return observations was 4.39 (p-
value 0.00). The consistency of the result is evident in the sample of 14-day cumulative Buy-and-
Hold Return observations, in which case it can be can inferred, with 99 per cent confidence, that 
advertising intensity relates positively to initial return (p-value 0.01). In either case, the 
coefficients of advertising intensity were positive and statistically significant. That is, on average, 
a firm can increase its initial return by increasing the level of advertising in the IPO year. The 
coefficient of advertising intensity was found to be 0.14 and 0.10 for the first-day and 14-day 
BHR observation, respectively. An increase in advertising intensity by 1 per cent of sales revenue 
will result in an increase of initial return by 14 per cent and an increase of 14-day Buy-and-Hold 
Return by 10 per cent. In other words, investors, on average, give a first-day valuation premium 
of 14 per cent if the firm increases its advertising intensity in the IPO year by 1 per cent of total 
sales. It is clearly evident that the extent of IPO underpricing is much more pronounced for 
those firms which spend more on their advertising expenditure in the IPO year.  
 
The figures in Table 1.5b show that it made no difference whether the advertising 
intensity in the IPO year was examined or that of the preceding year –  both approaches yielded 
the same inference that advertising intensity causes the initial return to be higher. Overall, the 
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results from advertising in the preceding year exhibited a similar trend to the results from the 
advertising intensity in the IPO year. Both approaches yielded the same inference that initial 
return and advertising intensity are positively related. 
To address the concern that the high correlation between variables in Table 1.5a might 
bias the results, we ran regression equation 1.4 again with ln(proceeds) excluded.  Table 1.4 
showed that ln(proceeds) exhibited high correlation with NASDAQ (r=-0.49) and reputation 
(r=0.59). Both correlations were statistically significant (t-stat -19.65 and 25.36, respectively). 
Thus, we ran regression equation 1.4 again, with ln (proceed) excluded, to see if the results were 
biased by these correlations. The results are reported in Table 1.5a.1. Overall, the results 
confirm our initial observation that the coefficient of advertising intensity is positive and 
statistically significant. The t-statistics of the advertising intensity coefficient calculated from 
first-day initial return observations was 4.42 (p-value 0.00). The consistency of the result is 
evident in the sample of 14-day cumulative Buy-and-Hold Return observations, in which case it 
can be can inferred, with 99 per cent confidence, that advertising intensity relates positively to 
initial return (p-value 0.01). In either case, the coefficients of advertising intensity were positive 
and statistically significant. These results confirm our inferences from Table 1.5a. Thus, we can 
infer that the inferences from Table 1.5a are unlikely to be biased by correlations between RHS 
variables.    
 
Although the results clearly showed that higher advertising intensity causes the IPO 
initial returns to be higher, the reason or reasons behind these phenomena still remained 
unclear. Although the positive relationship between advertising and initial returns suggests 
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potential consistency with the hypothesis that advertising can cause price inflation, it is also 
possible that investors might be rational and raise their price by taking into account ‘brand 
equity’ value suggested by advertising. Therefore, to investigate the rationale of this 
relationship, further evidence was needed from the study of stock valuation. There were two 
possibilities: (a) the behavioural explanation, that the media bias resulting from advertising 
around the IPO event causes stock price inflation, or (b) investors are rational and take into 
account the value of ‘brand equity’ to stock pricing and hence increase the stock price. One way 
to distinguish between the two scenarios was to directly value stocks in the early days after IPO. 
If the positive initial return is driven primarily by advertising-generated investor sentiment, then 
a positive relationship between overvaluation and advertising can be expected. If, on the other 
hand, investors behave rationally and incorporate brand equity into stock price then there will 
be no relationship between stock overvaluation and advertising. The stock valuation and its 
relevant hypothesis will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
 
2.5.2 The relationship between advertising intensity and short-term IPO return variability 
 Some of the literature has indicated that initial return dispersion is an ex post 
measurement for investors’ divergence of opinion. If the hypothesis was correct then one 
should expect a positive relationship between advertising and initial return variability. To test 
for the above notion, the advertising intensity in the IPO year was examined, and – in order to 
test for robustness – advertising in a year preceding IPO13.  
                                                     
13
 Some portion of advertising activities in the IPO year occur before the IPO event, and advertising intensity in the IPO year 
better reflects its economic relationship to an IPO event (see Chemmanur et al., 2009). However, some strict scholars may 
argue against such use in a short-run study, thus both data sets are reported here to ensure robustness. 
82 
 
In this section, the further investigation into the effect of advertising intensity on IPO 
short-term return variability is reported. Starting with the final sample of 1,254 IPO, previously 
described above in the IPO advertising data section, daily prices for the first 28-calendar-day 
post-IPO were collected from CRSP for each firm. For each firm in the sample, daily stock returns 
were calculated, in the same way as in equation 1.1.  
It is inappropriate to study initial return dispersion during a very short period post IPO 
(that is, a period of seven days post IPO or shorter). This is because there are two limiting 
factors preventing good results from such a study, namely the effect of price stabilisation and 
the small number of observations. Both factors adversely affect the accuracy of return 
dispersion measurements. However, the adverse effects quickly dissipate over time (the extent 
of price stabilisation is dramatically reduced after the tenth day after IPO, and number of 
observations is increased proportionately with time; see Hanley et al. (1993) for the effect of 
price stabilisation). Hence, to minimise the adverse effect of both limiting factors, stock returns 
volatility over 14-day post IPO were used. This period allowed for both effects to be minimised 
while retaining the ‘initial’ property. For robustness, return volatility over 21 days and 28 days 
post-IPO are also reported. Short-term return volatility was computed as the standard deviation 
of the first 14, 21, or 28 daily returns right after IPO, excluding the initial return. Finally, as a test 
for robustness,  preceding year advertising intensity results are reported, as well as results from 
advertising in the IPO year. The two data sets exhibited very similar results, and thus did not 
affect the hypothesis testing. 
The return dispersion (sample standard deviation) of each firm over the 14-day period was 
calculated as: 
83 
 
  
1
)(
1
2





N
Rr
S
N
i
iit
i       Equation 1.5 
 
 where Si = sample standard deviation of firm i’s daily return over 14 days post 
IPO excluding the initial return. 
  N = sample size (different for each firm, ranging by trading day available) 
Ri = mean return of firm i over the first 14 day post IPO, excluding the initial 
return. 
  rit = firm i’s stock return at time t 
  t = number of days post IPO (0 to 14) 
 
Finally, the following regression was estimated:  
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         Equation 1.6 
 where  
Si  = standard deviation of firm i initial return dispersion over a short period 
following IPO (14, 21 or 28 day post IPO period) 
advertising  = advertising intensity expressed as advertising/sale (either in the IPO year or in 
the preceding year) 
reputation  = underwriter’s reputation, measured by Carter and Manaster score (0,9) 
84 
 
price revision = percentage offer price changed relative to its mid-point of their original filing. 
VC_backed = a dummy variable for VC-backed IPO, equal to 1 if IPO is VC-backed IPO and 0 
otherwise 
ln(proceeds)  = proceeding amounts of IPO, express as natural logarithm 
NASDAQ = dummy variable for NASDAQ listed IPO, equal to 1 if IPO is listed in NASDAQ, 
and 0 otherwise. 
α   = intercept 
βi   = response coefficient 
 
Regression results are presented in Table 1.6. 
 
As shown in Table 1.6a, the extent of a firm’s advertising in the IPO year is a significant 
predictor of the variability of initial returns. The coefficient of advertising intensity (β1) was 
found to be positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level and robust across 
all three models tested. The t-statistics of β1 was found to be 3.44, 3.02 and 3.14 for the (0,14), 
(0,21) and (0,28) window, respectively. All three p-values were well below 1 per cent. Thus the 
null hypothesis, that there is no relationship between advertising intensity and initial return 
volatility, was rejected and the alternative hypothesis, that advertising causes higher initial 
returns volatility, was accepted. The results were uniform across all three samples and 
continued to hold, even when controlled for popular control variables employed by prior IPO 
research. The positive relationship between advertising intensity and initial return variability is 
one of the important contributions of this piece of research. Similar to results based on 
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advertising in the IPO year, advertising intensity in the preceding year exhibited a similar 
relationship to initial return volatility. Despite its smaller sample size, all t-stat for preceding 
advertising were statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level and robust across all 
three studied periods. Thus it can be inferred that the use of advertising intensity measures, 
either in the IPO year or the preceding year, did not affect the hypothesis testing. 
It can be seen from Table 1.6a that all other RHS variables, except for proceeding 
amounts, were significant predictors of initial return variability. Offer price revision exhibited a 
positive relationship with initial return dispersion. The price revision coefficient (β5) was found 
to be positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level. Again, the result was 
uniform and robust across all three models tested (p-value 0.00 for all model). The coefficient of 
VC-backed dummy (β3) and the coefficient of NASDAQ dummy (β2) were positive and 
statistically significant. In contrast, proceeding amounts was generally an insignificant 
determinant of initial return volatility, presumably because it is highly correlated with 
underwriter’s reputation (r=0.59). However, it exhibit a significant relationship to the (0,28) 
return volatility, thus the proceeding amounts was included in the regression model. Finally, 
underwriter reputation is a negative determinant of initial return dispersion. The coefficient of 
underwriters’ reputation was found to be negative and statistically significant at 1 per cent, 5 
per cent and 10 per cent for the (0,14), (0,21) and (0,28) return dispersion windows, 
respectively. These results are consistent with the notion that initial return variability should 
vary with the underwriters’ ability to accurately price IPO, as proposed by Lowry et al. (2010). 
This finding is economically meaningful as well-known and experienced underwriters may have 
the ability to price IPOs more accurately.  
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Based on the sample of 1,211 observations, it can be inferred, with 99 per cent 
confidence, that the firm’s level of advertising positively affects 14-day return volatility (p-value 
0.00). The coefficient of advertising intensity (β1) was positive, statistically significant and robust 
across various time windows post-IPO. The results suggest that there is a positive relationship 
between advertising intensity and level of IPO initial return volatility (proxy of ex post 
heterogeneous beliefs). The results support the notion that advertising activities relate 
positively to the post-market investors sentiment. In contrast, if investors price IPO rationally, it 
is unclear why advertising should increase ex post heterogeneous beliefs among investors. 
However, it could have been argued that market volatility might adversely affect the hypothesis 
testing. Therefore, in order to test for robustness, the relationship between advertising intensity 
and market-adjusted initial return volatility was further investigated. This is discussed in detail 
below. 
 
2.5.3 Advertising and short-term excess volatilities 
 In the previous section, evidence of the impact of advertising in the IPO year on initial 
return volatility was presented. However, it was recognised that the initial return volatility might 
follow a specific pattern over time, that is, initial return volatility might be time-clustered and 
market volatility might bias the results. Specifically, Lowry et al. (2010) have observed that initial 
return variability is higher during a ‘hot market’ period. Several IPO scholars recognise early-
market return volatility as a proxy for ex post measurement of market-wide divergence of 
opinion. However, the hypothesis suggested that advertising intensity and stock volatility are 
related which is specific to each firm rather than being a market-wide condition.  Therefore, to 
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control for market volatility, the previous equation using market-adjusted volatility was 
regressed instead of stock volatility level. Accordingly, excess return volatility was computed as 
the difference between the initial return volatility of an IPO over a short period post IPO and the 
return volatility of the CRSP value-weighted index over the same period. All stock returns and 
market returns were observed from CRSP. The standard deviation of stock returns and market 
returns were calculated in a similar way to that of equation 1.5, previously described. Excess 
volatility ( iS ) was computed as: 
iii SSS                                                                           Equation 1.7  
where  
iS  = initial return volatility of firm i (14, 21 or 28 days after trading day) 
S = standard deviation of the return on CRSP value-weighted index over the same period.  
 
After market-adjusted volatility is constructed, the following regression was estimated, 
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Equation 1.8 
where  
iS   = excess volatility of firm i over a short period following IPO (14, 21 or 28 day 
post IPO period) 
advertising  = advertising intensity express as advertising/sale (either in the IPO year or in the 
preceding year) 
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reputation  = underwriter’s reputation, measured by Carter and Manaster score (0,9) 
price revision = percentage offer price changed relative to its mid-point of their original filing. 
VC-backed   = a dummy variable for VC-backed IPO, equal to 1 if IPO is VC-backed IPO and 0 
otherwise 
ln(proceeds)  = proceeding amounts of IPO, express as natural logarithm 
NASDAQ = dummy variable for NASDAQ listed IPO, equal to 1 if IPO is listed in NASDAQ, 
and 0 otherwise. 
α   = intercept 
βi   = response coefficient 
 
Table 1.7 reports regression results. 
 
Consistent with the results presented earlier, the level of firms’ advertising in the IPO 
year was found to be a significant predictor of the variability of initial return. The coefficient of 
advertising intensity (β1) was positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level 
for all models tested. The t-statistics associated with advertising intensity coefficient were found 
to be 3.48, 3.10 and 3.24 for the (0,14), (0,21) and (0,28) windows, respectively. All relevant p-
values were well below 1 per cent, for all holding periods tested. Thus, the null hypothesis, that 
there is no relationship between advertising intensity and market-adjusted volatility, was 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis, that advertising intensity causes the market-adjusted 
initial return volatility to be higher, was accepted. Finally, despite a lower sample size, 
advertising intensity in the preceding year yielded consistent results. In summary, the results 
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from Table 1.7 are consistent with the previous results. Both initial return volatility and market-
adjusted volatility yielded consistent results. The results support the hypothesis that advertising 
intensity in the IPO year causes post-market initial return volatility to be high.  
Price revision exhibited a positive relationship with market-adjusted initial return 
dispersion. The coefficients of price revision (β5) were positive and statistically significant at 1 
per cent significance level for all three periods studied (p-value 0.00). This suggests that pre-
market demand for stock is a predictor of the stock’s post-market initial return dispersion. That 
is, return volatility is higher among firms that are in high demand than among those in less 
demand. The NASDAQ dummy is also a predictor of initial return variability. The coefficients of 
NASDAQ dummy were positive (β2>0) and statistically significant (maximum p-value 0.07). Since 
most firms listed in NASDAQ are small and technology-based, this suggests that investors find 
such firms more difficult to value. 
As can be seen from Table 1.7a, the coefficient of VC-backed dummies was positive and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level for all periods tested. This result suggests 
that VC-backed IPOs, on average, exhibit higher market-adjusted initial return volatility. The 
proceeding amounts (issue size) exhibited a weaker relationship with initial return volatility. The 
variable exhibited a negative relationship with the market-adjusted return dispersion over (0,21) 
and (0,28) period post IPO, presumably due to investors knowing more about larger stock issues 
than about minor ones. Finally, underwriter reputation is a significant determinant of market-
adjusted initial return dispersion. The coefficients of an underwriter’s reputation (β6) were 
negative and statistically significant at 1 per cent (p-value 0.00), 2 per cent (p-value 0.02) and 5 
per cent (p-value 0.04) for the (0,14), (0,21) and (0,28) return dispersion windows, respectively. 
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This finding was economically meaningful as well-regarded underwriters might have greater 
ability to price IPOs more accurately than others, and hence reduce the post-market return 
volatility. 
Consistent with the previous study, it could be inferred with 99.9 per cent confidence (p-
value 0.001) that the firm’s level of advertising causes 14-day market-adjusted return volatility 
to be higher. The coefficient of advertising intensity (β1) was positive, statistically significant, and 
robust across all holding periods studied. The results further strengthened the potential 
consistency with the hypothesis that advertising is positively related to heterogeneous beliefs. 
The results (from the study of initial return and initial return dispersion) were logical if 
advertising activities represent investors’ sentiments. In contrast, if investors price IPO rationally, 
it is unclear why advertising would increase ex post heterogeneous beliefs (initial return 
volatility) among investors. To some extent, the findings somewhat complemented the assertion 
of Lowry et al. (2010, p.426) that, ‘there is a strong positive correlation between the mean and 
the volatility of initial returns’. The relationship between advertising intensity and the long-term 
performance was also further investigated; this is discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
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2.5.4 Industry-adjusted advertising intensity 
 So far, evidence has been presented that advertising in the IPO year is a determinant of 
initial return, initial return dispersion and market-adjusted return dispersion. Earlier results 
indicated that advertising in the IPO year is positively related to initial return and initial return 
dispersion. The results continued to hold even when controlled for variables previously 
identified by IPO researchers (such as issue size, underwriters’ reputation, dummy for specific 
stock market, dummy for VC-backed IPO and offer price revision). However, to address the 
concern that some industries might naturally exhibit stronger advertising intensity than others 
(presumably due to its operating environment, the nature of the firm’s business and the effect 
of advertising in product market), the advertising intensity measure based on industry peers 
was normalised and the relationship with initial returns and initial return dispersion was further 
investigated.  
The universe for industry portfolio was constructed from all trading firms that had their 
advertising expenditure for the period of 1986-2009 available on the Compustat annual 
database. A firm’s industry was identified using the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 
and the code was used as a basis to assign each IPO into different industry portfolios. The 
industry portfolios were constructed following French’s 49 industry classification observable 
from French’s website14. This process identified 49 industry classes; the detail about the 
industry classification is shown in Appendix B.  
After the industry portfolios were constructed, the industry’s average advertising 
intensity was defined as the average advertising intensity of all firms in each portfolio. That is, 
                                                     
14
 Available online at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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for each portfolio, the following equation was computed: 
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      Equation 1.9 
  where Adi = advertising intensity 
  N    = number of observations in the industry portfolio. 
 
 Once the industry average advertising intensity was computed, this data set was merged 
with the IPO sample that contained advertising intensity in the IPO year (1254 IPOs sample). 
Due to its smaller size, the sample could be classified to 45 industry portfolios. Four 
observations were lost during this industry-matching process:  the sample size of the merged 
advertising intensity data set was thus four observations smaller (that is, the sample size of 
initial return study decreased from 1211 to 1207, after all missing values of other control 
variables were accounted for). For each IPO in the data set, industry-adjusted advertising 
intensity in the IPO year was measured by the percentage change in its intensity compared to 
the industry average (which is computed from equation 1.9). Note that industry-adjusted 
advertising intensity can now take a minus value.  
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 Finally, once the industry-adjusted advertising intensity was computed, its relationship 
to initial returns and initial return dispersion was further investigated: this was to ensure that 
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the earlier study was not biased by an industry-wide condition (to test if the research was 
sensitive to industry clustering of advertising intensity). If the research results were robust, one 
would have expected that advertising intensity and industry-adjusted advertising intensity 
should produce the same inferences. In contrast, if the link between advertising intensity is 
statistically significant and the industry-adjusted value suggests otherwise, then it is plausible 
that the results were driven by the industry-wide condition rather than by a specific firm’s 
characteristics such as advertising. 
 
2.5.5 Industry-adjusted advertising intensity and its relationship to IPO initial returns 
This section reports on the investigation into the relationship between initial returns and 
industry-adjusted advertising intensity. In this study, the industry-adjusted advertising intensity 
was used instead of the advertising intensity, to provide robustness. The industry-adjusted 
advertising intensity and a host of explanatory variables were regressed against the initial 
returns. The regression model was similar to equation 1.4. Specifically, controls were used for 
quality-related factor (VC-backed dummy), specific stock market (NASDAQ dummy), underwriter 
reputation (Carter Manaster ranking), issue size (proceeding amounts) and pre-IPO demand for 
stock (price revision). The measure of initial return was also sensitised to mitigate the effect of 
price stabilisation. Specifically, the results were reported from either first day returns or 14-days 
Buy-and-Hold Returns, for robustness. Table 1.8 reports the regression results. 
It can be seen from Table 1.8 that industry-adjusted advertising intensity in the IPO year 
was a significant predictor of the initial returns (as well as 14-days BHR). Consistent with the 
earlier findings based on advertising intensity (shown in Table 1.5), all advertising measures 
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(whether advertising intensity or industry-adjusted advertising intensity) related positively to 
initial returns. The same trend persisted:  the systematic link between advertising intensity and 
initial return was found to be positive and statistically significant. The coefficient of advertising 
intensity (β1) was statistically significant at 1 per cent and 10 per cent for the initial return and 
14-day BHR study, respectively. Thus, the null hypothesis, that industry-adjusted advertising 
intensity does not relate to initial return, was rejected and the alternative hypothesis, that 
industry-adjusted advertising intensity causes higher initial returns, was accepted. The inference 
from advertising intensity and its industry-adjusted counterpart revealed identical results and it 
was inferred that the earlier results (as shown in Table 1.5) were not biased by industry 
clustering.  
Other explanatory variables showed a similar relationship with initial returns, compared 
to results shown in Table 1.5. Proxy for pre-market stock demand (price revision) continues to 
be a strong determinant of initial returns. The VC-backed dummy, as well as the NASDAQ 
dummy, exhibited a positive relationship with initial returns. The coefficient of issue size (β4) 
and the coefficient of underwriter reputation (β6) were positive but statistically insignificant. In 
short, the model, based on advertising intensity or industry-adjusted advertising intensity, 
revealed identical results. This suggests that the two measures can be used interchangeably.  
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2.5.6 Industry-adjusted advertising intensity and its relationship to initial returns volatilities 
The relationship between industry-adjusted advertising intensity and initial return 
volatilities was further investigated. It was illustrated in the previous section that both 
advertising intensity models and industry-adjusted advertising intensity models yielded identical 
inference and that the two measures can be used interchangeably. Accordingly, similar results 
were expected from the initial return volatilities study. The initial return volatilities were 
regressed against the industry-adjusted advertising intensity and a group of control variables 
(the methodology is described earlier in equations 1.5, 1.7 and 1.8). Specifically, equation 1.5 
was used to compute the dispersion of initial return. Equation 1.7 was used to compute the 
market-adjusted advertising intensity. The regression model used was similar to equation 1.8. 
For robustness, the initial return volatility was computed over three holding periods (0,14), 
(0,21) and (0,28). Table 1.9 reports the regression results.  
Table 1.9 shows that the coefficient of industry-adjusted advertising intensity (β1) was 
found to be positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 0.01) for 
all three periods studied.  The result confirmed that the inference - that advertising causes initial 
return volatility to be higher - was robust. In general, Table 1.9 presents similar results to the 
results from the advertising intensity model (Table 1.6). The coefficients of both the measure of 
advertising intensity and the industry-adjusted counterpart were positive and statistically 
significant at 1 per cent significance level for all periods studied. This consistency suggests 
strongly that the hypothesis testing based on advertising intensity measure was not biased by 
industry clustering. Other control variables, such as NASDAQ dummy, VC-backed dummy and 
offer price revision exhibited positive relationships with initial return variability. The coefficient 
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of NASDAQ dummy (β2), the coefficient of VC-backed dummy (β3), and the coefficient of offer-
price revision (β5) were positive and statistically significant at 2 per cent, 1 per cent and 1 per 
cent significance level, respectively (p-value 0.02, 0.00 and 0.00). In contrast, the coefficient of 
underwriters’ reputation (β6) showed a negative relationship with initial return volatility. These 
results suggest potential consistency with the notion that well-regarded underwriters might 
have greater ability to price IPOs more accurately than others, and hence reduce the post-
market return volatility. 
Table 1.10 shows the relationship between market-adjusted initial return volatility and 
industry-adjusted advertising. The coefficients of industry-adjusted advertising intensity (β1) 
were found to be positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 
0.00) for all periods tested. Thus the null hypothesis, that there is no relationship between 
industry-adjusted advertising and initial return volatility, was rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis, that advertising around an IPO event causes initial return volatility to be higher, was 
accepted. The coefficients of other control variables such as NASDAQ dummy, VC-backed 
dummy and offer price revision exhibited a positive relationship with initial return variability. 
This suggests that specific IPO characteristics (small and young IPOs, technology-based IPOs, VC-
backed IPOs or highly demanded IPOs) relate positively to initial return volatility. In contrast, 
underwriters’ reputation showed a negative relationship with initial return volatility, 
presumably because well-regarded underwriters may have the ability to price IPOs more 
accurately than others. Overall, the results were consistent with the prior inferences observable 
in Tables 1.7  
Based on the results shown in Tables 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10, the argument that the hypothesis 
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testing based on advertising intensity measure would capture industry characteristics (industry-
average advertising intensity) rather than firm-specific factors (advertising around an IPO event) 
was rejected. The behaviour of IPO initial returns, initial return volatility and market-adjusted 
initial return volatility were investigated using the industry-adjusted advertising intensity. 
Consistent with prior results, a positive and significant relationship between IPO advertising and 
initial return, and IPO advertising and initial return dispersion continued to be observed. The 
uniform consistency suggests that the earlier results based on advertising intensity were robust 
and that advertising intensity and industry-adjusted advertising intensity can be used 
interchangeably. The results (Tables 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10) support the notion that the hypothesis 
testing about the advertising intensity was not biased by industry clustering. 
 
2.5.7 Differences between customer-facing firms and non-customer-facing firms 
So far, the evidence suggests that the intensity of advertising in the IPO year inflates the 
post-IPO stock price. The cross-sectional variations of initial returns as well as the cross-
sectional variation of initial return dispersion can be explained by the extent of advertising 
intensity in the IPO year. Regardless of how the intensity of advertising was measured, the 
results remained robust and significant; that is, no matter whether the simple advertising 
intensity or industry-adjusted advertising intensity was employed the results were still 
consistent and significant. These results suggested potential consistency with the notion that 
advertising, in the IPO context, attracts investors to buy stock at a higher price and hence drives 
the stock price up.  
Most research into advertising intensity is based upon samples of non-issuing firms 
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rather than on IPOs. Common among such studies is the conclusion that advertising increases 
customers’ recognition of a firm, and thus maximises future sales. Sales growth is usually used 
as a proxy to measure customer awareness. In comparison, this research focused on IPOs rather 
than on non-issuing firms, and the results were broadly consistent with the notion that 
advertising relates directly to market participants’ awareness of a firm. The peaked level of 
advertising in the IPO year seemed to suggest that IPO firms focus advertising primarily towards 
market participants. In this context, there is evidence to suggest that firms (both IPOs and non-
issuing firms) advertise in order to attract the attention of financial analysts (Barth, Kasznik and 
McNichols, 2001). Also, research conducted by Grullon et al. (2004) suggests that advertising 
positively affects stock visibility and liquidity. While  the results  from studies of non-issuing 
firms have indicated that firms advertise more in order to gain more attention among 
customers, the incentive for IPO firms to increase (or decrease) its advertising activities is 
fundamentally different. There is a strong need for IPO firms to gain attention among investors 
in order to maximise their share value in the secondary market. In contrast, non-issuing firms 
have incentives to increase customer’s awareness and sales growth, and it is this that drives 
their advertising intensity.  
IPOs can be categorised into two business groups: a) firms that engage in a business that 
involves direct transaction with its front-end customers and relies heavily on advertising to 
promote its products, and b) firms that engage in a business that does not involve direct 
transaction with retail customers. Some may argue that customer-facing IPOs have stronger 
incentives (relative to non-customer-facing IPOs) to focus their advertising towards their 
potential customers rather than towards their market participants. In contrast, non-customer-
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facing firms may have weaker incentives to focus their advertising towards their customers.  It is 
therefore plausible that the systematic linkage between advertising and initial returns may 
differ between the two groups of firms. 
However, since we hypothesised that IPO firms advertise more in the IPO year in order 
to maximise their share price in the secondary market, we predicted that the average level of 
advertising intensity between the two subgroups would be equal. This is because the primary 
force that drives the peak level of advertising intensity in the IPO year in both subgroups is the 
same, namely the maximisation of share value. Therefore, there should be no significant 
difference in the magnitude of the average level of advertising intensity between the two sub-
samples. Accordingly the following hypothesis was stated: 
H0: the average degree of advertising intensity is equal in both sub-samples.  
Ha: The average degree of advertising intensity is not equal in both sub-samples. 
The research question here was thus whether the average level of advertising intensity 
was equal for both types of firms. To investigate this, the two sub-samples were defined for 
analysis. The details of customer-facing portfolio formation can be found in Appendix A. The 
sample was comprised of 1254 IPOs. However, as four observations were unable to be matched 
with any known industry defined in Fama French 49 industry classification, the total number of 
observations was 1250, of which 805 were assigned to a customer-facing IPO portfolio, and 445 
IPOs were assigned to a non-customer-facing IPOs portfolio. 
A two-sample t-test was performed to see if there was any difference in the average 
level of advertising intensity in the IPO year between the two portfolios. The analysis was 
sensitised by including both measures of advertising intensity, that is, both advertising intensity 
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and industry-adjusted advertising intensity were included in the analysis. For robustness, the t-
test was performed under two scenarios: one assumed equal variance while the other assumed 
unequal variance between the two samples (Welch, 1947). It should be noted here, however, 
that there is no prior theoretical reason why the two samples should contain different variance. 
Table 1.11 reports the test results. 
It can be seen from Table 1.11 that the average degree of advertising intensity around an 
IPO event did not differ significantly between the two sub-samples. The t-stat was found to be 
less than its critical value, thus the null hypothesis, that the mean difference of the advertising 
intensity between the two subsamples was zero (that is, the average degree of advertising 
intensity was the same for both sub-groups), was accepted: both sub samples (customer-facing 
and non-customer-facing firms) exhibited the same level of advertising intensity around an IPO 
event. The result was consistent whether the average level of simple advertising intensity or of 
the industry-adjusted advertising intensity was measured.  These results seem to suggest that it 
did not matter if the IPOs were customer-facing firms or non-customer-facing firms, both sub-
samples exhibited about the same level of advertising around the IPO event.  
 The next question that arose from the formation of the two subsamples was whether 
the systematic linkage between advertising intensity and initial return were statistically 
significant for these two subsamples. Our hypothesis stated that the primary force that drives 
the peak level of advertising in the IPO year is the incentive to maximise share price, and that 
the incentive is the same for both subsamples. Therefore, we predicted that the systemic 
linkage between advertising intensity and initial return/returns volatility would be positive and 
statistically significant for both subsamples. Table 1.12 and Table 1.13 report the regression 
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results consistent with this prediction. Table 1.12a shows that the positive relationship between 
advertising intensity and initial return was positive and statistically significant from the portfolio 
of customer-facing IPOs (portfolio A) and from the portfolio of non-customer-facing IPOs 
(portfolio B). The coefficients of advertising (β1) were positive and statistically significant at 1 
per cent and 2 per cent significance level for portfolio A and portfolio B, respectively (p-value 
0.00,0.02). The results shown in Table 1.13a and 1.13b suggest that advertising intensity causes 
higher initial return dispersion in both portfolios. The coefficients of advertising (β1) were 
positive and statistically significant for all variants of initial-return volatilities tested, in both 
portfolios (maximum p-value 0.03). Thus, these results confirmed the inference that advertising 
and initial-return volatility is positively related. We also analysed the interaction between 
independent variables with a dummy variable representing the customer-facing property. The 
customer-facing dummy was constructed based on the industry categorisation documented in 
Appendix A. Table 1.4 reports the Pearson’s correlation between independent variables. The 
results presented in Table 1.4 show that customer-facing dummy exhibits very weak to no 
correlation with other independent variables (maximum correlation r=0.06 with offer price 
revision). Overall, there appears to be no significant difference in terms of the incentive of IPOs 
to invest in advertising in the IPO year: both portfolios benefited from higher initial returns 
caused by advertising intensity.  
 In addition, we ran extended regression models to provide the formalised tests for 
differences; although the hypothesis did not require this, the extended regression models are 
useful as a check for robustness. The regression models used in Tables 1.12b and 1.13c are 
similar to equation 1.4 and equation 1.8, respectively.  They contain 14 RHS variables (including 
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the intercept), which consists of 6*explanatory variables defined in equation 1.4 plus 6*slope 
shifting terms (explanatory variable * customer-facing dummy) plus 1*customer-facing dummy 
and 1*intercept. Overall, the regression results are consistent with the results presented in 
Tables 1.12a, 1.13a and 1.13b - that advertising in the IPO year is positively related to the initial 
returns/initial return dispersion.  
 
2.5.8 Robustness check: Heckman selection model 
 To address the concern that our selection of the advertising sample might have biased 
the results, we ran regression equations 1.4 and 1.8 again using the Heckman (1979) selection 
model. This robustness check was conducted in order to see if the relationship between 
advertising and initial return/initial return volatility still existed after correcting for the selection 
bias. The results from the first-stage selection equation were similar to those presented in Table 
1.14, so only the results from the second-stage initial return equation (the response equation in 
Heckman’s selection model) are presented. Table 1.15 and Table 1.16 report the regression 
results.  
It can be seen from Table 1.15 that advertising intensity is a determinant of initial 
returns.  The t-statistics of the advertising intensity coefficient calculated from first-day initial 
return observations was 4.02 (p-value 0.00). The consistency of the result is evident in the 
sample of 14-day cumulative Buy-and-Hold Return observations, in which case it can be can 
inferred, with 98 per cent confidence, that advertising intensity relates positively to initial return 
(p-value 0.02). In either case, the coefficients of advertising intensity were positive and 
statistically significant. The coefficient of offer price revision (β5) was positive and statistically 
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significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 0.00), suggesting that pre-market demand for 
stock is a significant determinant of initial performance. The coefficient of VC-backed dummy 
(β3) was found to be positive, and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level for both 
first-day and 14-day-BHR models (p-value 0.01). This result suggests that investors tend to value 
VC-backed IPOs more highly in the early market. The NASDAQ dummy statistically explained the 
initial return at 10 per cent significance level (β2). The coefficient of issue size (β4) and the 
coefficient of underwriter’s ranking (β6) were statistically insignificant. Both variables exhibited 
p-value above 10 per cent. Overall, the results from the Heckman selection model presented in 
Table 1.15 exhibited a similar trend to the results presented in Table 1.5a, namely that initial 
return and advertising intensity are positively related. Thus, we can infer that that the relation 
between advertising and initial return are unlikely to be biased by the sample selection. 
 Table 1.16 shows that the level of a firm’s advertising in the IPO year was found to be a 
significant predictor of the variability of initial return. The coefficient of advertising intensity (β1) 
was positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level for all models tested. The 
t-statistics associated with advertising intensity coefficient were found to be 2.87, 2.47 and 2.51 
for the (0,14), (0,21) and (0,28) window, respectively. Thus, the null hypothesis, that there is no 
relationship between advertising intensity and market-adjusted volatility, was rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis, that advertising intensity causes the market-adjusted initial return 
volatility to be higher, was accepted. The results were uniform across all holding periods 
studied. Price revision exhibited a positive relationship with market-adjusted initial return 
dispersion. The coefficients of price revision (β5) were positive and statistically significant at 1 
per cent significance level for all three periods studied (p-value 0.00). This suggests that pre-
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market demand for stock is a predictor of the stock’s initial return dispersion. That is, initial-
return volatility is higher among firms that are in high demand than among those that are in less 
demand. The NASDAQ dummy is also a predictor of initial return variability. The coefficient of 
NASDAQ dummy was positive (β2>0) and statistically significant at 2 per cent significance level. 
Since most firms listed in NASDAQ are small and technology-based, this suggests that such firms 
are more difficult to value by investors. The coefficient of VC-backed dummies was positive 
(β3>0) and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level for all periods tested (p-value 
0.00). This result suggests that VC-backed IPOs, on average, exhibit higher market-adjusted 
initial return volatility. The proceeding amounts (issue size) exhibited negative but weaker 
relationship with initial return volatility. The variable exhibited p-value above 10 per cent.  
Finally, underwriter reputation is a significant determinant of market-adjusted initial 
return dispersion. The coefficients of an underwriter’s reputation (β6) were negative and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent (p-value 0.01), 5 per cent (p-value 0.03) and 10 per cent (p-
value 0.06) for the (0,14), (0,21) and (0,28) return dispersion window, respectively. This finding 
was economically meaningful as well-regarded underwriters might have greater ability to price 
IPOs more accurately than others, and hence reduce the post-market return volatility. To 
summarise, it could be inferred with 99.6 per cent confidence (p-value 0.004) that a firm’s level 
of advertising causes 14-day market-adjusted return volatility to be higher. The coefficient of 
advertising intensity (β1) was positive, statistically significant, and robust across all holding 
periods studied. Altogether, the results from the Heckman selection models show that the 
relation between advertising and initial returns (as well as the relation between advertising and 
initial return volatility) are unlikely to be driven by the selection of our advertising sample. 
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Section IV 
2.6 Conclusion 
 Various theories have been developed to explain first-day IPO underpricing, with most 
commentators pointing to the existence of information asymmetry between certain parties in 
the IPO process. The view of stock overvaluation has recently gained much attention, and is 
supported by recent research (see Ritter and Welch, 2002 and Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 
2004 among others). The common explanation for IPO underpricing is the prediction that first-
day underpricing is positively associated with either the extent of information asymmetry or the 
extent of investors’ misevaluation. While various proxies of information asymmetry have been 
identified in empirical studies that associate information asymmetry and underpricing, little is 
known about the determinant of investors’ behaviour.  
This research has addressed an important determinant of investors’ divergence of 
opinion associated with an IPO event, namely the advertising intensity in the IPO year. 
According to Chemmanur and Yan (2009a), the extent of advertising intensity is highest in the 
IPO year and relates directly to a firm’s decision to go public. This suggestion holds true even 
when controlled for market considerations and matching firms. While it is unclear why a firm 
would choose to do so, advertising in the IPO year significantly impacts on the firm’s initial 
return/initial return dispersion. This work has filled a gap within the research about the positive 
relationship between advertising around an IPO event and its subsequent initial return volatility. 
In addition, a theory has been developed to explain the information dynamics of advertising 
intensity associated with the IPO event. However, IPO advertising is a relatively new research 
area. Further investigation is to be expected in the near future and the theoretical underpinning 
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and economic reasons behind this phenomenon are likely to remain a matter for debate. It is 
hoped that this work sheds some light on this little-known area by providing a theoretical 
framework as well as empirical evidence. 
Building on the theoretical insights of Miller (1977), Lowry et al. (2010), Ritter and Welch 
(2002) and Chemmanur and Yan (2009a), it was hypothesised that IPO advertising causes 
inflation of stock price in the early days post IPO. Two joint hypothesises were developed to test 
for the robustness and reliability of this scenario: H1: advertising causes the initial return to be 
higher; H2: higher advertising intensity causes a higher uncertainty of stock prices. Empirical 
evidence presented in this chapter is consistent with these hypotheses.  
The findings were consistent with behavioural notions that advertising around IPO 
attracts the attention of uninformed investors, thereby inducing them to buy the IPO firm’s 
equity at a high price on the first trading day. We found no significant difference between 
customer-facing IPOs and non-customer-facing IPOs: the sub-samples yielded identical 
inferences. The results showed that IPO advertising is one of the significant determinants of IPO 
performance. In addition, the results also suggest that advertising intensity in the IPO year 
generates higher short-term market-adjusted return volatility. Specifically, advertising around an 
IPO event causes higher initial return volatility observable in the first 14, 21 and 28 days post 
IPO. The results were consistent with the over-valuation theory documented by Miller (1977), 
suggesting that advertising can be considered to be a proxy for heterogeneous beliefs. The 
results thus complement earlier research into IPOs such as that of Miller (1977), Ritter and 
Welch (2002), Chemmanur and Yan (2009a), and Chemmanur and Yan (2011). To some extent, 
the results support the notion that short-term IPO markets are over-regulated (a notion of 
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Houge et al. 2001) and that investors require some time to realise all of the information. 
However, the research results are not direct evidence of the efficient market theories because 
the short-term inflated stock price always reverts back to its fundamental value after the short-
term constraints are relaxed and all information is realised.  
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2.7 Tables of Chapter 2 
Table 1.1: Financial data sources 
Database Type of Financial Data 
Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Market Price, trading volume 
Thomson SDC Platinum IPO data 
I/B/E/S Analysts’ forecasts data 
WRDS Financial research databases 
Bloomberg News and various market data 
Compustat Accounting data 
Kennet R. French data library, available online at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
Cost of equity and relevant data 
Jay R. Ritter data library, available online at 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm 
IPOs and Issuers’ reputation 
Datastream News and various market data 
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Table 1.2: Distribution of sample size though the sample period (1986-2009) 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
# of IPOs 492 338 135 119 112 270 398 549 430 448 661 
            
 1997 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
# of IPOs 477 303 80 79 66 202 184 172 169 25 49 
 
 
Table 1.3: Sample description 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Advertising Intensity 0.06 0.00 6.59 0.24 
NASDAQ Dummy 0.82 0.00 1.00 0.38 
VC-backed Dummy 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.49 
Ln(Proceeds) 3.59 -0.92 8.90 1.18 
Price revision 0% -98% 115% 18% 
Underwriter Reputation 7.50 1.00 9.00 1.91 
Observations 1211 
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Table 1.4: Pearson correlations between explanatory variables 
 Customer-
Facing dummy 
(t-stat) 
Adi 
 
(t-stat) 
NASDAQ 
dummy 
(t-stat) 
VC-backed 
dummy 
(t-stat) 
ln(proceeds) 
 
(t-stat) 
Price 
revision 
(t-stat) 
Underwriter 
Reputation 
(t-stat) 
Customer-Facing dummy 
1.00 
-       
Adi 
0.03 
(1.07) 
1.00 
-      
NASDAQ dummy 
-0.01 
(-0.27) 
0.03 
(1.13) 
1.00 
-     
VC-backed dummy 
-0.03 
(-1.26) 
0.04 
(1.55) 
0.22 
(8.01) 
1.00 
-    
ln (proceeds) 
0.06 
(2.25) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.49 
(-19.65) 
0.01 
(0.47) 
1.00 
-   
Price revision 
0.06 
(2.21) 
0.02 
(0.68) 
-0.02 
(-0.64) 
0.10 
(3.64) 
0.19 
(6.89) 
1.00 
-  
Underwriter reputation 
-0.02 
(-0.67) 
-0.04 
(-1.42) 
-0.22 
(-8.02) 
0.21 
(7.49) 
0.59 
(25.36) 
0.12 
(4.27) 
1.00 
- 
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Table 1.5a: Initial returns vs. IPO-year advertising intensity 
 
  
Dependent variable     
 
1st day return   14-day BHR 
   
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t) 0.14 4.39 0.00 
 
0.10 2.68 0.01 
 
1.01 
NASDAQ dummy 0.05 2.20 0.03 
 
0.04 1.56 0.12 
 
1.43 
VC-backed Dummy 0.05 3.09 0.00 
 
0.06 3.21 0.00 
 
1.15 
In (proceeds) 0.01 0.64 0.52 
 
0.01 0.80 0.43 
 
2.00 
Price revision 0.50 11.28 0.00 
 
0.54 10.85 0.00 
 
1.06 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 -0.17 0.87 
 
0.00 -0.67 0.50 
 
1.64 
Intercept 0.05 1.16 0.25 
 
0.07 1.38 0.17 
 
  
F statistics 31.37 
 
26.73 
  
R Square 0.14 
 
0.12 
  
Observations 1211 
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Table 1.5a.1: Initial returns vs. IPO-year advertising intensity [without ln(proceeds)] 
 
  
Dependent variable     
 
1st day return   14-day BHR 
   
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t) 0.14 4.42 0.00 
 
0.10 2.72 0.01 
 
1.01 
NASDAQ dummy 0.05 2.14 0.03 
 
0.03 1.34 0.18 
 
1.15 
VC-backed Dummy 0.05 3.08 0.00 
 
0.06 3.19 0.00 
 
1.15 
Price revision 0.51 11.58 0.00 
 
0.55 11.17 0.00 
 
1.02 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 0.22 0.83 
 
0.00 -0.28 0.78 
 
1.15 
Intercept 0.07 1.64 0.10 
 
0.09 1.96 0.05 
 
  
F statistics 37.58 
 
31.96 
  
R Square 0.13 
 
0.12 
  
Observations 1211 
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Table 1.5b: Initial returns vs. preceding-year advertising intensity 
  
Dependent variable     
 
1st day return   14-day BHR 
   
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t-1) 0.51 8.07 0.00 
 
0.20 2.82 0.00 
 
1.01 
NASDAQ dummy 0.05 1.77 0.08 
 
0.04 1.28 0.20 
 
1.42 
VC-backed Dummy 0.04 1.86 0.06 
 
0.05 2.35 0.02 
 
1.16 
In (proceeds) 0.00 -0.12 0.90 
 
0.00 0.24 0.81 
 
1.97 
Price revision 0.51 9.59 0.00 
 
0.56 9.42 0.00 
 
1.07 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 0.78 0.44 
 
0.00 0.22 0.82 
 
1.60 
Intercept 0.03 0.57 0.57 
 
0.05 0.88 0.38 
 
  
F statistics 31.08 
 
21.45 
  
R Square 0.16 
 
0.11 
  
Observations 972 
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Table 1.6a: Initial returns dispersion vs. IPO-year advertising intensity 
 
  
Dependent variable 
 
14-days volatility 
 
21-days volatility 
 
28-days volatility 
  
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t) 0.01 3.44 0.00 
 
0.01 3.02 0.00 
 
0.01 3.14 0.00 
 
1.01 
NASDAQ dummy 0.00 2.31 0.02 
 
0.00 2.51 0.01 
 
0.01 3.11 0.00 
 
1.43 
VC-backed Dummy 0.01 4.05 0.00 
 
0.01 3.90 0.00 
 
0.01 4.39 0.00 
 
1.15 
In (proceeds) 0.00 -1.04 0.30 
 
0.00 -1.58 0.11 
 
0.00 -1.85 0.07 
 
2.00 
Price revision 0.02 4.81 0.00 
 
0.02 4.60 0.00 
 
0.01 3.84 0.00 
 
1.06 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 -2.62 0.01 
 
0.00 -2.15 0.03 
 
0.00 -1.69 0.09 
 
1.64 
Intercept 0.04 9.64 0.00 
 
0.04 10.28 0.00 
 
0.04 10.23 0.00 
 
  
F statistics 15.00 
 
14.66 
 
16.08 
 
R Square 0.07 
 
0.07 
 
0.07 
 
Observations 1211 
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Table 1.6b: Initial returns dispersion vs. preceding-year advertising intensity 
 
  
Dependent variable 
 
14-days volatility 
 
21-days volatility 
 
28-days volatility 
  
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t-1) 0.03 6.34 0.00 
 
0.03 5.73 0.00 
 
0.03 5.83 0.00 
 
1.01 
NASDAQ dummy 0.00 2.08 0.04 
 
0.00 2.19 0.03 
 
0.01 2.76 0.01 
 
1.42 
VC-backed Dummy 0.00 2.90 0.00 
 
0.00 2.86 0.00 
 
0.00 3.17 0.00 
 
1.16 
In (proceeds) 0.00 -1.87 0.06 
 
0.00 -2.43 0.02 
 
0.00 -2.81 0.01 
 
1.97 
Price revision 0.02 5.50 0.00 
 
0.02 4.95 0.00 
 
0.02 4.22 0.00 
 
1.07 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 -1.24 0.22 
 
0.00 -0.69 0.49 
 
0.00 -0.19 0.85 
 
1.60 
Intercept 0.04 8.66 0.00 
 
0.04 9.03 0.00 
 
0.04 9.02 0.00 
 
  
F statistics 18.67 
 
17.02 
 
18.24 
 
R Square 0.10 
 
0.10 
 
0.10 
 
Observations 972 
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Table 1.7a: Market-adjusted volatility vs. IPO-year advertising intensity 
 
  
Dependent variable 
 
14-days market-
adjusted volatility 
 
21-days market-
adjusted volatility 
 
28-days market-
adjusted volatility 
  
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t) 0.01 3.48 0.00 
 
0.01 3.10 0.00 
 
0.01 3.24 0.00 
 
1.01 
NASDAQ dummy 0.00 2.07 0.04 
 
0.00 2.22 0.03 
 
0.01 2.93 0.00 
 
1.43 
VC-backed Dummy 0.01 4.09 0.00 
 
0.01 4.03 0.00 
 
0.01 4.54 0.00 
 
1.15 
In (proceeds) 0.00 -1.06 0.29 
 
0.00 -1.66 0.10 
 
0.00 -1.92 0.06 
 
2.00 
Price revision 0.02 5.30 0.00 
 
0.02 5.21 0.00 
 
0.02 4.45 0.00 
 
1.06 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 -2.96 0.00 
 
0.00 -2.38 0.02 
 
0.00 -2.09 0.04 
 
1.64 
Intercept 0.03 8.17 0.00 
 
0.03 8.83 0.00 
 
0.03 8.81 0.00 
 
  
F statistics 16.01 
 
15.84 
 
17.60 
 
R Square 0.07 
 
0.07 
 
0.08 
 
Observations 1211 
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Table 1.7b: Market-adjusted volatility vs. preceding-year advertising intensity 
 
  
Dependent variable 
 14-days market-
adjusted volatility 
 
21-days market-
adjusted volatility 
 
28-days market-
adjusted volatility 
  
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t-1) 0.03 6.13 0.00 
 
0.02 5.51 0.00 
 
0.03 5.72 0.00 
 
1.01 
NASDAQ dummy 0.00 1.83 0.07 
 
0.00 1.96 0.05 
 
0.00 2.56 0.01 
 
1.42 
VC-backed Dummy 0.00 2.86 0.00 
 
0.00 2.93 0.00 
 
0.00 3.19 0.00 
 
1.16 
In (proceeds) 0.00 -1.90 0.06 
 
0.00 -2.55 0.01 
 
0.00 -2.92 0.00 
 
1.97 
Price revision 0.02 5.80 0.00 
 
0.02 5.32 0.00 
 
0.02 4.62 0.00 
 
1.07 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 -1.46 0.15 
 
0.00 -0.74 0.46 
 
0.00 -0.41 0.68 
 
1.60 
Intercept 0.03 7.23 0.00 
 
0.03 7.58 0.00 
 
0.03 7.67 0.00 
 
  
F statistics 18.54 
 
17.14 
 
18.64 
 
R Square 0.10 
 
0.10 
 
0.10 
 
Observations 972 
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Table 1.8: Initial returns vs. industry-adjusted IPO advertising 
  
Dependent variable     
 
1st day return   14-day BHR 
   
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t) 0.01 2.58 0.01 
 
0.00 1.75 0.08 
 
1.00 
NASDAQ dummy 0.05 2.33 0.02 
 
0.04 1.62 0.10 
 
1.43 
VC-backed Dummy 0.05 3.07 0.00 
 
0.06 3.08 0.00 
 
1.15 
In (proceeds) 0.01 0.71 0.48 
 
0.01 0.81 0.42 
 
2.00 
Price revision 0.50 11.93 0.00 
 
0.54 11.60 0.00 
 
1.06 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 -0.21 0.84 
 
0.00 -0.64 0.52 
 
1.64 
Intercept 0.06 1.43 0.15 
 
0.08 1.60 0.11 
 
  
F statistics 31.66 
 
28.70 
  
R Square 0.14 
 
0.13 
  
Observations 1207 
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Table 1.9: Initial returns dispersion vs. industry-adjusted IPO advertising 
  
Dependent variable 
 
14-days volatility 
 
21-days volatility 
 
28-days volatility 
  
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t) 0.001 3.37 0.00 
 
0.001 3.11 0.00 
 
0.001 2.73 0.01 
 
1.00 
NASDAQ dummy 0.005 2.35 0.02 
 
0.005 2.54 0.01 
 
0.006 3.15 0.00 
 
1.43 
VC-backed Dummy 0.006 4.23 0.00 
 
0.006 4.03 0.00 
 
0.006 4.54 0.00 
 
1.15 
In (proceeds) -0.001 -0.95 0.34 
 
-0.001 -1.52 0.13 
 
-0.001 -1.77 0.08 
 
2.00 
Price revision 0.018 4.77 0.00 
 
0.017 4.56 0.00 
 
0.013 3.81 0.00 
 
1.06 
Underwriter Reputation -0.001 -2.61 0.01 
 
-0.001 -2.11 0.04 
 
-0.001 -1.70 0.09 
 
1.64 
Intercept 0.039 9.67 0.00 
 
0.038 10.29 0.00 
 
0.037 10.26 0.00 
 
  
F statistics 14.85 
 
14.65 
 
15.60 
 
R Square 0.07 
 
0.07 
 
0.07 
 
Observations 1207 
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Table 1.10: Market-adjusted initial returns dispersion vs. industry-adjusted IPO advertising 
 
  
Dependent variable 
 14-days market-
adjusted volatility 
 
21-days market-
adjusted volatility 
 
28-days market-
adjusted volatility 
  
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat 
p-
value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t) 0.00 3.43 0.00 
 
0.00 3.20 0.00 
 
0.00 2.84 0.00 
 
1.00 
NASDAQ dummy 0.00 2.11 0.03 
 
0.00 2.26 0.02 
 
0.01 2.97 0.00 
 
1.43 
VC-backed Dummy 0.01 4.26 0.00 
 
0.01 4.14 0.00 
 
0.01 4.67 0.00 
 
1.15 
In (proceeds) 0.00 -0.97 0.33 
 
0.00 -1.60 0.11 
 
0.00 -1.84 0.07 
 
2.00 
Price revision 0.02 5.26 0.00 
 
0.02 5.17 0.00 
 
0.02 4.42 0.00 
 
1.06 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 -2.94 0.00 
 
0.00 -2.34 0.02 
 
0.00 -2.09 0.04 
 
1.64 
Intercept 0.03 8.20 0.00 
 
0.03 8.85 0.00 
 
0.03 8.84 0.00 
 
  
F statistics 15.84 
 
15.80 
 
17.06 
 
R Square 0.07 
 
0.07 
 
0.08 
 
Observations 1207 
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Table 1.11: Test for the equality of mean advertising intensity (customer-facing firms vs. non-customer-facing firms) 
  t-test  Satterthwaite-Welch  
Critical value 
  (equal variance assumed)  (Unequal variance assumed)  
  0: 210  XXH   0: 210  XXH
 
 1-tail 2-tail 
  t-stat p-value  t-stat p-value    
          
Advertising intensity  1.06 0.29      1.27  0.21  1.65 1.96 
Industry-adjusted advertising intensity  1.43 0.15      1.29  0.20  1.65 1.96 
          
     #Observations    
Customer-facing portfolio     805    
Non-customer facing portfolio      445    
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Table 1.12a: Initial returns vs. IPO advertising 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Initial return 
 
A)     Customer facing IPOs   B) Non-customer facing IPOs 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value VIF 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value VIF 
Advertising intensity 0.14 3.95 0.00 1.01 
 
0.15 2.39 0.02 1.02 
NASDAQ dummy 0.06 1.93 0.05 1.41 
 
0.04 1.36 0.18 1.49 
VC-backed Dummy 0.05 2.19 0.03 1.18 
 
0.03 1.85 0.07 1.14 
In (proceeds) 0.00 0.05 0.96 1.94 
 
0.02 1.41 0.16 2.20 
Price revision 0.56 9.67 0.00 1.05 
 
0.36 7.14 0.00 1.10 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 0.22 0.83 1.65 
 
0.00 -0.61 0.54 1.68 
Intercept 0.05 0.87 0.39   
 
0.04 0.89 0.37   
F statistics 22.72 
 
13.13 
R Square 0.15 
 
0.16 
Observations 775 
 
432 
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Table 1.12b: Initial returns vs. IPO advertising (full sample) 
  
Dependent Variable: Initial return 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t) 0.15 2.14 0.03 
 
3.10 
NASDAQ dummy 0.04 1.07 0.28 
 
3.28 
VC-backed Dummy 0.05 1.81 0.07 
 
2.11 
In (proceeds) 0.02 1.12 0.26 
 
5.71 
Price revision 0.37 4.80 0.00 
 
2.02 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 -0.51 0.61 
 
2.12 
Customer-facing dummy (CFD) 0.02 0.20 0.84 
 
18.61 
Advertising intensity (t)*CFD 0.00 -0.03 0.97 
 
6.28 
NASDAQ dummy*CFD 0.02 0.31 0.75 
 
6.54 
VC-backed Dummy*CFD 0.00 -0.02 0.98 
 
3.84 
In (proceeds)*CFD -0.02 -0.91 0.36 
 
10.51 
Price revision*CFD 0.19 1.94 0.05 
 
3.02 
Underwriter Reputation*CFD 0.01 0.55 0.58 
 
5.01 
Intercept 0.03 0.42 0.67 
  
F statistics 14.82 
  
R Square 0.14 
  
Observations 1207   
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Table 1.13a: Market-adjusted initial returns dispersion vs. IPO advertising (customer-facing IPOs) 
  
Portfolio A) customer facing IPOs 
 
14-days market-
adjusted volatility 
 
21-days market-
adjusted volatility 
 
28-days market 
adjusted volatility 
  
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t) 0.01 2.46 0.01 
 
0.01 2.14 0.03 
 
0.01 2.45 0.01 
 
1.01 
NASDAQ dummy 0.01 1.93 0.05 
 
0.00 2.03 0.04 
 
0.01 2.61 0.01 
 
1.41 
VC-backed Dummy 0.01 3.01 0.00 
 
0.01 3.49 0.00 
 
0.01 4.23 0.00 
 
1.18 
In (proceeds) 0.00 -0.64 0.52 
 
0.00 -1.13 0.26 
 
0.00 -1.19 0.23 
 
1.94 
Price revision 0.02 4.92 0.00 
 
0.02 4.84 0.00 
 
0.02 3.93 0.00 
 
1.05 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 -3.17 0.00 
 
0.00 -2.78 0.01 
 
0.00 -2.52 0.01 
 
1.65 
Intercept 0.03 6.64 0.00 
 
0.03 7.29 0.00 
 
0.03 7.00 0.00 
 
  
F statistics 12.00 
 
12.68 
 
13.78 
 
R Square 0.09   0.09   0.10 
 
Observations 775 
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Table 1.13b: Market-adjusted initial returns dispersion vs. IPO advertising (non-customer-facing IPOs) 
 
  
Portfolio B) Non-customer facing IPOs 
 14-days market-
adjusted volatility 
 
21-days market-adjusted 
volatility 
 
28-days market 
adjusted volatility 
  
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t) 0.03 3.70 0.00 
 
0.02 3.31 0.00 
 
0.02 2.61 0.01 
 
1.02 
NASDAQ dummy 0.00 0.80 0.42 
 
0.00 0.99 0.32 
 
0.00 1.41 0.16 
 
1.49 
VC-backed Dummy 0.01 3.00 0.00 
 
0.00 2.04 0.04 
 
0.00 1.86 0.06 
 
1.14 
In (proceeds) 0.00 -0.63 0.53 
 
0.00 -0.95 0.35 
 
0.00 -1.32 0.19 
 
2.20 
Price revision 0.01 1.81 0.07 
 
0.01 1.79 0.07 
 
0.01 1.84 0.07 
 
1.10 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 -0.41 0.68 
 
0.00 -0.10 0.92 
 
0.00 -0.06 0.95 
 
1.68 
Intercept 0.02 4.32 0.00 
 
0.03 4.50 0.00 
 
0.03 5.03 0.00 
 
  
F statistics 5.65 
 
4.49 
 
4.46 
 
R Square 0.07   0.06   0.06 
 
Observations 432 
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Table 1.13c: Market-adjusted initial returns dispersion vs. IPO advertising (full sample) 
14-days market-adjusted 
volatility 
21-days market-adjusted 
volatility 
28-days market-adjusted 
volatility 
Coeff. t-stat p-value Coeff. t-stat p-value Coeff. t-stat p-value VIF 
Advertising intensity (t) 0.03 3.17 0.00 0.02 3.08 0.00 0.02 2.39 0.02 3.10 
NASDAQ dummy 0.00 0.68 0.50 0.00 0.91 0.36 0.00 1.28 0.20 3.28 
VC-backed Dummy 0.01 2.54 0.01 0.00 1.89 0.06 0.00 1.69 0.09 2.11 
In (proceeds) 0.00 -0.55 0.58 0.00 -0.88 0.38 0.00 -1.22 0.22 5.71 
Price revision 0.01 1.65 0.10 0.01 1.66 0.10 0.01 1.67 0.09 2.02 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 -0.35 0.73 0.00 -0.10 0.92 0.00 -0.06 0.96 2.12 
Customer_facing_dummy (CFD) 0.01 1.22 0.22 0.01 1.10 0.27 0.00 0.61 0.54 18.61 
Advertising intensity (t)*CFD -0.01 -2.12 0.03 -0.01 -2.17 0.03 -0.01 -1.65 0.10 6.28 
NASDAQ dummy*CFD 0.00 0.65 0.52 0.00 0.48 0.63 0.00 0.55 0.58 6.54 
VC-backed Dummy*CFD 0.00 -0.04 0.96 0.00 0.71 0.48 0.00 1.36 0.17 3.84 
In (proceeds)*CFD 0.00 0.08 0.94 0.00 0.09 0.93 0.00 0.33 0.74 10.51 
Price revision*CFD 0.01 1.59 0.11 0.01 1.53 0.13 0.01 0.99 0.32 3.02 
Underwriter Reputation*CFD 0.00 -1.40 0.16 0.00 -1.54 0.12 0.00 -1.53 0.13 5.01 
Intercept 0.02 3.71 0.00 0.03 4.19 0.00 0.03 4.61 0.00 
F statistics 8.27 8.08 8.67 
R Square 0.09 0.08 0.09 
Observations 1207 
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Table 1.14: Probit regression results 
  
Dependent Variable : Advertising Disclosure (Disclosure) 
 
Column (1) 
  
Column (2) 
 Coeff. t-stat p-value VIF 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value VIF 
Profitability (Prft) -0.08 -2.07 0.04 1.43 
 
-0.06 -1.85 0.06 1.26 
Sales (Sales) 0.02 3.01 0.00 2.12 
 
0.02 3.97 0.00 1.56 
Firm size (Size) 0.01 1.28 0.20 1.54 
     
Book-to-market ratio (BM) 0.00 -0.93 0.35 1.00 
     
NASDAQ dummy (NASDAQ) 0.14 6.62 0.00 1.28 
 
1.34 6.43 0.00 1.26 
Intercept 0.11 2.66 0.01 
  
0.16 4.97 0.00 
 
F statistics 11.87 
 
14.58 
R Square 0.012 
 
0.011 
Observations 
 
6541 
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Table 1.15: Robustness check: Heckman two-step regressions of Initial Returns vs. Advertising 
  
Dependent variable     
 
1st day return   14-day BHR 
   
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t) 0.13 4.02 0.00 
 
0.09 2.35 0.02 
 
1.05 
NASDAQ dummy 0.12 1.85 0.06 
 
0.12 1.68 0.09 
 
1.59 
VC-backed Dummy 0.05 2.54 0.01 
 
0.06 2.72 0.01 
 
1.15 
In (proceeds) 0.01 1.23 0.22 
 
0.02 1.43 0.15 
 
1.91 
Price revision 0.50 10.55 0.00 
 
0.54 10.15 0.00 
 
1.08 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 -0.09 0.93 
 
0.00 -0.35 0.72 
 
1.46 
Intercept 0.29 0.91 0.36 
 
0.16 0.99 0.32 
 
  
Estimation Method Heckman Two-Step Model 
Observations 6541 
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Table 1.16 Robustness check: Heckman two-step regressions of Market-adjusted initial returns dispersion vs. Advertising 
  
Dependent variable 
 
14-days market-
adjusted volatility 
 
21-days market-
adjusted volatility 
 
28-days market-
adjusted volatility 
  
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity (t) 0.01 2.87 0.00 
 
0.01 2.47 0.01 
 
0.01 2.51 0.01 
 
1.05 
NASDAQ dummy 0.02 2.37 0.02 
 
0.01 2.31 0.02 
 
0.01 2.61 0.01 
 
1.59 
VC-backed Dummy 0.00 3.16 0.00 
 
0.00 3.10 0.00 
 
0.00 3.44 0.00 
 
1.15 
In (proceeds) 0.00 -0.87 0.39 
 
0.00 -0.30 0.76 
 
0.00 -0.20 0.84 
 
1.91 
Price revision 0.02 4.48 0.00 
 
0.02 4.42 0.00 
 
0.01 3.67 0.00 
 
1.08 
Underwriter Reputation 0.00 -2.47 0.01 
 
0.00 -2.16 0.03 
 
0.00 -1.90 0.06 
 
1.46 
Intercept 0.00 2.98 0.00 
 
0.00 2.73 0.00 
 
0.00 2.51 0.01 
 
  
Estimation Method Heckman Two-Step Model 
Observations 6541 
130 
 
Chapter 3 The intrinsic value of highly advertised IPOs 
3.1 Introduction 
 One of the more interesting ideas emerging from IPO-underpricing studies in recent 
years has been that of IPO overvaluation. This chapter shows that the degree of advertising 
intensity in the IPO year explains the cross-sectional variation of stock price inflation (relative to 
its theoretical intrinsic value) in the early days after IPO. This relationship holds true even when 
controlled for a host of other determinants of underpricing previously identified in the IPO 
literature. The trend is then reversed when the relationship between long-term performance 
and advertising intensity around an IPO event is examined. This evidence suggests that 
advertising intensity around an IPO event is a possible determinant of stock overvaluation and 
also a significant predictor of long-run stock return.  
 In the previous chapter, it was shown that higher advertising expenditure in the IPO year 
leads to a less informative stock price, post IPO. That is, empirical evidence was provided that 
suggested that firms with higher advertising expenditure in the IPO year have an increase in 
post-IPO stock price volatility as well as an increase in the degree of initial returns. This chapter 
presents new evidence that suggests that advertising intensity is a cause of IPO overvaluation 
rather than the cause of systematic underpricing.  In particular, a direct valuation of IPO in the 
early days after trading shows that price-to-residual-income-valuation (P/V) is higher among 
those firms that invest more in advertising in the IPO year. Furthermore, this trend is found 
whether the IPO sample studied is drawn from customer-facing firms or non-customer-facing 
firms. The results remain robust even when other relative measures, such as P/B ratio, are 
examined. In addition, the analysis is insensitive to the degree of errors in analysts’ forecasts. 
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The in-depth analysis of the relationship between stock overvaluation and advertising intensity 
around IPO is discussed further. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
 The view of information asymmetries has been widely held among scholars in this field 
for more than two decades; in contrast, the theory of IPO overvaluation is still in its infancy. The 
theory of information asymmetries has been investigated in several contexts since the 1980s. 
Rock (1986) documented the idea that the offering firm systematically underprices its shares in 
order to guarantee that the uninformed investors purchase the issue. Welch (1989)suggested 
that firms systematically underprice IPO offers in order to obtain a higher price at a seasoned 
offering, while Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) proposed that managers strategically 
underprice IPOs in order to maximise personal wealth from selling shares at lockup expiration. 
There is a large amount of literature that documents the relationship between first-day 
abnormal returns and the existent of information asymmetries (see Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989, 
among others). Despite its popularity, theories about information asymmetries are unlikely to 
explain first-day abnormal returns of recent years, particularly the observed underpricing during 
the dot-com bubble period. The emerging of extreme IPO underpricing during the dot-com 
bubble period has resurrected the debate about the true cause of the IPO underpricing 
phenomena and has led scholars to investigate the possibility of stock overvaluation in the early 
days post IPO.  
 The idea that short-term inefficient market misevaluation is an important driver of IPO 
underpricing is not new. For example, Ritter and Welch (2002) argued strongly that asymmetric 
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information was unlikely to explain first-day abnormal returns, especially the huge amount of 
first-day returns during the internet bubble period, and specifically that the information 
asymmetry model was unlikely to explain 65 per cent of initial returns observed during the years 
of 1999-2000:   “we argue that asymmetric information is not the primary driver of many IPO 
phenomena. Instead, we believe future progress in the literature will come from non-rational 
and agency conflict explanations.”(Ritter and Welch, 2002, p.1795) 
 Following Ritter and Welch (2002), scholars began to give more attention to alternative 
causes of underpricing.  Notable among the literature is an insightful study conducted by 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) who showed that, including the internet bubble period, 
firms that issued equity between 1980 and 1997 were actually overvalued at the offer price 
relative to peer firms. According to Purnanandam and Swaminathan, IPOs were overvalued at 
the offer, tended to run up in the aftermarket, and reverted back to their fair value in the long 
run. These results, which are robust to various risk-adjusted methods to detect abnormal 
returns, are inconsistent with existing asymmetries-related theories. Underlying most of the 
overvaluation literature is a theoretical notion first documented by Miller (1977), namely that 
stock prices will reflect a more optimistic valuation if pessimistic investors are kept out of the 
market by high short-sale constraints. IPOs provide an ideal setup to test Miller’s proposition 
since short-selling is very much constrained in the immediate aftermarket. In this context, 
Houge et al. (2001) have suggested that institutional controls and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulations in the IPO market significantly restrict short-selling in the early 
post-offering period. Accordingly, there is a possibility that IPOs might be overvalued in the 
immediate aftermarket. Morris (1996) has demonstrated that investors might over value stock 
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in the short run (see also Barberis and Thaler, 2003, for work on stock overvaluation and 
irrationality). 
 Strong believers of the efficient market hypothesis would argue that all mispricing will 
be eliminated by arbitrage. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that this may not hold 
true for some stock, for example in the case of volatile stocks in which there is a high level of 
risk.  They argue strongly that the riskiness associated with an arbitrage position prevents 
arbitrageurs taking such a stance. As a result, there will be some stock mispricing left in 
equilibrium because not all arbitrage positions are taken by arbitragers. In other words, 
performance-based arbitrage may not be fully effective in bringing stock prices down to 
fundamental values, particularly in the case of highly-volatile stocks (such as highly advertised 
IPOs). As Shleifer and Vishny (1997, pp.52 and 54) have noted:   “For a given noise trading 
process, volatile securities will exhibit greater mispricing and a higher average return to 
arbitrage in equilibrium”, and  “More generally, specialized, professional arbitrageurs may avoid 
extremely volatile arbitrage positions”. 
 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggested that, due to the limitations of arbitrage, the higher 
the volatility of stock price, the higher the degree of mispricing will be. This hypothesis states 
that the volatility of stock prices is related positively with stock mispricing. Extending this idea 
further, it is also possible that there may be some unknown common factors that drive the stock 
price volatility and the stock mispricing. Intuitively, it seems that the advertising around an IPO 
event could be one such factor because such activities might attract the attention of 
uninformed investors, thereby inducing them to buy the IPO firm’s equity at a high price on the 
first trading day. This scenario predicts a positive relationship between advertising and initial 
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return volatility as well as a positive relationship between advertising and price-to-valuation 
ratio. In this context, it was demonstrated in the previous chapter that high advertising 
intensities around an IPO event lead to higher volatility of stock price post market. This finding is 
particularly interesting, as it seems to suggest (to some extent) that there should be a 
systematic link between the degree of advertising intensity around an IPO event and the degree 
of mispricing (that is, overvaluation) in the secondary market; accordingly, this hypothesis is the 
main focus of this chapter. The hypothesis predicts that the degree of advertising intensity 
around an IPO event will relate positively to the extent of post-market stock overvaluation. This 
is the main reason for hypothesis H1:  that higher (lower) advertising intensity in the IPO year 
drives the stock price to be more(less) over-valued in the early days after the IPO event.  
 The static equality of stock value and price, as stated by the efficient market hypothesis, 
is based on an ideal assumption that arbitrage costs are insignificant and that all arbitrage 
positions will be taken by arbitrageurs. When trading costs and information are trivial, stock 
prices should be offered up to the point of their intrinsic value. However, when trading costs are 
significant and/or when intrinsic values are difficult to measure, the process by which price 
adjusts to intrinsic value requires some time (i.e. some ‘learning’, as pointed out by Morris, 
1996), and price does not always perfectly reflect intrinsic value at all times. In such a case, a 
more realistic definition of the relation between price and value is one of continuous 
convergence rather than fully static equality. Once the possibility is acknowledged that stock 
price may diverge from its value in the short run, the measurement of stock’s intrinsic value 
becomes paramount. To the extent that historical stock prices of newly listed IPOs are 
unavailable, newly listed firms are indeed more difficult to value than non-issuing firms.  
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 The primary focus of this research is the impact of advertising around an IPO event on 
post-market stock valuation. In the previous chapter, it was shown that IPO advertising increases 
the initial return as well as increases post-IPO stock price volatility. However, without a true 
indicator of the intrinsic value of stock, it is somewhat questionable whether advertising causes 
stock overvaluation. The direct valuation of IPO is thus paramount and for this reason it is the 
primary focus of the research presented in this chapter. 
 To the extent that advertising intensity can drive the stock price of newly-listed firms to 
diverge from their fundamental value in the early days post IPO, it is particularly important to 
investigate the actual intrinsic value of these IPO firms before stating any conclusion about their 
true value. In this regard, this study has directly assessed an alternative empirical value 
estimated when stock price itself is a noisy measure of intrinsic value. The valuation 
methodology used in this study (RIV model) allows for the convergence of stock prices and value 
over time, rather than relying on an assumed assumption of static equality. To the best of our 
knowledge, the relation between IPOs’ price-to-value ratio and the degree of advertising 
intensity around an IPO event has never been investigated before; there is thus a need for this 
gap in the research to be filled. 
 
3.2.1 The role of advertising in the stock market 
 The role of advertising as an informant to convey product quality to customers is not 
new. Marketing practitioners and scholars have long acknowledged that advertising is an 
effective way to communicate and bring good news to its customers. However, a full 
understanding of the role of advertising in the context of an IPO event and a firm’s value is still 
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in its infancy. Little is known about how (or if) advertising affects IPO prices. This has been one 
of the ongoing debates among scholars in recent years. However, the popularity of this research 
area is relatively low. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that broadly relates to this study.  
For instance, Barth, Kasznik and McNichols (2001) have suggested that advertising attracts the 
attention of financial analysts. However, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have focused 
on the relationship between advertising intensity and post-market stock valuation. 
 One might rationally expect a direct relationship between an IPO event and the level of 
advertising around the event in order to rationalise the view that advertising is one determinant 
of a firm’s decision to issue equity. In this context, Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) have provided 
important empirical evidence that a firm’s advertising expenditure in its IPO year is greater than 
in its non-IPO years, even after controlling for product market considerations. They found that in 
the five-year span around the equity issue year (-2,+2), the peak advertising level was reached in 
the year of the new equity issue (that is, the IPO year). While their empirical evidence clearly 
suggests a systematic link between advertising intensity and IPO event, the rationale for this 
practice still remains debatable. It is hoped that the research reported here will shed some light 
on this issue. Unlike the research conducted by Chemmanur and Yan (2009a), which focused 
upon the role of advertising as an information carrier to convey the value of the firm to 
investors, the focus of this chapter is the direct valuation of newly-listed firms in the early days 
post IPO and on how advertising affect post-IPO price inflation.  
Although Chemmanur and Yan (2009a, p.40) focus on a different context of IPO 
advertising, they make the important point that advertising does relate to the decision of a firm 
to go public:  “firms choose a higher level of product market advertising when they are planning 
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to issue new equity, compared with situations in which they have no immediate plans to do so”. 
Accordingly, it is clear that a systematic link exists between the degree of advertising intensity in 
the IPO year and the IPO event. In this context, it is interesting to see how advertising intensity 
relates to the stock prices post-IPO. The research reported in this chapter proposes a new 
perspective to explain this link; namely that advertising causes the stock to be more overvalued 
in the secondary market. A logical way to investigate this hypothesis is to implement a direct 
valuation of stock in the early days post IPO.  
 It is important to note the role of advertising activities around the IPO event. In general, 
the role of advertising in the context of IPO can be categorised in one of two ways. On the one 
hand, advertising can be considered to be a tool to convey the true value of firms to investors. 
This model, based on information asymmetries, proposes that advertising serves primarily to 
provide information to investors, to let them value IPO more correctly. A number of studies 
support this view, for instance, Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) have argued that firms use product 
market advertising in conjunction with underfinancing as a substitute for underpricing to convey 
the intrinsic value of the firm to investors. According to this argument, firms utilise several 
forms of signalling, in equilibrium, to convey their true value to market participants. These 
methods of signalling include stock underpricing, stock under financing (raising a smaller 
amount of equity than the optimal amount in a full information setting) and advertising 
activities around an IPO event.  In equilibrium, firms use the least expensive combination of the 
three signals to convey the quality of their product and project value to investors.  
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According to Chemmanur and Yan (2009a, p.41), “the equilibrium choice of signaling mix 
by the firm depends on the extent of asymmetric information facing the firm and the internal 
capital available to it”. By definition, if one considers advertising to be a signal, it is clear that 
there must be costs attached to it, as Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) have noted,  
. . . the firm’s choice between advertising and underpricing as the signal to add 
to under financing depends upon the internal capital available to it prior to the 
equity issue. To advertise, the higher type firm (firms with superior quality 
products and higher intrinsic value projects) needs to cut back on investment in 
its ongoing project, thereby reducing firm value and diluting insiders’ equity 
holdings. If the internal capital available to the firm is large enough that only 
investment in the lower productivity ranges of the ongoing project has to be 
sacrificed to fund the required amount of advertising, then it can be shown that 
the firm adds only advertising to the signaling mix. If, however, the internal 
capital available to the firm is smaller, so that the firm has to sacrifice investment 
in the higher productivity ranges of its ongoing project to undertake the required 
amount of advertising, then minimizing the signaling cost involves the firm 
adding both advertising and IPO underpricing to the signaling mix, thus using all 
three signals to convey its true type to outsiders. (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009a, 
p. 42).  
 
 
Ultimately, this model predicts that higher advertising intensity in the IPO year decreases 
the uncertainty of stock prices (the extent of information asymmetry) because advertising 
serves as a carrier of information to investors thereby reducing the uncertainty of stock prices. 
As the investors have more information to estimate the stock value, the level of uncertainty in 
stock prices is reduced. Therefore, the alternative signalling hypothesis predicts that the 
uncertainty of initial return decreases as the advertising intensity increases. According to 
Chemmanur and Yan (2009a), in equilibrium, stock price information can be conveyed by a 
mixture of signals, and that advertising is a form of such signal. However, since the theoretical 
degree of advertising intensity in an equilibrium mix of signals is not observable, it is difficult to 
verify whether the firm increases its advertising intensity just to address the signalling 
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requirement only or whether there are other reasons that drive the decision to increase the 
advertising expenditure in the IPO year15. In addition, another problem with this view is that it is 
contradicted by the empirical results obtained earlier, namely that advertising is related 
positively to initial-return uncertainty. In the previous chapter, evidence was presented that, 
controlling for various known underpricing determinants, advertising intensity in the IPO year 
relates positively to initial returns/return volatility.  
 On the other hand, advertising may attract the attention of uninformed investors, 
thereby inducing them to buy the IPO firm’s equity at a higher price in the early trading days. 
This hypothesis is based on the Gurun and Butler (2012)’s notion that advertising causes media 
bias, which in turn affects stock prices in the secondary market. A recent study by Chemmanur 
and Yan (2011) supports this notion. They found that the increased degree of investor 
recognition attracted by advertising leads to an increase in stock returns in the advertising year. 
This is also consistent with Grullon et al. (2004)’s finding, that advertising attracts larger number 
of both individual and institutional investors. Ritter and Welch (2002) conjecture that over 
enthusiasm among retail investors may explain high first-day returns and low long-run returns. 
Underlying the stock overvaluation hypothesis is the notion that advertising causes media bias, 
which in turn drive the stock prices up in the secondary market. This notion is supported by 
Gurun and Butler (2012). 
 In the IPO context, it is also possible that stock price better reflects the view of the 
optimistic investor than that of the pessimistic investor due to short selling restrictions and 
                                                     
15
 Considering the fact that the empirical evidence suggests that advertising intensity and initial return dispersion 
are positively related, it is plausible that there should be another rationale, rather than that proposed by the 
alternative signalling theory, that drives this relationship. 
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some regulations associated with IPO. Underlying this overvaluation theory, is the notion first 
proposed by Miller (1977) and further formalised by Morris (1996) who predicted that greater 
divergence in investor beliefs about a firm’s true value leads to short-run overvaluation and 
long-run underperformance. IPO firms provide an ideal setting for testing this overvaluation 
hypothesis since short-selling is very limited in the early days post IPO, some portion of short-
selling is muted after trading (due to SEC regulations, IPO lockup and price stabilisation), and 
IPO firms face greater uncertainty and divergence of opinions than non-issuing firms. Therefore, 
it is possible that the degree of overvaluation will be amplified by the restricted short selling. In 
this context, Houge et al. (2001) argue strongly that institutional controls and Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations in the IPO market significantly restrict short-selling in 
the early post-offering period, and that this limitation could theoretically amplify the degree of 
overvaluation. 
 Extending this theoretical notion - that overvaluation is present in the case of highly-
advertised IPOs - then a higher intensity of advertising will increase the degree of IPO initial 
returns (i.e., stock price in the secondary market), and  the price-to-value ratio of IPO will relate 
directly and positively to the degree of advertising in the IPO year. In other words, firms can 
cause higher stock price inflation if they spend more on advertising around an IPO event. To the 
extent that firms can maximize the stock price in the secondary market, firms have the ability 
(and some degree of freedom, subject to cash on hand) to choose their own level of advertising 
in the IPO year. It is clearly desirable, and possible, for IPO firms to maximise their advertising 
activities in the IPO year in the hope for a higher stock price in the secondary market as well as 
higher IPO price during the price setting process. This supposition is consistent with 
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Chemmanur and Yan (2009a)’s finding that the degree of advertising intensity peaks in the IPO 
year. 
 This view of stock overvaluation can explain the incentive behind the peaked level of IPO 
advertising in the IPO year as well as predict a systematic link between advertising intensity in 
the IPO year and the short-run stock overvaluation. Ultimately, this view predicts that higher 
advertising intensity around an IPO event will drive the stock price to be more over valued in 
the secondary market. This prediction is very important, as it allows a testable hypothesis to be 
developed based on the observable market data. It is worth noting here that, apart from stock 
price in the secondary market, it is also possible that advertising can increase the IPO price 
itself. Although it is more probable16 that stock price is inflated in the secondary market rather 
than in the pre-IPO market, there is no prior reason why a similar effect would not occur during 
the IPO pricing process. In this context, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) have suggested 
that, on average, the offer price of an IPO is overvalued at the offer relative to matching peers. 
The possibility of stock overvaluation at the offer will also be discussed further in this chapter.  
However, price overvaluation at the offer is not the main focus of this research, but it will be 
discussed as a robustness check against the hypothesis. 
 Empirical results presented in the previous chapter show that high advertising intensity 
drives the initial return, as well as stock price volatility, higher in the early days post IPO. In this 
chapter, it is shown that these phenomena are followed later by negative long-run performance 
                                                     
16
 A number of papers have made the claim that retail investors are generally overly optimistic about newly listed 
firms, whereas institutional investors are less prone to this bias. However, there is no hard evidence to support this 
view. While institutional investors may have superior ability to value IPOs more precisely compared to retail 
investors, this does not mean that they will not also hold overly optimistic views. 
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in the few years following IPO. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the extent of this mean 
reversion is positively related to the degree of advertising intensity around an IPO event. All of 
these results imply that advertising intensity is one cause of stock overvaluation, and that 
overvalued stock reverts back to its fundamental value over time. This result is statistically 
significant and economically meaningful as the stock price should always revert to its 
fundamental value in the long run.  
 In the context of stock overvaluation, all of the prior results seem to imply that the 
degree of advertising intensity around an IPO event inflate the short-run stock price in the 
secondary market. In this regard, it is particularly interesting to employ a more direct approach 
to examine the market value of newly issued stocks relative to their intrinsic value in the early 
days post IPO. A direct valuation of IPOs, in the early days after IPO event, reveals whether 
advertising causes the stock price to be overvalued. In this chapter, a direct approach (residual-
income-valuation) is employed to examine the theoretical value of newly listed firms. 
Accordingly, hypothesis H1 is stated in such a way to directly address the relation between 
advertising intensity and stock valuation: 
H1: higher advertising intensity in the IPO year drives the stock price to be more over-
valued in the early days after IPO event. 
Price-to-valuation ratio was employed as an estimate for stock intrinsic value relative to 
its market price observed in the early days after trading. This measure was used to detect the 
presence of, as well as the degree of, post-IPO stock overvaluation. The stock that is not 
overvalued should exhibit the price-to-value (P/V) ratio close to unity. While overvalued 
(undervalued) stock should exhibit the P/V ratio of significantly more than (less than) one. 
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Therefore, the average degree of stock overvaluation was also analysed by testing the average 
P/V ratio to see if the mean P/V ratio was statistically different from unity.   
In order to test hypothesis H1, an estimate of stock theoretical value (Vˆ ) was needed in 
the analysis. In this regard, the RIV model was employed to value the sample of newly listed 
firms. The RIV model was first developed by Peasnell (1982) and further formalised by Ohlson 
(1995), who stressed the importance of linear information dynamics and incorporated this into 
Peasnell’s model.  This method was employed in order to value the IPO sample because it better 
reflects the economic value of stock price when price and value is one of continuous 
convergence rather than static equality. This non-ideal condition is similar to those of newly 
listed firms in the early days after IPO. It takes some time for the stock price to converge to its 
fundamental value.  
The approach of Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999) to implement the RIV model was 
employed; this was for three main reasons. First, this approach provides superior ability to 
explain cross-sectional variation of US stock prices - close to 70 per cent of cross sectional 
variation of US stock prices can be explained by this model (Lee et al. 1999 p.1700, see also 
Frankel and Lee, 1998). Second, this approach avoids the use of ex post realisation of earnings 
and relies solely on the publicly available information such as consensus analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Third, although the relative valuation approach employed by Purnanandam et al. 
(2004) has the merit that current multiples and forecast multiples are easily estimated, its 
drawback is that it is sensitive to accounting manipulation (especially earnings figures). 
Therefore, the RIV model was chosen as the preferred method to estimate a firm’s value 
because it considers whether the projected growth path of the firm is realistic. In addition, it 
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also examines the evolution of the financial statements through the forecast horizon. The 
practical considerations of this model, such as terminal value, expected earnings and cost of 
equity capital, are specified similar to those stated in Lee et al. (1999). The details of the 
methodology used are fully discussed in the data methodology section.  
 
3.2.2 Prior research on stock overvaluation and IPO advertising. 
 In theory, if the market is perfectly efficient, it can be concluded that the stock price will 
always reflect its true intrinsic value at all times. However, ‘perfectly efficient’ market conditions 
are an ideal that do not hold at all times for all types of stock. At some point in time, the 
presence of slight market imperfection occurs, especially in the case of newly-listed firms which 
exhibit a higher degree of information asymmetries and noisier stock prices. Thus, it is 
necessary to understand the difference between intrinsic value and stock prices, as well as the 
rationale for the existence of such difference. 
 One important assumption of the perfectly efficient market is that no arbitrage exists in 
equilibrium, and that the window time for arbitrage is zero. In other words, investors require no 
time to adjust the stock price to its fundamental value. It is widely debatable whether this 
assumption is valid at all times. In this context, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued strongly that 
there is some limitation for arbitrageurs to take arbitrage positions for volatile stock (p. 54). 
These market imperfections (in terms of efficiency) can lead to possible stock mispricing in 
equilibrium17.  
                                                     
17
 According to the efficient market hypothesis, the equality of prices and intrinsic value will hold if, and only if, the 
market is perfectly efficient. In practice, however, it is argued that some slight market imperfections exist such as 
arbitrage costs and information asymmetry. 
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 The evidence presented in the previous chapter showed that, controlled for various 
determinants of initial returns, higher advertising intensity causes stock prices to be significantly 
more volatile (higher initial return volatility) and simultaneously more highly valued in the 
secondary market shortly after an IPO event (higher initial return). In this context, it is 
interesting to see if advertising intensity would affect short-term stock overvaluation in the early 
days post IPO. In consequence, hypothesis H1 is stated in such a way as to reveal the direct link 
between stock overvaluation and the intensity of advertising around an IPO event. 
 Earlier research regarding firms’ advertising intensity usually examined the data of non-
issuing firms rather than those of IPOs. Common among such studies is a conclusion that the 
intensity of advertising is set in order to increase a firm’s visibility among customers. However, it 
could be argued that the incentive of IPO firms to invest more or less in advertising expenditure 
is fundamentally different from that of non-issuing firms due to the decision to issue IPO itself. 
For example, IPOs may have to focus more on a firm’s visibility among market participants (see 
Barth and McNichols, 2001) whereas non-issuing firms may focus advertising activities primarily 
on visibility among their customers (i.e., to maximise customer awareness) to increase future 
sales/profits. Since the sample in this study is comprised of IPOs rather than non-issuing firms, it 
is important to recognise that the rationale behind the decision to advertise IPOs may be 
fundamentally different from those of non-issuing firms.  
 Research on the advertising expenditure of IPOs is still in its infancy, and thus it is an 
area that requires further work.  Some researchers have examined IPOs; for example, 
Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) presented evidence that advertising intensity peaks in the year of 
equity issuance (this holds true for both IPO and SEO events and even when controlled for 
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market considerations as well as industry matching). Their research was based on a sample of 
newly issued firms and thus is closely related to this study.  However, unlike their study, this 
chapter focused primarily on stock valuation in the secondary market and provides an 
alternative view that advertising may cause overvaluation.  
 The findings of Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) implied that advertising expenditure peaks 
in the IPO year, which suggests the existence of a systematic link between advertising intensity 
and the IPO event. However, the true incentive behind this relationship is still unclear. 
Therefore, it is interesting to investigate, first hand, the motive and rationale behind the 
practice of maximising advertising in the IPO year. IPO firms have obvious incentives to advertise 
more about their equity issuance. The firm’s management also has some degree of freedom 
(subject to cash on hand) to decide how much to spend on advertising expenditure in the IPO 
year. To put this into perspective, this means that IPO firms have both the incentive and ability 
to increase (or decrease) advertising intensity around the IPO event as they see fit. If this is the 
case, it should be possible to observe that IPO firms earn some benefit from maximising the 
advertising intensity in the IPO year. One common intuitive belief is that a firm may choose to 
advertise more in the IPO year in order to maximise its value in the secondary market. Since IPO 
prices are determined by demand, which is inherently determined by invertors’ view and 
investor’s recognition, in theory therefore, an IPO firm could raise its stock market price by 
generating excess demand for stock around an IPO event. One way to achieve this is to increase 
advertising expenditure in the IPO year to attract more of the less-informed investors that might 
drive the stock price up. Of course, firms could also pay some incentive to financial analysts to 
encourage them to release favourable recommendations regarding their stock. However, such 
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actions cannot be implemented easily because the sell-side analyst’s report is strictly prohibited 
by SEC regulation during the quiet period18 to prevent stock mispricing. Unlike the sell-side 
analyst’s report, however, the advertising activities are unregulated and potentially could 
generate media bias in newly-listed stocks in the same way that sell-side analyst's report could 
have done (see Gurun and Butler 2012 for the relationship between advertising and media 
bias). Hence, the method of advertising more in the IPO year certainly has a clear advantage 
over the sell-side analyst’s recommendation. That is, provided that the firms have enough 
resources to raise the advertising expenditure, managers have full control over the decision to 
maximise the level of advertising in the IPO year. In addition, since share holder value is 
determined by market value of stock price and the firm’s management has a strong incentive to 
strengthen share holders value, it is also plausible that a firm’s management will intensify 
advertising activities to gain benefits from stock price appreciation in the secondary market.  
 In this context, the empirical evidence from this study suggests that a firm’s attempt to 
maximise its stock value by maximising advertising intensity in the IPO is a successful practice. 
Consistent with Chemmanur and Yan (2009a), the empirical results presented in the previous 
chapter showed that firms successfully heighten the degree of underpricing (i.e., stock price 
post IPO) by intensifying advertising in the IPO year. However, the initial return study alone 
cannot suggest directly the true value of IPO firms because a firm/underwriter could also 
systematically underprice its shares in order to gain other benefits, such as stock visibility 
                                                     
18
  A quiet period, sometimes also referred to as a ‘waiting period’, is a period extending from the time a company 
files a registration statement with the SEC until SEC staff declare the registration statement effective. During that 
period, the federal securities laws limit what information a company and related parties can release to the public. 
Such information includes the sell-side analyst’s earning forecasts of the issuing company. 
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among investors and/or minimising the underwriter’s cost of price stabilisation. Or, on the 
contrary, the stock price of newly listed firms may have been inflated by the media bias 
generated by advertising, as Gurun and Butler (2012) pointed out. That is, the study of initial 
returns alone cannot distinguish between the two aforementioned scenarios19. Having 
acknowledged this limitation, a more direct way to value IPO firms was developed for this study 
by utilising the RIV model to estimate directly the intrinsic value of the sample of newly listed 
firms. 
 This chapter presents evidence that suggests the existence of stock overvaluation in the 
early days after IPO, also evidence that the degree of stock overvaluation shortly after IPO 
(measured by price-to-valuation ratios (P/V)) is higher (lower) among highly (lowly) advertised 
firms. In particular, these findings are consistent with the results obtained from the long-run 
return study; namely that the stock price of highly advertised firms tends to revert to its 
fundamental value in the long run. These results jointly imply that higher initial returns 
generated by advertising are not caused by systematic underpricing, rather this phenomena is a 
direct result of stock price overvaluation caused by a higher degree of advertising intensity 
around the IPO event.  
 Another way to rationalise a firm’s decision to maximise its advertising intensity in the 
IPO year is the view of brand equity. In this context, one can rationalise advertising expenditure 
as a form of company investment. Specifically, advertising can be considered to be a form of a 
company’s intangible assets, similar to research and development. According to this view, 
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 The examination of initial returns alone cannot suggest the intrinsic value of those IPOs. However, since my 
interest is in the intrinsic value and stock price of highly advertised IPOs in the early days after IPO, a more direct 
way to value IPO is needed.  
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advertising intensity should increase a company’s intrinsic value and no association between 
stock mispricing and advertising intensity will be seen. If advertising is considered to be a good 
investment of the firm (i.e., an intangible asset) then it should be possible to observe that an 
increase in advertising intensity will positively affect the firm’s intrinsic value. In this context, it 
is well known among marketing scholars that well-targeted advertising activities increase 
awareness of a company and thereby increase future earnings/sales. For example, Chauvin and 
Hirschey (1993) have asserted that spending on advertising and R&D can be viewed as a form of 
investment in intangible assets with predictably positive effects on future cash flows. However, 
the research reported here is fundamentally different from their work because their research 
was based on non-issuing firms’ data whereas this analysis focuses primarily on IPO firms.  
 Since advertising intensity has been seen to peak in the year of equity issuance, it is not 
logical in the context of IPO to assume that this advertising was targeted toward customers. 
From the product awareness perspective, the product market condition is the true determinant 
of the need for advertising activities in any particular year. If the true reason behind the decision 
to advertise is customer awareness, then financial events such as IPO should, theoretically, be 
irrelevant to the degree of advertising intensity. However, since empirical evidence suggests that 
advertising intensity peaks in the IPO year regardless of what the market environment is at the 
time, it is unlikely that the decision to intensify advertising is solely driven by market 
considerations and/or the expectation of higher future profits income implied by brand equity 
value20. In contrast, since an IPO firm could drive the short-run stock price upwards (cause their 
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 It has been documented in the literature that advertising increases future sales and/or future profits. Common 
among such studies is the notion that advertising increases product awareness and that a firm can increase its 
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stock price to be more over-valued) by advertising more in the IPO year, the view of advertising 
as a form of company investment (intangible assets invested in a hope for higher future profits) 
is somewhat less likely for IPO firms.  
 To the extent that advertising serves as an information carrier that conveys the existence 
of IPOs to market participants, one can expect higher firm visibility generated by advertising. 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that this is the case for firms in general. For example, 
Grullon et al. (2004) studied the impact of firm’s advertising on a firm’s common stock liquidity 
in the aftermarket. They found evidence that advertising has a direct effect on the liquidity of its 
common stock and the number of attracted investors. The work of Grullon et al. (2004) has 
played an important role in this research because they proposed a systematic relationship 
between the demand for stock (as implied by a firm’s visibility among investors) and the degree 
of advertising intensity. However, the positive association between advertising intensity and the 
uncertainty of stock prices is inconsistent with the notion that advertising helps to convey 
information to market participants.  
 The study reported here examined the relationship between advertising and the intrinsic 
value of newly listed firms. There are two possibilities of measuring errors: a) the method used 
to measure intrinsic value itself (that is, the method used to detect the presence of stock 
overvaluation), and b) the errors derived from the imperfect cognitive ability of financial 
analysts to predict a firm’s future earnings. To address these concerns the analysis was 
sensitised by employing two additional tests for robustness:  1) the analysis of P/B ratio as an 
                                                                                                                                                                           
value by investing more in advertising (i.e., brand equity). However, those studies are based on the sample of non-
issuing firms that have no incentive to advertise important financial events such as IPO. 
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alternative benchmark for P/V ratio to detect the variation of stock overvaluation, and 2) the 
RIV model was sensitised using ex post realisation of earnings instead of the consensus analysts’ 
forecasts. These additional tests ensured that the results were not biased by the valuation 
methodology or the analysts’ overly optimistic views. Accordingly, the second and third 
hypotheses of this chapter can be stated as: 
H2: highly (poorly) advertised IPOs exhibit higher (lower) P/B ratios in the early days 
after an IPO event. 
To test for robustness, it is also logical to examine the relationship between advertising 
intensity and its subsequent long-run performance. To the extent that highly advertised firms 
are overvalued in the early days post IPOs and that higher advertising causes the price-to-
theoretical-valuation ratio to be higher, one should rationally expect stock price to converge to 
its fundamental value over time. That is, in the long run, one would expect a negative relation 
between current advertising intensity and the subsequent long-term performance. In addition, 
a long-run performance study is useful as a robustness check because it provides further 
evidence on the theory of stock overvaluation. In this regard, the third hypothesis is: 
 H3: There is a negative relationship between advertising intensity around an IPO event 
and its subsequent long-run performance of newly listed firms. 
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3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Sample selection 
 The IPOs sample selection was described earlier in Chapter 2. There were 1254 IPOs that 
satisfied the advertising expense data criteria. Analysts’ earnings forecasts observations were 
constructed from Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S detail history file. Although it is more convenient to 
directly observe consensus analysts’ forecasts from summary estimate files, the analysis for this 
study strictly required that analysts’ earnings forecast estimates were announced in the early 
days after IPO event (specifically, within 90 days after trading, inclusive). Therefore each 
estimate of earnings forecasts was observed individually from the detail history file, and 
consensus analysts’ forecasts were manually calculated. The RIV model (based on the version by 
Lee et al., 1999, that was a modification of Peasnell, 1982) required that one-year-ahead 
analysts’ forecasts and two-year-ahead analysts’ forecasts must be simultaneously available 
from I/B/E/S. In addition, since the firms needed to be valued in the early days after IPO, it was 
required that each forecast observation had to be announced no later than three months post 
IPO. Accordingly, those observations with missing analysts’ earnings forecast data (either 
missing one-year ahead and/or missing two-years-ahead earnings forecasts data) were 
dismissed.  Finally, the three data sets (CRSP, I/B/E/S and Compustat) were merged and missing 
values (price, analyst forecasts and advertising expenditures) were eliminated.  The final sample 
consisted of 501 IPO observations that satisfied all of the above criteria.  
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3.3.2 Residual Income Valuation (RIV) Model 
 The model of Lee et al. (1999) is not a new valuation model; rather it incorporates 
analysts’ forecast estimates into the Peasnell (1982) RIV model.  Peasnell (1982) demonstrated 
that the intrinsic value defined in equation could be rewritten as the reported book value, plus 
an infinite sum of discounted future residual income, given that a firm’s earnings and book value 
are forecast in a manner consistent with ‘clean surplus’ accounting. (Clean surplus accounting 
requires that all gains and losses affecting book value of equity are included in earnings.) 
Therefore, the net change in book value from one period to the next is equal to earnings minus 
total dividends. In this frame work, the value of a firm (Vˆ ) can be calculated as the summation 
of two main components: 1) the current amount of capital invested in the company (Bt: current 
book value of equity) and 2) the present value of all future residual income (the infinite sum of 
future residual income). Equation 2.1, which represents the residual-income valuation of a firm’s 
value, is thus: 
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 It can be seen from the equation that it is similar to the dividend discount model, but it 
expresses a firm’s value in terms of accounting variables (book value of equity and return on 
equity) instead of the dividend. Hence, it relies on the same theory as the dividend discount 
model and is subject to the same theoretical limitations. However, practical considerations such 
as the availability of consensus analysis earnings forecasts in the US market as well as the ability 
to explain over 70 per cent of cross-sectional variation of US stock prices make this model 
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particularly useful to test the hypothesis. In addition, this model provides a useful conceptual 
framework for the economically meaningful relationship between accounting variables and a 
firm’s value. That is, if firm’s rates of return are equal to its cost of equity capital, then its value 
is equal to the current amount of invested capital (Vˆ = Bt). However, a firm with rates of returns 
that are higher than its cost of capital is valued higher than its current book value, and vice 
versa. 
The efficacy of this model to value stock has been extensively tested and found to be 
robust. It is, of course, possible to value IPOs using a much simpler method such as P/B ratio.  
However, the residual income model is a superior valuation model than traditional market ratios 
such as B/P and E/P and D/P. As noted by Lee et al. (1999, p.1695): “In the post-1963 period, 
traditional market ratios such as B/P, D/P, and E/P ratios do not predict US market returns. 
However, during the same time period, a V/P ratio, in which ‘V’ is estimated using a residual 
income formula, has reliable predictive power for U.S. market returns”.   They found that, based 
on a vector autoregressive (VAR) simulation technique, the above model is robust to the 
inclusion of various factors in the regression, including B/P, E/P, and D/P, as well as the past 
market returns , short-term interest rate, the ex ante term structure risk premium, and the ex 
ante default risk premium.  
The RIV model was implemented by using consensus analysts’ earnings forecasts as a 
proxy for expected earnings, following the approach of Lee et al. (1999). This way, it was 
possible to estimate ex ante earning expectations without relying on the realised ex post 
returns. The availability of analysts’ earnings forecasts also makes this approach easier to 
implement. In particular, the robustness of the model has been previously investigated and 
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proved to be a reliable indicator of stock price variation. Frankel and Lee (1998) implemented 
this model using I/B/E/S analysts’ earnings forecasts. They reported that almost 70 per cent of 
cross-sectional prices in the US can be explained by the valuation measure and that the V/P 
ratio is a more stable predictor of cross-sectional returns than B/P ratio. Various studies have 
employed this model to investigate the value of firms in various contexts. For example, Penman 
and Sougiannis (1997) implemented variations of the model using ex post realisations of 
earnings to proxy for ex ante expectations. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006) 
utilised this valuation model to value the takeover firms in the US stock market (see also 
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 2001). In short, the advantage of this model is as stated by Lee 
et al. (1999:1700): ‘prior studies show that the residual income model can be implemented to 
yield intrinsic value estimates that are highly correlated with cross-sectional stock prices, both in 
the United States and overseas’.  
It can be seen from equation 2.1 that the firm’s value in per-share basis can be easily 
calculated by dividing the equation by the total number of shares outstanding. To estimate a 
firm’s intrinsic value (Vˆ ), a two-stage approach was employed:  1) for the first two years, the 
consensus analysts’ forecasts were used to calculate ROE, and 2) for the following years beyond 
years 2, the ROEs were forecast by mean, reverting the period t+2 ROE to the industry median 
ROE by period t+T. The mean reversion in ROE was specified in order to capture the long-term 
decay of abnormal ROE over time and to address the notion that, in the long run, individual 
firms tend to converge their rate of returns to their industry peers. Accordingly, for the first two 
years, the consensus analysts’ forecasts were used as the proxy for earning expectation 
(forecasted ROE). The forecasted ROE for period 1 and 2 (FROEt+1 and FROEt+2) were computed 
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as FEPSt+1/Bt and FEPSt+2/Bt+1, respectively, where, FEPSt+i were the I/B/E/S consensus analysts’ 
forecasted EPS for year t+i and Bt+i-1 were the book value of equity per share observed from 
Compustat for the fiscal year t+i-1. For the third year onwards (inclusive), the long-term rate of 
returns (ROE) was modelled using a linearly mean reversion to industry ROE, following the 
methodology of Lee at al. (1999). This method is based on a realistic assumption that any 
company cannot keep on winning (or losing) forever. The analysts’ earnings forecast data were 
obtained from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) detail history file. It was 
required, for this study, that those earning per share observations were announced no later 
than three months post-IPO21. Since the analysis focused on the valuation of stock in the early 
days post IPO, only analysts’ forecasts announced within three months (90 calendar days) post 
IPO were included;  all observations announced after three months were excluded. Finally, once 
the analyst earnings forecast data were collected, the consensus analysts’ forecasts were 
calculated for each firm in the sample, as the mean earnings per share forecasted by all analysts. 
It is worth noting here that although it may appear that this observation window is 
somewhat arbitrary, in fact it is not.  Empirically, the period of observation was an optimal 
balance between the availability of data (which affects sample size, thus the reliability of 
results) and the theoretical requirement that the sample should ideally be observed as close to 
the IPO event as possible. If the stock price is observed too late (for example, one year after the 
                                                     
21
  We also experimented with periods of two months and one month post IPO but found that the sample size was 
too small compared to the original sample size. Out of 1254 IPOs, only 5 per cent of the sample (65 IPOs) satisfied 
the criterion that firms in the sample must have analysts’ coverage within the first month post IPO.  Similarly, only 
14 per cent (180 IPOs) had analysts’ coverage within the first two months post IPO. This limitation led to the 
decision to choose a period of three months post IPO, which resulted in the retention of 40 per cent of the sample 
(501 IPOs).  
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IPO event) then the valuation calculated for this study will not correctly reflect the value of firms 
in the early days post IPO. However, if the observation window is too small (for example one day 
after IPO), then the sample would be very limited and thus the results yielded from such a small 
sample would be unreliable. For these reasons, the observation window was chosen to be three 
months. This observation period allowed observation of the expectation of earnings in the early 
days post IPO while retaining a reasonable sample size (almost half of the US firms that report 
its advertising expenditure have three-month analysts’ coverage).  
 
3.3.3 The valuation model and terminal value 
For practical implementation, an explicit forecast period must be specified in order to 
calculateVˆ . That is, the forecast period needs to be specified in order to transform the above 
infinite-form valuation function (equation 2.1) as a finite-form valuation. Consequently, 
equation 2.1 can be re-written as: 
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The model was that future returns on equity (ROE) linearly converge from the ROE level 
at the end of second year to the level of target industry ROEs within seven years. Accordingly, 
from the third year onwards (inclusive), FROEs were forecast using a linear interpolation to the 
industry median ROE (discussed below). The terminal values (TV) were calculated in such a way 
that earnings from year nine to perpetuity were calculated by the industry median ROE (firm’s 
158 
 
ROE in perpetuity), multiplied by the clean-surplus forecasted opening book value for year nine. 
Accordingly, the analysis forecast 10 intervals (T=10) future residual incomes including the 
terminal value. Of course it is possible to calculate value using longer intervals, but it was found 
that the valuation results from longer intervals were very similar and did not affect the 
hypothesis testing. This finding, in fact, is not surprising because Gebhardt et al. (2001) 
sensitised the RIV model and found that the results for varying T=6 to T=21 were very similar. 
Accordingly, T=10 was substituted (as discussed) in the equation 2.2, and the RIV model can be 
written as: 
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          Equation 2.3   
where Bt = current book value of equity per share from the last fiscal year immediately 
after IPO event from Compustat 
r = the cost of equity (discussed below) 
FROEt+i = forecasted ROE for period t + i. For the first two years, these variables were 
computed as  FEPSt+i /Bt+i-1, where FEPSt+i is the consensus analyst’s forecasted EPS from 
I/B/E/S for year t+i and Bt+i-1 is the book value per share for year t+i-1. Beyond the 
second year, FROE was forecast using a linear interpolation to the industry median ROE. 
Bt+i = Forecasted book value of equity per share using clean surplus relation, this is 
computed as Bt+i = Bt+i−1 +FEPSt+i− FDPSt+i , where FDPSt+i is the forecasted dividend per 
share for year t +i, estimated using the current dividend payout ratio (k). That is, FDPSt+i 
= FEPSt+i∗ k. 
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In cases where the implied perpetual value of residual income was negative, the final 
residual income term in the expression above was replaced with zero, on the realistic basis that 
firms cannot endure infinite value loss. Thus, effectively at the end of the forecast period the 
firm is worth the closing book value implied by its short-run earnings. The RIV called for the 
value of industry target return on equity (ROE), cost of capital (r), dividend payout ratio (k), and 
the forecasted book value of equity (B).  The construction of these variables is discussed below. 
 
3.3.4 Clean surplus relation and dividend payout ratio 
The forecasted book value of equity per share was calculated in such a way as to be 
consistent with the clean surplus accounting. The opening book value of equity per share (Bt+i ) 
was equal to the closing book value of equity (Bt+i−1) plus the net change in equity value (per-
share net income FEPSt+i minus dividend per share FDPSt+i). The clean surplus relation can be 
expressed as: 
Bt+i = Bt+i−1 + (FEPSt+i− FDPSt+i).  
= Bt+i−1+ (1-k)*FEPSt+i.      Equation 2.4 
To forecast future equity value, one will require an implied dividend payout ratio (k). In 
this regard, actual payout ratio as observed from Compustat (k=dividend/net income) was used 
for the first two years (current payout ratio and the next) and constant payout ratio was 
assumed from the third year onwards. The model was also sensitised using a constant payout 
ratio for all periods equal to the current payout ratio. It was found that the valuation results 
were very similar and that the choice of dividend payout ratio did not affect the testing of the 
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hypothesis. This is not surprising because, for most of the cases, the dividend payout ratio of the 
second year was equal to the payout ratio in the first year. 
Those missing values of the second year dividend payout ratio were assigned to a value 
of current payout rate. This was done based on a realistic assumption that firms’ payout ratio 
generally does not change drastically from year to year, due to the imposed dividend policy, and 
that firms can maximise their value by maintaining a stable payout ratio. For those firms 
experiencing negative earnings, the dividend payout ratio was assigned to zero. This was done 
based on an economically meaningful assumption that firms experiencing negative earnings 
should not pay dividends. (Although, in practice, this is not always be the case as some loss-
making firms do pay dividends. However, since the firms in the sample were newly listed, and 
expect growth in the following years, they behave in a similar way to growth stocks in that they 
tend to avoid paying dividends.)  A payout ratio of greater than one was assigned a value of one, 
on the assumption that dividend payout at a higher rate than its own earnings are not 
sustainable in the long run for any firm.  
 
3.3.5 Industry ROE 
To compute a target industry return on equity (ROE), all stocks were grouped into the 
same 49 industry classifications, as stated by Fama and French (1997); these industry groups can 
be seen on Fama’s website. The returns on equity of all firms in the same industry within the 
past ten years were collected from Compustat. The ROE was computed as net income divided by 
total book value of total equity. The Compustat data set was then classified into 49 industries 
using SIC code as matching method. The industry return on equity was calculated using all firms 
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in the same industry for the past ten years. Specifically, the industry target ROE was the median 
of past ROEs from all firms in the same industry. To ensure that the estimate of industry ROE 
was not biased by low value estimates, the target industry ROE were winsorised at a risk-free 
rate (Rf), on the basis of a realistic assumption that a firm’s rate of return (ROE) cannot 
indefinitely stay below the risk-free rate. The upper bound of industry ROE could be winsorised, 
however, the sample did not contain many implausible target ROE values. The model was 
sensitised using industry ROE winsorised at 30 per cent and no significant change in the 
valuation results was found. 
 
3.3.6 Cost of equity capital 
 Cost of equity capital was calculated using the CAPM framework. This variable was 
computed by grouping the sample into 49 industries following Fama and French (1997). Then, 
for each IPO in the sample, three pieces of data were collected, namely ten years historical 
monthly market risk premium data, monthly risk-free rate, and monthly industry returns from 
the Fama French data library. The observation period was January 1976 to November 2010, as 
all the IPO samples were issued during January 1986 to December 2010. All data were observed 
120 months (ten years) before the IPO month, excluding the month of the IPO event. This 
process yielded the required data to be used to compute equity’s beta at time of IPO (βit). Since 
10-years equity return prior to IPO was not observable, industry beta were employed as a proxy 
of equity beta (βit). For each IPO, the CAPM equation was regressed using the monthly data to 
estimate the industry beta (βit).The beta of each IPO issued at time t was computed by solving 
the following regression equation :(Rit-Rft) = βit(Market risk premiumt) + ci, ignoring the error 
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term ci. This process yielded ten years historical rolling betas observations of each IPO in the 
sample. 
The beta was then used to calculate the firm’s cost of capital. The cost of capital (ri) was 
then estimated using CAPM framework as: 
rit = Rft+ βit*[E(Rmt)-Rft]       Equation 2.5 
 where Rft= average risk-free rate 
[E(Rm)-Rft] = market risk premium 
A ten-year forward-looking T-bond rate was used as a proxy for ex ante expectations of a 
risk-free rate (Rft) at the time of IPO. This variable was observed from the US department of the 
Treasury22. The market risk premium was assumed to be constant at 4 per cent, to reflect the 
investor’s expectation of risk premium at the time of IPO. The beta of each IPO was computed 
as described above. Other means of estimating this variable could have been utilised (for 
example, Fama French 3-factor model methods). However, Frankel and Lee (1998) argued that 
the choice of cost of equity capital (r) had little effect on their cross-sectional analysis. Likewise, 
it was found that the choice of cost of equity capital estimated did not affect the hypothesis 
testing23. 
In theory, cost of capital should be firm specific, reflecting the premium demanded by 
                                                     
22
 Available online at : http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-
rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yieldAll 
23
 Fama-French 3-factor model yields different cost of capital estimates to those computed by CAPM. However, on 
average, the firm value estimates suggest overvaluation regardless of how the cost of capital is computed (either 
CAPM or FF 3-factor model). This result is consistent with prior research as Frankel and Lee (1998) also noted that 
the method used to estimate cost of capital had little effect on their cross-sectional analysis: “We find varying the 
discount rate had little effect on our results. Abarbanell and Bernard (1995) also find that allowing for 
intertemporal and firm-specific variations in re had little effect on their results.” Frankel and Lee (1998, p.294) 
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equity investors to invest in a firm or project of comparable risk. In practice, however, there is 
little consensus on how this discount rate should be determined. Earlier research was followed 
(Frankel and Lee 1998, among others) and thus a firm’s cost of capital was estimated by using 
the industry cost of capital. To the extent that the industry cost of capital is not a perfect 
predictor of a firm’s cost of capital, it is acknowledged as a possible limitation. However, the 
industry cost of capital is employed as the estimate for the IPO firm’s cost of capital because the 
data regarding the firm prior to the IPO is not observable. Specifically, the financial data of firms 
prior to their listing are generally not available from Compustat. Similarly, the historical stock 
price prior to listing is not available from CRSP. Thus, the use of industry cost of capital has an 
advantage in this regard, as it allows us to observe historical data of many years prior to IPO.  
 
3.3.7 Price-to-valuation ratio 
 The RIV was calculated for each firm in the sample, using equation 2.3 as stated above.  
The IPO sample consisted of 501 IPOs issued during 1986-2009. Stock price at the time of 
earning forecasts were obtained from CRSP.  Where stock price at earning announcement was 
the closing price (or closing average bid-ask if closing prices were not available) of a firm on the 
announcement day of earning forecasts obtained from I/B/E/S, the date of earning forecasts 
was observed from I/B/E/S database. All I/B/E/S forecasts were observed from detail history file 
instead of summary history file, in order to observe the correct announcement date for each 
observation. I/B/E/S forecast data were examined to correct for fiscal year ‘roll-forward’, and 
reassigned to the correct fiscal year.  
Accordingly, price-to-theoretical-valuation ratio was calculated by dividing the observed 
164 
 
stock price at earning announcement (Pt) by its valuation. The model was sensitised using initial-
price-to-valuation ratio (P0/Vt) and three months-price-to-valuation ratio (P3m/Vt) to vary the 
price observed in the early days following IPO event. The various choices of stock prices used to 
calculate the price-to-valuation ratio provided an insight about the stock valuation relative to its 
value in the early days. All variants of computed P/V ratio consistently suggested the same 
results, namely that stock is overvalued in the early days following IPO. Finally, to prevent 
possible bias caused by outliers when calculating P/V ratio, extreme observations were excluded 
from the sample, specifically, those implausible P/V ratios such as the P/V ratio of more than 
30x as well as those valuations that were less than zero (negative valuation). The trimming 
procedure was done to ensure that the P/V ratio samples were not biased by outliers and 
implausible values. To ensure that the choice of method used to eliminate outliers did not affect 
the hypothesis testing, the analysis was also sensitised using 3 per cent winsorisation, and it was 
found that the P/V ratio and regression results were very similar.  
 
3.3.8 Advertising intensity and industry-adjusted advertising intensity 
 A company’s advertising intensity was computed as the cost of advertising, media, and 
promotional expenses obtained from Compustat item #45 divided by total sales revenue in the 
same fiscal year. Advertising intensity was scaled with its sales revenue to control for a firm’s 
size and sales volume. In addition, a firm’s size measurement (total market capitalisation) was 
also included in the regression. Equation 2.6 represents the advertising intensity: 
 
 Advertising Intensity (Adi) = Advertising Expense/Sales Revenue  Equation 2.6 
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 To the extent that certain industries may naturally exhibit higher (or lower) average 
advertising intensity than others, the advertising intensity calculation was adjusted by 
computing a firm’s advertising intensity relative to its matching peers based on industry 
matching. The expected value of industry-wide advertising intensity was calculated by the mean 
advertising intensity from all firms in the same industry using Fama French’s 49 industry 
grouping as grouping criteria. Accordingly industry-adjusted advertising intensity, for each firm 
was calculated as follows: 
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In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that advertising intensity and industry-
adjusted advertising intensity yielded similar results. Consistent with earlier results, it was found 
that the industry-adjusted value and advertising intensity could be used interchangeably 
without affecting the hypothesis testing. For robustness, the analysis reports both the results 
yielded from advertising intensity and the results from industry-adjusted counterpart.  
 
3.4 Results and analysis 
3.4.1 Summary statistics 
 Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics. The average price-to-value (P/V) ratio, at a mean 
of 1.81, showed clear evidence of stock overvaluation in the early days post IPO. This result is 
robust, no matter whether stock price was observed immediately after trading, at the time of 
earnings announcement (sometime between nought to three months following IPO, vary by 
each IPO) or at three months following the IPO event. The average price-to-valuation ratios 
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observed at these periods were 1.75, 1.81 and 1.80, respectively.  All of the mentioned average 
P/V ratios were statistically different from unity (discussed below).  
Theoretically, if firm stocks are appropriately priced, the price-to-valuation ratio should 
be close to unity: by definition, the price-to-valuation ratio of greater (smaller) than one 
suggests stock overvaluation (undervaluation). Accordingly, a conventional t-test was employed 
to test for equality of mean (P/V) on the null hypothesis that mean price-to-valuation ratio 
(Pt/Vt) is unity, against an alternative hypothesis that mean price-to-valuation ration is not equal 
to 1. The test method was also sensitised by employing a non-parametric Wilcoxon-signed-rank 
test to test for the equality of median. The hypotheses for non-parametric test were: H0the 
median price-to-valuation ratio (Pt/Vt) is 1, and Ha the median price-to-valuation ratio is not 
equal to 1. Both hypotheses were stated in such a way to test for the existence of stock 
valuation. Table 2.2 reports the results. 
 Table 2.2 shows that the IPO sample had an average P/V ratio of significantly greater 
than one. Both test statistics were highly significant and both p-values were approximately zero. 
Thus, the null hypothesis, that the sample average Pt/Vt ratio = 1, was rejected, and the 
alternative hypothesis, that the sample average Pt/Vt ratio is not equal to 1, was accepted. Table 
2.1 shows that sample average Pt/Vt ratio was 1.81, and Table 2.2 shows that the average price-
to-valuation ratio is statistically different from unity (t-stat 7.40).  Thus it can be inferred with 99 
per cent confidence (p-value 0.00) that, on average, the sample of IPOs was overvalued. This 
result was consistent, whether a parametric t-test or a non-parametric Wilcoxon-signed-rank 
test was employed. Please note that the above tests are two-tailed tests, thus the test statistics 
from one tailed test will yield the same inference. Overall, both tests suggest that IPOs are 
167 
 
generally overvalued in the early days post IPO. It did not matter at what point observations 
were made during the first three months after an IPO event. The results yielded from the price 
observed from the first day of trading (P0) and the results observed from stock price at three 
months following IPO event (P3m) consistently suggested the overvaluation of stock.  
 
 The research was continued in order to examine the rationale behind the phenomenon 
of stock overvaluation. In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that advertising intensity in 
the IPO years drove the initial return of newly listed firms to be higher. In addition, higher 
advertising intensity also induced higher initial return dispersion (there is a positive relationship 
between initial-return volatility and advertising intensity). However, the positive relationship 
between advertising intensity and the degree of underpricing alone may not be able to 
distinguish two possible explanations. Either the initial returns are driven by systematic IPO 
underpricing, or IPO advertising intensifies short-term stock overvaluation, and hence drives 
stock price up. The hypothesis states that IPO advertising is a possible cause of stock 
overvaluation. One way to investigate the association between advertising and stock 
overvaluation is an investigation of long-term performance because, according to the efficient 
market hypothesis (taking into account practical limitations such as arbitrage costs and 
incomplete information), all stock mispricing should be eliminated over time. In this context, the 
relation between long-term performance and IPO advertising was investigated and it was found 
that the two variables were negatively related. Thus, the results seemed to suggest that 
advertising intensity is a possible cause of stock overvaluation. This is discussed later in this 
chapter. The other way to distinguish stock overvaluation from systematic underpricing is an 
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investigation of the intrinsic value of newly listed firms. A direct valuation of IPOs is a more 
direct way to reveal the true rationale of the observed positive initial returns. The research thus 
continued in that direction.  
 
3.4.2 Relation between advertising intensity and post-market stock over-valuation 
 The literature on IPO established that certain issue-specific characteristics are related to 
the initial return of IPOs. Prior IPO underpricing research indentified several determinants of IPO 
price in the early days post IPO. For example, firm size (or equivalent issue size), underwriter’s 
reputation, VC-backed dummy, certain markets in which IPOs are listed (NASDAQ dummies) and 
pre-IPO market demand for stock (offer price revision). To the extent that price-to-valuation 
(P/V) ratio contains stock price information (as nominator) and the sample in this study 
consisted of IPOs, it was important to include these control variables in the RHS of the 
regression analysis. Accordingly, to examine a clean relation between advertising intensity and 
stock valuation, the following control variables were included.   
Offer price revision was used as the proxy for the pre-market demand for IPO. This 
variable was defined as the difference between the highest and mid-price of the original filing, 
divided by the midpoint of the filing price (Offer price–Midprice)/Midprice). Offer price and mid 
price were observed from SDC platinum. NASDAQ dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was 
listed in NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise. Total market capitalisation was the proxy for firm size, this 
variable was computed as first-day closing price (or closing average bid-ask, whichever was 
available from CRSP) multiplied by its total number of share outstanding. Market capitalisation 
was expressed as natural logarithm, ln(market_cap). The VC-backed dummy equals 1 if the firm 
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was a VC-backed IPO and 0 otherwise. This variable was observed from SDC platinum. 
Underwriter reputation (reputation) was measured by the rank score of Carter and Manaster 
ranking. The ranking score was allocated to each underwriter following Carter and Manaster 
(1990) and Carter et al. (1998) methodologies. The underwriter prestige rankings are on a 0 to 9 
scale, and are based on the pecking order seen in ‘tombstone’ advertisements. The ranking 
score was later updated by Jay Ritter; this variable can thus be seen on Jay Ritter’s website. The 
Carter-Manaster ranking was matched to the IPO sample using company name as matching 
criteria. All stock price, number of shares outstanding and stock market data (including the 
NASDAQ dummy) were observed from CRSP. Advertising intensity and Industry-adjusted 
advertising intensity were computed by Equation 2.6, and Equation 2.7, respectively.  The 
constructions of industry portfolios were described earlier in Chapter 2. Finally the cross-
sectional regressions equation 2.8 was estimated: 
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         Equation 2.8 
 where 
Pi = market closing price per share of firm’s i, equal to first day closing price 
observed from CRSP (others variant of P/V ratio are also reported, discuss below) 
Vit = theoretical value per share of firm i, computed by Peasnell (1982) RIV as stated 
by Equation 2.3  
advertising  = advertising intensity express as advertising/sale (discuss below) 
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reputation  = underwriter’s reputation, measured by Carter and Manaster rank score (0,9) 
price revision = percentage offer price changed relative to its mid-point of their original filing. 
VC-backed  = a dummy variable for VC-backed IPO, equal to 1 if IPO is VC-backed IPO and 0 
otherwise 
ln(market_cap) = firm size of newly-listed firm, express as natural logarithm 
NASDAQ = dummy variable for NASDAQ listed IPO, equal to 1 if IPO is listed in NASDAQ, 
and 0 otherwise. 
α   = intercept 
βi  = response coefficient 
 
Results from advertising intensity and industry-adjusted advertising intensity are 
reported.  It was found that both measures could be used interchangeably without affecting the 
hypothesis testing. Both measures yielded the same inference: that advertising intensity is a 
determinant of stock overvaluation. Hence, only advertising intensity is reported in the 
following studies. The analysis was also sensitised by varying the choice of price used to 
calculate P/V ratio. The results were found to be robust no matter which price was used to 
calculate price-to-valuation ratio. Specifically, three stock prices were observed:  at first-day post 
IPO (P0), at time of earning announcements (Pt), and at three months following the IPO event 
(P3m). All of these P/V ratios suggested overvaluation results. Henceforth, only the Pt/Vt is 
reported as the sole proxy for stock overvaluation in the following studies. Table 2.3 summarises 
the regression results. 
It can be seen that advertising intensity is a significant determinant of the degree of 
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stock overvaluation. There is a strong and positive relation between advertising intensity and 
price-to-valuation ratio of newly listed firms. The coefficient of advertising intensity (β1) is 
positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level for all price-to-valuation ratios 
studied (p-value 0.00). This result suggests that the price-to-valuation ratio of newly-listed firms 
is driven significantly and positively by advertising intensity24. Evidently, firms can maximise 
their share price in the secondary market by spending more on advertising around the IPO 
event. The results in Table 2.3 were derived from advertising intensity measured by equation 
2.6. The results from industry-adjusted advertising intensity (equation 2.7) also yielded results 
consistent with Table 2.3. Both measures of advertising revealed a positive relationship with 
price-to-valuation ratio in the early days post IPO. To illustrate this, a further investigation about 
the relationship between industry-adjusted advertising intensity and price-to-valuation ratios 
was undertaken. The results are presented in Table 2.4. 
It is evident that the industry-adjusted advertising intensity yielded similar results to 
those from advertising intensity. The results based on either measure revealed a significantly 
positive relationship between advertising and price-to-valuation ratios. The coefficient of 
industry-adjusted advertising was positive (β1=0.69) and statistically significant at 1 per cent 
significance level (Pt/Vt: p-value 0.00). This result suggested that the choice of advertising 
measurements, either a measure of advertising intensity (computed by equation 2.6) or 
industry-adjusted advertising intensity (equation 2.7), did not affect the hypothesis testing. 
Thus, the inference is robust against the method used to measure the degree of advertising 
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 The results from the previous chapter show that advertising intensity causes initial returns (i.e. price) to be 
higher. The results from P/V ratio study reveal consistent results and suggest further that the rationale behind this 
phenomenon is stock overvaluation. 
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intensity. Consistent results were observed across various periods after IPO (the observed stock 
prices P0, Pt and P3m). These results suggested that the advertising intensity is a robust 
determinant of price-to-valuation ratio in the early days after IPO. Regardless of the point at 
which the stock price was observed within the first three months, the coefficients of all P/V 
ratios tested (P0/V, Pt/V, and P3m/V) consistently suggest that advertising intensity causes stock 
overvaluation (p-value 0.05, 0.00 and 0.00, respectively). The only notable difference is the 
smaller magnitude of the industry-adjusted advertising coefficient (β1 compared to the 
coefficient of advertising intensity. However, this is to be expected because some portion of 
advertising expense goes to the product/service promotion. There are two other determinants 
that explain the price-to-valuation ratio: the offer price revision and VC-backed dummy. The 
coefficient of offer price revision is positive (Table 2.4: β4 ranging from 2.7 to 2.9), and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level. Similarly, the coefficient of VC-backed 
dummy (β5) was positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 
0.00).  
In summary, the analysis showed that the price-to-valuation ratio of newly listed firms 
relates directly to advertising intensity around the IPO event. As was shown in the previous 
chapter, higher advertising intensity in the IPO year leads to noisier stock prices post market. 
This chapter presents evidence that price-to-valuation ratio of IPO firm relates positively to the 
degree of advertising intensify around an IPO event, and that the extent of advertising intensity 
in the IPO year can explain both P/V ratio and stock price volatility in the secondary market. 
These results jointly suggest that advertising intensity itself is a determinant of stock mispricing: 
that is, advertising causes stock price to be more overvalued. In summary, the observed positive 
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relationship between advertising intensity and price-to-valuation ratio strongly suggests that the 
degree of advertising around an IPO event drives the stock price (as well as the degree of stock 
overvaluation) up in the early days post IPO. 
 
3.4.3 Relationship between P/B ratio and advertising intensity in the IPO year 
To address any concern that the valuation methods used in this study may give too low 
(or too high) intrinsic value estimates that ultimately bias the results, it is important to note that 
the inference relied on the cross-sectional variation of price-to-valuation ratio (varying across 
various firms) rather than on the average level of P/V ratios. That is, even in the existence of 
upward (or downward) bias of the valuation method, the inference based on cross-sectional 
variation of P/V ratio will remain unaffected. Nevertheless, to ensure that the results were 
robust, another crude proxy of price-to-value ratio was used, which has been used in earlier 
studies. In this regard, the relation between price-to-book ratio and advertising intensity in the 
IPO year was examined.  
The book value of equity (B) after IPO event was observed from Standard and Poor 
Compustat the year end of IPO offering. Any negative book value per share observations were 
excluded from the analysis to ensure that it was not contaminated by these implausible 
observations (these observations yield negative P/B ratio which can bias the results). Some firms 
may issue SEO in the same year that resulted in the change in book value per share at the year 
end. These samples were excluded from the analysis. Similarly, we excluded firms that 
announced stock splits before the fiscal year had ended. The stock prices in the secondary 
market were observed from CRSP. Three stock prices of three different dates were collected, 
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namely, the closing price at the first day, the closing price at the day of earning forecasts, and 
the closing price three months following the IPO event. If the closing price at that date was not 
available, the average bid-ask spread was used instead (CRSP denote the bid-ask spread as 
minus value). Those implausible P/B ratios such as the P/B ratio of more than 30x as well as less 
than zero P/B ratio (negative book value) were excluded from the sample. This procedure was 
done to ensure that the P/B ratio samples were not biased by outliers and implausible values. 
Finally, for each IPO in the sample, the price-to-book ratio was computed using the three prices 
collected divided by book value of equity. These P/B ratios were then regressed against 
advertising intensity in the IPO year and a host of controls. To ensure that the results yielded 
from P/B ratio were comparable to the results yield from P/V conducted earlier, control variables 
similar to those used in equation 2.8 were used. These variables included a proxy for pre-market 
IPO demand, firm size, certain financial market which the IPO is listed, underwriter reputation, 
and a dummy for VC-backed IPO. The control variables were kept similar to those found in P/V 
ratio analysis. For robustness, both regression results, based on advertising intensity and on 
industry-adjusted advertising intensity in the IPO year, are reported. The dependent variables 
were P/B ratios and the independent variables were advertising intensity around an IPO event 
and the controls mentioned. Overall, the regression model employed was similar to equation 
2.8 described earlier. Table 2.5 shows the regression results.  
 
Table 2.5 shows that the degree of advertising intensity positively relates to the price-to-
book ratios. The cross-sectional variation of price-to-book ratios can be explained by the extent 
of advertising around an IPO event. The coefficient of advertising intensity (β1) was positive and 
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statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 0.01) for all variants of P/B ratios 
tested. These results, in conjunction with prior results from the price-to-valuation ratios study, 
consistently suggest a positive association between advertising and the stock price inflation. The 
studies of both P/V and P/B suggest that both price-to-valuation ratio and price-to-book ratio 
are higher (lower) if a firm increases (decreases) its advertising intensity in the IPO year. Other 
determinants of initial returns such as pre-market demand for IPO (price revision) and VC-
backed dummy are also significant variables that explain P/B ratios in the early days after an IPO 
event. These results were not surprising as they had been noted in earlier IPO research. The 
stock price in the secondary market can be explained by the pre-market demand for IPO and 
VC-backed dummy. Consistent with the results shown in Table 2.4, in general, the coefficient of 
NASDAQ dummy is a negative but statistically insignificant predictor of price-to-valuation ratio 
and price-to-book ratio. However, the exception in Table 2.5 is that the NASDAQ Dummy is a 
statistically significant determinant of P0/Bt ratio 
25.  
In order to test for robustness, the regression model based on industry-adjusted 
advertising intensity was estimated individually. Table 2.6 shows the regression results. 
 
Similarly, it can be seen in Table 2.6, that industry-adjusted advertising intensity is a 
                                                     
25
 We first hypothesised that the reason for this may be either a) the distributional property of P0/Bt might be 
different from the other two P/B ratios studied, or b) the variable in question (NASDAQ dummy) may be highly 
correlated with other independent variables. However, further data analysis ruled out both these conjectures. 
Specifically, we examined the correlation of NASDAQ dummy and found that the variable had low correlation with 
other independent variables (maximum r=0.03, and is insignificant (t-stat 1.13)). The variance inflation factor of 
NASDAQ dummy was also found to be relatively low at VIF=1.31 (from Table 2.5). We thus investigated further into 
the distributional property of the P0/Bt ratios. However, we found that the distribution of P0/Bt was not different 
from the other two P/B ratios (Pt/Bt, P3m/Bt). All variants of P/B ratios studied exhibited very similar distributional 
properties. 
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significant determinant of price-to-book ratios. Consistent with prior empirical results, the 
relationship between industry-adjusted advertising and price-to-book ratio was found to be 
positive and statistically significant at 5 per cent, 10 per cent and 2 per cent significance level for 
P0/Bt, Pt/Bt, P3m/Bt, respectively.  Regardless of how the extent of advertising around an IPO 
event was measured, each measure yielded the same inference that advertising intensity in the 
IPO year causes stock price inflation in the secondary market. Overall, the study of price-to-book 
ratios yielded results consistent with the P/V ratios studies. This consistency (P/B, P/V) suggests 
that the inference was robust and that the valuation technique did not bias the hypothesis 
testing. 
 
3.4.4 Sensitivity analysis: realised earnings and analysts’ cognitive ability to predict future 
earnings 
 One of the key advantages of the version of the RIV model developed by Lee et al. (1999) 
is that it relies only on publicly available information. The model requires no information that is 
not publicly available at the time of the announcement of earnings forecasts, thus it should 
better reflect the true theoretical value of newly listed firms. In the RIV function (equation 2.3), 
the consensus analysts’ forecasts are utilised as the proxy for the expected future earnings on 
the basis that those forecasts reflect market participants’ expectation of future earnings, and 
that they are publicly available at the time of valuation (t). However, there are two theoretical 
concerns:  1) the consensus analysts’ forecasts may be positively biased, and 2) the financial 
analysts may have limited cognitive ability to forecast future earnings. This section shows 
evidence that the issues did not affect the hypothesis testing. In particular, the inference 
177 
 
continued to hold, even when the valuation model was sensitised using ex post realisation of 
earnings. 
 Although the Lee et al. (1999)’s version of RIV systematically defines formal linkage 
between valuations and accounting numbers, it is still prone to analysts’ forecast bias. The 
efficacy of the valuation using the RIV model relies on the accuracy of consensus analyst 
forecasts. Upward bias in consensus analyst forecast is not new and is well known within 
academia. Some of the literature has criticised the use of analysts’ forecasts because they tend 
to be over optimistic. For example, Rajan and Servaes (1997) found evidence that analysts are 
over optimistic about the earnings potential and long-term growth prospects of IPOs. 
Furthermore, they also found that the upward bias in earnings forecasts is more substantial for 
IPOs than for matched firms in their industries. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) showed that 
analysts underreact to negative information but overreact to positive information.  In addition, 
there are incentives for analysts to give an optimistic view of future growth. Hong and Kubik 
(2003) found that brokerage houses reward optimistic analysts who promote stocks. However, 
although the analysts’ forecasts tend to be upwardly biased, they are very unlikely to jeopardise 
these results. This is because the research focuses primarily on the cross-sectional variation of 
P/V ratios rather than the average level of P/V ratios; there is, thus,  no prior reason why the 
bias should affect the inference regarding the link between advertising intensity and price-to-
valuation ratio. 
 Nevertheless, to ensure that the results were not biased by analysts’ forecast errors, the 
RIV model (equation 2.3) was re-examined using ex post realised earnings instead of consensus 
analyst’s forecasts. This approach is similar to the implementation of Penman and Sougiannis 
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(1997) that required realised EPS observations. This way, both of the aforementioned concerns 
could be addressed, namely: a) realised earnings are obviously not biased in any way, and b) 
realised earnings assume that analysts have perfect cognitive ability to forecast earnings.  
Despite the two advantages, however, the valuation model now required realised future 
earnings data that was not available at the time of earnings forecasts. Because of this, the 
approach of Lee et al. (1999) was preferred to examine the samples, rather than the approach 
proposed by Penman and Sougiannis (1997). Although the approach of Penman et al. (1997) 
may poorly address forecasting issues, their method can provide a valuable robustness check 
and it can also reveal whether the approach adopted in this study suffered from analysts’ 
forecasts error. 
The same methodology employed earlier was followed to ensure that the results were 
comparable. Accordingly, equation 2.3 was modified by using realised earnings instead of 
I/B/E/S earnings forecast for the first two years. The following year (year three onwards) 
earnings were forecast by linearly interpolation to industry average values over a seven-year 
period. All other variables were calculated in the same manner to the RIV model presented in 
equation 2.3. Changes in method were minimised as much as possible to maintain 
comparability. However, it should be noted that the change in earnings-forecast estimates 
directly affected the book value of equity and forecasted ROE. Accordingly, all book values (B) 
and forecasted earnings (FROE) were re-calculated for every period. These variables were 
forecast based on the clean surplus relation described earlier. The price-to-valuation ratios were 
calculated based on three variants of observed prices similar to those reported above (P0, P3m, 
Pt). Finally, famous IPO control variables (such as underwriter reputation, market capitalisation, 
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offer price revision, VC-backed dummy and NASDAQ dummy) were controlled and the relation 
between P/V ratio and the advertising intensity in the IPO year, similar to the regression 
equation 2.8, was examined. For robustness, the choice of advertising intensity measures were 
varied by including both advertising intensity (equation 2.6) and industry-adjusted advertising 
intensity (equation 2.7) in the analysis. Table 2.7 reports the regression results. 
It can be seen, in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, that there is a positive relation between advertising 
intensity and the degree of stock overvaluation post-IPO (P/V ratio).  Regardless of whether 
stock price was observed on the first day after IPO, at a time in between (a date between day 
one and three months) or at three months following the IPO event, the results were consistent:  
advertising is a strong determinant of stock overvaluation (relative to its theoretical intrinsic 
value).The coefficient of advertising intensity (β1) was found to be positive and statistically 
significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 0.00) across all models tested. Thus, the null 
hypothesis, that advertising intensity causes post-IPO stock overvaluation, was accepted. The 
results also revealed that both measures of advertising intensity (industry-adjusted advertising 
intensity and advertising intensity) yielded consistent results. Other variables such as pre-IPO 
demand for stock (offer price revision) and a quality-related factor (VC-backed dummy) are 
determinants that also explain price-to-valuation ratio in the secondary market. Firm size 
(expressed in a natural logarithm of market capitalisation), underwriter’s reputation and 
NASDAQ dummy exhibited insignificant relationships to stock overvaluation post market. 
 Overall, the results obtained from the RIV using ex post realised earnings (Penman and 
Sougiannis, 1997) are consistent with the results from Lee et al. (1999), using ex ante consensus 
analysts’ forecasts. The consistency between the two models suggests that the use of consensus 
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analyst forecasts did not bias the results/hypothesis testing. In particular, the approach of Lee et 
al. (1999) gave advantages over the methodology of Penman et al. (1997) because it does not 
require the realisation of earnings, the information which is unavailable at the time of earning 
forecasts. In addition, the explanatory power of Lee et al.’s approach is similar to that of 
Penman et al.’s. In closing, regardless of the approach used to calculate the theoretical value of 
stock, the advertising intensity around an IPO event is a robust and strong determinant of stock 
overvaluation in the secondary market. The relationship between advertising intensity and the 
price-to-valuation ratio is positive and robust across various models used to calculate price-to-
valuation ratio and robust across methods used to measure advertising intensity around an IPO 
event. 
 
3.4.5 The possibility of stock overvaluation at the offer 
 In the previous sections, it has been demonstrated that the degree of advertising 
intensity in the IPO year relates significantly to the price-to-valuation ratio. Evidence was 
presented that cross-sectional regression of the price-to-valuation ratio vs. the degree of 
advertising intensity in the IPO year yielded a positive and significant relationship between the 
two variables. The results were economically meaningful and seemed to suggest that 
advertising intensity is a factor that causes stock overvaluation.  
The literature has reported on the overvaluation of issued equity at the offer price 
relative to peer firms: Purnanandam and Swaminatham (2004) have provided empirical 
evidence to support the view of stock overvaluation at the offer; they demonstrated that US 
firms that issued equity during 1980 to 1997 were actually overvalued at the offer price relative 
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to their peer firms. If this hypothesis is correct, advertising intensity should relate positively 
with offer-price-to-valuation ratio. Unlike Purnanandam and Swaminatham (2004)’s study, 
which was based on relative measures such as such as P/E and P/EBITDA ratios, this analysis was 
based on an absolute valuation approach (price-to-valuation ratio) using the residual income 
model. Of course, it was inappropriate to utilise the methodology of Lee et al. (1999) to value 
IPO before trading because the consensus analysts’ forecasts are not publicly available before 
the IPO are actually traded in the public financial market. However, since this analysis focused 
mainly on the cross-sectional variation of P/V ratio, rather than on the actual level of value 
estimate (Vˆ ) itself, this study can provide a useful robustness check.  
If the degree of advertising intensity positively affects the offer price of IPO, then one 
should observe a positive relationship between advertising intensity and the variation of offer-
price-to-value ratio. To test this hypothesis, a modified version of valuation equation 2.8 was 
employed, using the offer-price-to-valuation ratio as the dependent variable. Since the stock 
market capitalisation was not observable at the offer, the total proceeding amounts observed 
from SDC platinum were used instead as the proxy for firm sizes. Table 2.9 reports the 
regression results.  
Table 2.9 showed that there is a positive relationship between offer-price-to-valuation 
ratio and the degree of advertising intensity. The coefficient of advertising intensity (β1) was 
positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 0.00). Thus the null 
hypothesis, that there is no relationship between offer price appreciation and advertising, was 
rejected, and the alternative hypothesis, that advertising intensity causes higher offer-price 
appreciation, was accepted. The results were robust, even when important controls, such as the 
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offer price revision, were included. The coefficient of offer price revision (β4) was found to be 
positive and statistically significant at 2 per cent significance level (p-value 0.02). The results 
suggest that there is a positive association between pre-IPO demand and offer-price-to-
valuation ratio. Quality-related factors, such as proceeding amounts, relate positively with offer-
price-to-valuation ratio (p-value 0.02). Overall, the result was robust; each measure yielded the 
consistent result that the degree of advertising intensity affects offer-price-to valuation ratio. 
 
3.4.6 The relationship between advertising intensity and its subsequent long-run 
performance. 
 So far, the results from price-to-valuation ratios studies suggest that firms with higher 
advertising intensity in the IPO year are more overvalued in the secondary market. However, to 
the extent that stock price always converges to it fundamental value over time, according to the 
efficient market hypothesis, one can rationally expect that long-run performance should relate 
negatively to the degree of advertising intensity. In other words, if advertising intensity causes 
the stock price to be more overvalued in the early days post IPO, then one should observe the 
reverse trend that advertising intensity should cause the long-run performance to under-
perform. This is because the extent of long-run mean reversion will relate proportionally to the 
degree of stock overvaluation in the early days post-IPO, and stock overvaluation is inherently 
determined by advertising intensity. So far, the analysis has shown that advertising intensity 
causes stock to be more overvalued, hence it could be expected that firms which undergo 
higher advertising intensity in the IPO year will experience poorer long-run performance. 
Accordingly, hypothesis (H3) regarding the long-run performance of IPOs, is stated in such a way 
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to directly test for a systematic link between long-run performance and the advertising intensity 
in the IPO year:  
 H3: There is a negative relationship between advertising intensity around an IPO event 
and the subsequent long-run performance of newly listed firms. 
In order to examine the relationship between stock’s long-run performance and 
advertising intensity, it was necessary to control for other characteristics of firms that might 
determine the stock’s long-run performance. As previously identified in earlier research in this 
area, these controls include IPO size, quality of issue, underwriter reputation, dummy for VC-
backed IPO, and dummy for specific stock market. Initial returns were also included as another 
control variable to ensure that the underperformance results were robust and were not biased 
by the degree of initial returns. Hence, the initial return was included in the RHS. 
 Central to the debate among scholars about measuring abnormal long-run performance 
is the specification of ‘normal’ long-term performance, as well as the method used to measure 
it. In general, researchers usually refer to three ways of measuring long-run abnormal 
performance:  Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR), Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR), and 
Fama-French 3-factor model. All methods have their merits and none has proved to be a clear 
winner.  As noted, it is apparent from the literature, that the time-series factor model suffers 
greatly from low power to reject the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns; results from such 
studies can produce unreliable inferences26. (The power of a test is the probability of rejecting 
                                                     
26
Barber and Lyon (1997) argue strongly against the use of the Fama-French 3-factor model to detect long-run 
abnormal returns; in addition  Loughran and Ritter (2000) made the following observation: ‘If there are significant 
misvaluations in the stock market, both abnormal returns and measured inefficiencies should not be robust to 
alternative methodologies. In particular, some methods (Fama-French) have little power to pick up materially 
significant misvaluations’. 
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the null hypothesis when the hypothesis is false.) Accordingly, the results from Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR) are presented, as well as Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) as 
the primary long-run performance measure. However, despite some disadvantages of the Fama 
French method as described, the results from the study of the long-run performance are still 
reported using the Fama French 3-factor model as well as Carhart’s 4-factor model (Carhart 
1997) for robustness. Please note, however, that the results of such studies should be 
interpreted with care due to the potential problems that can arise from mis-specified test 
statistics when we deal with stock misvaluation (see Barber and Lyon, 1997 and Loughran and 
Ritter, 2000 for more detail).  
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)  
Cumulative monthly abnormal returns were computed following Ritter (1991). First, Rit 
was computed, as the simple return on an IPO firm i in month t and E(Rit) as the expected return 
(i.e., the benchmark return). CAR was then calculated as the difference between the simple 
return and the benchmark return across T months, where T represents the holding horizon of 
the IPO, equals to the end date up to which CAR was computed or the delisting date of the IPO 
firm i, whichever was earlier. The benchmark returns E(Rit) were computed as the return on 
Fama French's 2*3 portfolios constructed from firm size and book-to-market matching. These 
portfolios were the intersections of two portfolios formed on size (market value of equity, ME) 
and three portfolios formed on the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity 
(BE/ME). The size breakpoint was the median NYSE market equity. BE/ME of year t was the book 
equity for the last fiscal year end in t-1 divided by ME for December of t-1. The BE/ME 
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breakpoints were the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. The portfolio returns and breakpoints were 
observable from Fama French's website. All stock splits and divided payments during the 
holding period were taken into account. The sample size of 1254 IPOs was larger than the 
sample size of P/V ratio studies because long-run studies no longer require the consensus 
analysts’ forecast. 
Brav and Gompers (2003) have observed that there are price revisions at six months post 
IPO due to lockup expiration27.Having acknowledged this, the calculation during the first six 
months from the long-run return study was omitted to prevent potential bias. Thus CAR was 
calculated based on various holding periods but not before six months post IPO. Accordingly, the 
following holding periods of CAR were reported: namely 12, 24, 36 and 48 months following the 
first trading day. The CAR is described as:  
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  where CAR  = Cumulative Abnormal Return of firm i 
  T  = the end date up to which CAR is computed or the delisting date of the  
   IPO firm i, whichever occurs sooner 
  Rit = simple return of firm i  
  E(Rit) = benchmark return 
 
                                                     
27
 See also Field and Hanka (2001), Aggarwal et al. (2002) for the stock price performance and insider selling 
around lock-up expiration. 
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 After the CAR was computed, the following regression was estimated for each holding 
period. Table 2.10 shows the relationship between long-term IPO performance (CAR) and the 
advertising intensity in the IPO year. All test statistics were corrected for heteroskedasticity 
using the methodology of White (1980). 
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          Equation 2.10   
 where 
CARi = cumulative monthly abnormal return of firm i 
advertising  = advertising intensity express as industry-adjusted advertising intensity in the 
IPO year (equation 2.7) 
reputation  = underwriter’s reputation, measured by Carter and Manaster score (0,9) 
ln(proceeds)  = proceeding amounts of IPO, express as natural logarithm 
NASDAQ = dummy variable for NASDAQ listed IPO, equal to 1 if IPO is listed in NASDAQ, 
and 0 otherwise. 
price revision = percentage offer price changed relative to its mid-point of their original filing. 
VC-backed  = a dummy variable for VC-backed IPO, equal to 1 if IPO is VC-backed IPO and 0 
otherwise. 
Initial return = 1st day return of firm i, defined as percentage change in 1st day closing price 
relative to offer 
α   = intercept 
βi  = response coefficient 
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 Since the effect of investors’ sentiment decays over time, as all information is realised 
and short-sale constraints are relaxed in the long run, the hypothesis (H3) predicts that there is 
negative long-run price reversion caused by advertising intensity. Consistent with this notion, 
evidence was found that advertising intensity in the IPO year related negatively to long-run 
performance. The coefficients of industry-adjusted advertising intensity (β1) were found to be 
negative, and statistically significant at 2 per cent significance level (p-value < 0.02 for all holding 
period tested). Thus the null hypothesis, that advertising intensity and long-run performance 
are unrelated, was rejected and the alternative hypothesis, that advertising intensity causes 
stock to underperform in the long run, was accepted.  The results were robust against important 
characteristics of firms (big or small, high or low book-to-market), and robust against the 
inclusion of popular IPO controls. In summary, the negative price reversion that was caused by 
high advertising intensity around an IPO event was observed. The results from Table 2.10 
support the notion that the higher the advertising intensity around an IPO event, the higher 
degree of stock underperformance, and vice versa.   
 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) 
 The methodology was also sensitised to measure long-run performance by including 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) in the analysis. The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
has the advantage of easier statistical tests, but some scholars argue that CAR may be positively 
biased and difficult to interpret in a practically meaningful way. In comparison, Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Return (BHAR) represents the returns obtainable by an implementable investment 
strategy. Hence, both methods were employed to ensure that the results were robust. Following 
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Loughran and Ritter (1995), BHAR was computed as the return on a buy-and-hold investment in 
the IPO firm less the return on a buy-and-hold investment in its benchmark stock (the 
benchmark return). The Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return can be described as: 
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          Equation 2.11 
 The Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns are the difference between continuously 
compounded stock returns and the continuously compounded return on benchmark. The 
benchmark was defined as Fama French's 2*3 portfolios constructed from firm size and book-to-
market matching. The portfolio breakpoints and portfolio returns are observable from French's 
website. All stock splits and divided payments during the holding period were taken into 
account. The buy-and-hold-abnormal returns (BHAR) over various holding periods were 
reported:  the holding periods of 12, 24, 36 and 48 months following first trading day were 
included in the analysis. After the BHAR of each IPO sample was computed, the following 
regression was estimated: 
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          Equation 2.12 
 The control variables were defined in a similar way to that of the CAR regression 
(equation 2.10) described above, including the initial return. Table 2.11 reports the regression 
results. All test statistics were corrected for heteroskedasticity using the methodology of White 
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(1980). 
 Consistent with the notion that the effect of IPO advertising is short lived, it was found 
that the price correction trend caused by advertising intensity occurs relatively early. Table 2.11 
shows that advertising intensity in the IPO year caused negative long-run abnormal return after 
one year following the IPO event28. The coefficient of advertising intensity (β1) was negative and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level for a one-year holding period. Thus, it can 
be inferred that a high degree of advertising intensity causes negative long-run abnormal 
returns. Although the test statistics for other holding periods were statistically insignificant, the 
coefficient of advertising intensity was uniformly negative (β1<0) for all holding periods tested, 
which confirms the inference that advertising intensity and long-run abnormal returns relate 
negatively.  
In closing, the CAR and BHAR suggest that the higher the advertising intensity around an 
IPO event, the higher degree of stock underperformance. After a year following the IPO event, 
                                                     
28
 We expected to find negative and statistically significant intercepts of longer holding periods than those 
presented in Table 2.11 (two three and four years) because prior research (Ritter 1991) established that the 
abnormal returns of IPOs are generally negative. However, according to Simpson (2008) firms choose to disclose 
advertising expense when they expect to earn valuation benefit. If this is correct, the effect of voluntarily 
disclosure can bias upward the intercept observed over the longer holding period (i.e., three or four year holding 
period).The effect of voluntarily disclosure was further examined and it was found that those firms that disclosed 
their advertising expense indeed earned positive abnormal return over three and four years holding periods, if 
computed with Carhart (1997)'s calendar time portfolio regression (the results are presented in Table 2.15). 
Accordingly, we conjecture that the effect of voluntary disclosure may undermine the significance of results 
presented in Table 2.11. Although the effect of voluntarily disclosure should affect both CAR and BHAR, it is 
plausible that BHAR is more susceptible to the bias than CAR because BHAR is computed by continuously 
compounded return while in the case of CAR the return is not compounded.  
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highly advertised IPOs underperformed relative to firms matched with similar characteristics, 
such as size and book-to-market. These results were statistically significant as well as 
economically meaningful because they suggest that short-run stock overvaluation is followed by 
long-run mean reversion. These results are robust in terms of the methods used to measure 
long-run abnormal returns (either CAR or BHAR), and in the use of control variables, such as 
those identified in earlier IPO research.   
 
Calendar-time regression:  Fama-French’s 3-factor model and Carhart’s 4-factor model 
 The method that was used in this study was sensitised by employing Fama French 3-
factor model as well as Carhart’s 4-factor model in the analysis. That is, the difference between 
the abnormal return of low-advertising portfolios and the abnormal return of high-advertising 
portfolios was examined. Each IPO in the sample was assigned into one of three portfolios of 
low, medium and high industry-adjusted advertising intensity. The portfolio breakpoint was 
specified at 33.3 per cent and 66.6 per cent percentile. The return data were observed from 
CRSP monthly.  IPOs that did not report their advertising expenses in the IPO year were excluded 
from the sample. The abnormal return (αi) of the portfolio of high and low advertising intensity 
was computed using Fama-French 3-factor model and Carhart’s 4-factor model (Equations 2.13 
and 2.14, respectively): 
tttftmtiftpt ehHMLsSMBRRbRR  ][      
          Equation 2.13   
tttftmtiftpt emMOMhHMLsSMBRRbRR  ][    
          Equation 2.14 
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  where αi = intercept (abnormal return) 
 Rmt-Rft  = market premium 
  SMB = small-minus-big (market capitalization) 
  HML = high-minus-low (book-to-market) 
 MOM  = momentum factor 
 Tables 2.12 and 2.13 present the results from calendar time regression using the Fama-
French 3-factor model and Carhart’s 4-factor model, respectively. The results were found to be 
consistent with Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) in that the three common risk 
factors (SMB, HML and market premium) as well as the momentum factor (MOM) were found 
to be statistically significant. However, it was interesting to note the difference in the abnormal 
returns of the portfolio of low advertising and that of the high-advertising portfolio. The 
hypothesis predicted that the high-advertising portfolio would earn less than the low-
advertising portfolio because the degree of price reversion should be more severe in the case of 
highly-advertised firms and vice versa. Consistent with this, the results, as shown in Table 2.12, 
indicate that the high-advertising portfolio earned 7.2 per cent  less (annually) than the 
portfolio of low-advertising intensity over the four-year holding period (-0.2 per cent minus 0.4 
per cent times 12 months). The results from Carhart’s 4- factor model (Table 2.13) also 
confirmed that the low-advertising portfolio over performed relative to the high-advertising 
portfolio by 7.2 per cent per year (0.6 per cent times 12 months) over the same period of time. 
Overall, the results from both models (using either the Fama French 3-factor model or the 
Carhart 4-factor model) indicated that firms in the high-advertising portfolio earned significantly 
less than those in the low-advertising portfolio in the long-run. Thus, the hypothesis that the 
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degree of price reversion is more severe in the case of highly-advertised firms was accepted.  
 The negative intercepts (α<0) of the high-advertising portfolio are consistent with the 
prediction that the high-advertising portfolio should underperform (relative to the low-
advertising portfolio). The results presented in Table 2.12 confirm that the signs of the high-
advertising portfolio’s intercepts (αi) over one, two, three and four-year holding periods are 
consistently negative (Table 2.12 : αi<0 for all holding periods tested). However, the intercepts of 
high-advertising portfolios over longer holding periods (three and four years), while negative, 
were found to be statistically insignificant. We conjecture that the effect of advertising 
voluntary disclosure may undermine the significance of these results29.  
 
                                                     
29
  We expected negative and statistically significant intercepts because prior research (Ritter 1991) established 
that the abnormal returns of IPOs are generally negative. However, according to Simpson (2008), firms choose to 
disclose advertising expense when they expect to earn valuation benefit. If this is correct, the effect of voluntarily 
disclosure can bias upward the intercept observed over the longer holding periods (two three or four year holding 
period). The effect of voluntarily disclosure also explains the positive abnormal returns observed in the portfolio of 
low advertising firms. Accordingly, we conjecture that the effect of voluntary disclosure may undermine the 
significance of the results presented in Table 2.12 and 2.13. Further investigation into the effect of voluntary 
disclosure showed that those firms that disclosed their adverting expense earned positive abnormal returns over 
longer holding periods (i.e., three and four-years), if computed with Carhart (1997)'s calendar time portfolio 
regression (the results are presented in Table 2.15). 
The results presented in Table 2.15 support our notion that the effect of voluntary disclosure may undermine the 
significance of the results presented in Table 2.12 and 2.13. Table 2.15 shows that those firms that disclosed their 
advertising expenses earned positive abnormal returns over three and four years holding periods, if computed 
with Carhart (1997)'s calendar time portfolio regression (Table 2.15 : α3y>0 , t-stat 2.35 and α4y>0, t-stat 3.02 ). 
Since the effect of the voluntary disclosure of advertising biases upwards the intercept (α), we conjecture that the 
effect of voluntary disclosure may undermine the significance of our results in Table 2.12. 
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3.4.7 Advertising and voluntary disclosure. 
 Simpson (2008) has suggested that there are fundamental differences between firms 
that reported their advertising expense before 1994 and firms that reported their advertising 
expense after 1994. Before 1994, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required 
industrial and commercial firms to supply information regarding advertising expense. The SEC’s 
Financial Reporting Release No. 44 (FRR44) from 1994 eliminated the requirement to furnish 
this schedule. Since advertising expense was one of the items previously referenced by this 
release, FRR44 effectively made separate disclosure of advertising outlays optional. According to 
Simpson (2008), firms disclosed their advertising expense voluntarily when they earned the 
valuation benefit, and chose not to disclose their advertising when they earned no valuation 
benefit. Since more than half of the sample (53 per cent) consisted of firms that voluntarily 
disclosed their advertising post 1994, it is possible that the abnormal returns observed from the 
sub-sample of post- 1994 IPOs that voluntarily disclosed their advertising may be higher than 
the abnormal returns among firms that did not. This scenario could also explain why there are 
some positive abnormal returns in Tables 2.12 and 2.13. To test against this selective disclosure 
hypothesis, an analysis was undertaken to see if there was any differences in long-run abnormal 
return between firms that disclosed their advertising compared with those that did not, during 
the voluntary period (post 1994). 
 Two portfolios were constructed, consisting of: a) IPOs that disclosed their advertising 
voluntarily, and b) IPOs that did not, during the voluntary period (that is, the period during 
which firms were not required by legislation to disclose their advertising expense, namely the 
year after 1994). This process yielded two portfolios with sample sizes of 3,257 and 674 IPOs, 
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respectively. According to Simpson (2008), one will observe higher abnormal returns among 
firms that voluntarily disclose their advertising compared to those that do not. Thus the test 
hypothesis was as follows: H0: there is no difference in abnormal returns between the two sub-
samples, and the alternative hypothesis was: Ha: firms that voluntarily disclose their advertising 
earn higher abnormal returns. The abnormal returns of the two aforementioned portfolios were 
computed using Fama French's 3-factor model and Carhart’s 4-factor model. Tables 2.14 and 
2.15 report the regression results. All test statistics reported are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
using White (1980)'s methodology.  
It can be seen that, consistent with Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), the 
three common risk factors, namely SMB, HML, market risk premium as well as the momentum 
factor (MOM), were found to be statistically significant. The results were consistent regardless 
of whether Fama-French’s 3-factor or Carhart’s 4-factor model were used. The long-run 
abnormal returns (i.e., intercept) of IPOs that disclosed advertising voluntarily were found to be 
positive and statistically significant over three and four-year holding periods (Table 2.14 
α4y=0.42% per month, t-stat 1.77 : Table 2.15 α3y=0.61% t-stat 2.35 and α4y=0.68% t-stat 3.02). 
This result was consistent with the suggestion of Simpson (2008) that firms advertise only when 
they see positive valuation benefits. In contrast, firms that did not disclose their advertising 
exhibited abnormal returns (intercept) that were not statistically different from zero (t-stat 0.17 
and 1.40, over a four-year holding period, from Tables 2.14 and 2.15, respectively). That is, the 
abnormal returns among IPOs that disclosed their advertising were positive and statistically 
significant. Specifically, those firms that disclosed advertising voluntarily earned 8.16 per cent 
per year (0.68 per cent times 12 months) over the four- year period, if computed with Carhart 
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(1997)'s calendar time portfolio regression This abnormal return is statistically significant at 1 
per cent significance level (Table 2.15: α4y - t-stat 3.02). Overall, the long-run average abnormal 
returns of the advertising-disclosed portfolio exhibited higher abnormal returns compared to 
those derived from advertising-not-disclosed portfolio. Thus, the null hypothesis was rejected 
and the alternative hypothesis, that IPOs that disclose their advertising voluntarily earn higher 
abnormal returns than those firms that do not, was accepted. This result is consistent with the 
suggestion by Simpson (2008) that firms disclose their advertising voluntarily only when they 
see positive valuation benefits. Thus, it can be inferred that the observed positive abnormal 
returns among advertising-disclosed firms were a direct result of selective advertising 
disclosure.  
In closing, this section discussed the effect of selective disclosure bias in the context of 
long-run performance. In order to address the concern that sample selection may bias the 
inference about the association between advertising and price-to valuation ratio, the 
relationship was investigated further using the Heckman selection model. The relationship 
between advertising and price-to-valuation ratio, after corrected for the selection bias, is 
discussed in section 3.4.8  
 
3.4.8 Robustness check Heckman selection model 
Advertising intensity is observable when firms disclose their advertising figure, and not 
observable otherwise. Therefore our analysis was limited to the advertising sample (firms that 
report their advertising). This raises the concern that the observed results may be biased by the 
sample selection and thus affects our inferences, so the Heckman (1979) selection model was 
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run in order to correct for the sample selection bias. The Heckman selection model consists of a 
selection equation and a response equation. Since the results from the first-stage selection 
equation is similar to those presented in Table 1.14, only the results from the second-stage 
price-to-valuation ratio equation (the response equation) are presented here. Accordingly, we 
ran regression equation 2.8 again, using the Heckman selection model. This robustness check 
was conducted in order to see if the relation between advertising and stock overvaluation 
(price-to-valuation ratio) still existed after correction for selection bias.  
The theoretical valuation of each firm was computed by the Peasnell (1982)’s residual-
income-valuation model. The method used to estimate firms’ values was described earlier in 
equation 2.3. To prevent possible bias caused by outliers when calculating P/V ratio, extreme 
observations were excluded from the sample, specifically, those implausible P/V ratios such as 
the P/V ratio of more than 30x as well as those valuations that were less than zero (negative 
valuation). The trimming procedure was done to ensure that the P/V ratio samples were not 
biased by outliers and implausible values. To ensure that the choice of method used to 
eliminate outliers did not affect the hypothesis testing, the analysis was also sensitised using 3 
per cent winsorisation, and it was found that the P/V ratio and regression results were very 
similar. The main area of interest here is the relation between advertising and price-to-valuation 
ratio, right after the IPO event. Therefore, we focused on the initial-price-to-valuation ratio 
(P0/Vt) because it better reflects the price-to-theoretical valuation ratio at the first day after 
IPO30. Since the variable constructions are similar to those presented in equation 2.8, only the 
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 We also experimented with other variants of P/V ratios [price at earning announcement divide by its valuation 
(Pt/Vt), and three months-price-to-valuation ratio (P3m/Vt)]. However, all three variants of price-to-valuation ratios 
suggested the same inference that advertising and price-to-valuation ratios are positively related.  
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regression results are presented (in Table 2.16).  
It can be seen that advertising intensity is a significant determinant of the degree of 
stock overvaluation. There is a positive relationship between advertising intensity and price-to-
valuation ratio of newly listed firms. The coefficient of advertising intensity (β1) is positive and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level for all variant of price-to-valuation ratios 
studied (p-value 0.00). Thus, we can infer with 99 per cent confidence that the advertising 
intensity related positively to price-to-valuation ratio. This inference is consistent with the 
inference inferred from our advertising sample presented earlier. There are two other 
determinants that explain the price-to-valuation ratio: the offer price revision and VC-backed 
dummy. The coefficient of offer price revision is positive (β4 ranging from 2.91 to 3.21), and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 0.00). This result suggests that the 
IPO pre-market demand is a determinant of price-to-valuation ratio. Similarly, the coefficient of 
VC-backed dummy (β5) was positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level 
(p-value 0.00). This result suggests that investors tend to value VC-backed IPOs more highly in 
the early days post IPO. Overall, the results from the Heckman selection model are consistent 
with those results presented earlier from our advertising sample: that advertising, offer price 
revision and VC-backed dummy related positively to price-to-valuation ratio. Therefore, we can 
infer that that the observed relation between advertising and price-to-valuation ratio is unlikely 
to be biased by the sample selection.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 This research provided an investigation of the stock overvaluation caused by advertising 
around an IPO event. Evidence was presented that firms that intensify their advertising in the 
IPO year (relative to their industry peers) earn higher stock-price appreciation in the secondary 
market. The direct valuation of IPOs, using residual-income valuation framework, revealed that 
the positive initial returns in the early days post IPO were not caused by systematic 
underpricing. Rather, the results suggest that the observed positive initial returns were the 
direct results of stock overvaluation (measurable by its price-to-theoretical value ratio), which is 
systematically caused by advertising around an IPO event. The inclusion of an alternative 
measure such as P/B ratio also revealed the same trend. The long-run abnormal return study 
also confirmed that the inflated stock price reverts back to its intrinsic value in the few years 
after trading.  The results were robust against all popular methods used to detect abnormal 
returns. Specifically, all three methods used to measure abnormal returns (Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR), Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) and the Fama French 3-factor 
model) showed that industry-adjusted advertising intensity causes lower abnormal returns.  
It has been well documented that the extent of initial returns earned from holding IPO 
stocks in the short run are significantly positive. This research has contributed to the IPO 
underpricing literature by documenting a possible explanation for IPO underpricing: that 
advertising around an IPO event drives the stock price to be more overvalued in the secondary 
market. Interestingly, other forms of good news such as sale side analysts’ recommendations 
are strictly prohibited during the early days after IPO, while the extent of advertising activities 
around the IPO event is completely unregulated. The results showed that industry-adjusted 
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advertising intensity directly affects the price-to-valuation ratio in the early days after IPO event. 
This raises a serious question about the necessity to regulate IPO advertising in order to prevent 
stock misevaluation in the secondary market. 
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3.6 Tables of Chapter 3 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Valuation at earning announcements (Vt), in 
dollars 
16.52 13.21 0.00 167.26 15.90 
Initial Price (P0) 17.43 15.80 5.13 100.34 8.51 
Price at earning announcements (Pt) 17.98 16.50 2.63 100.34 9.79 
Price 3 months post IPO (P3m) 18.48 15.95 2.45 238.31 14.76 
Initial Price-to-valuation ratio (P0/Vt) 1.75 1.17 0.12 27.06 2.19 
Price-to-valuation ratio (Pt/Vt) 1.81 1.17 0.13 27.53 2.35 
3 months-price to valuation ratio (P3m/Vt) 1.80 1.19 0.13 22.75 2.21 
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Table 2.2a: Test statistics of price-to-valuation ratio (at earning announcement) 
Type of test 
t-
stat 
p-
value 
t-test for the equality of mean  
H0 :  mean Pt/Vt ratio = 1 
7.40 0.00 
Wilcoxon signed rank test for the equality of median 
H0 : median Pt/Vt ratio = 1 
8.21 0.00 
 
 
Table 2.2b: Test statistics of price-to-valuation ratio (first-day and 3-months following IPO) 
Type of test 
t-
stat 
p-
value 
t-test for the equality of mean  
H0 :  mean P0/Vt ratio = 1 
7.32 0.00 
Wilcoxon signed rank test for the equality of median 
H0 : median P0/Vt ratio = 1 
8.15 0.00 
t-test for the equality of mean  
H0 :  mean P3m/Vt ratio = 1 
7.79 0.00 
Wilcoxon signed rank test for the equality of median 
H0 : median P3m/Vt ratio = 1 
8.07 0.00 
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Table 2.3: IPO-year advertising intensity vs. price-to-valuation ratios 
 
  Dependent variable 
 
P0/Vt 
 
Pt/Vt 
 
P3m/Vt 
 
  
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity 6.58 3.53 0.00 
 
10.32 5.45 0.00 
 
11.34 7.45 0.00 
 
1.02 
Underwriter Reputation 0.08 0.87 0.38 
 
0.12 1.32 0.19 
 
0.10 1.21 0.23 
 
1.27 
In (Market Capitalization) 0.16 1.76 0.08 
 
0.11 1.13 0.26 
 
0.10 1.17 0.24 
 
1.56 
Price revision 2.54 4.70 0.00 
 
2.71 4.75 0.00 
 
2.40 4.60 0.00 
 
1.26 
VC-backed Dummy 0.64 2.94 0.00 
 
0.71 3.1 0.00 
 
0.68 3.27 0.00 
 
1.21 
NASDAQ Dummy 0.27 1.04 0.30 
 
0.36 1.33 0.19 
 
0.39 1.59 0.11 
 
1.31 
Intercept -0.31 -0.41 0.69 
 
-0.65 -0.83 0.41 
 
-0.52 -0.71 0.48 
  
F statistics 13.86 
 
17.33 
 
22.38 
 
  
R-Squared 0.16   0.19   0.24 
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Table 2.4: Industry-adjusted advertising intensity vs. price-to-valuation ratios 
 
Dependent variable 
 
P0/Vt 
 
Pt/Vt 
 
P3m/Vt 
 
  
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Industry-Adjusted 
Advertising intensity 0.26 1.93 0.05 
 
0.69 5.13 0.00 
 
0.57 4.50 0.00 
 
1.00 
Underwriter Reputation 0.09 1.03 0.30 
 
0.15 1.61 0.11 
 
0.13 1.45 0.15 
 
1.27 
In (Market Capitalization) 0.15 1.61 0.11 
 
0.09 0.90 0.37 
 
0.07 0.79 0.43 
 
1.55 
Price revision 2.67 4.90 0.00 
 
2.90 5.08 0.00 
 
2.70 5.01 0.00 
 
1.25 
VC-backed Dummy 0.70 3.19 0.00 
 
0.81 3.55 0.00 
 
0.81 3.75 0.00 
 
1.21 
NASDAQ Dummy 0.26 1.01 0.31 
 
0.38 1.40 0.16 
 
0.40 1.54 0.12 
 
1.31 
Intercept -0.05 -0.07 0.95 
 
-0.16 -0.20 0.84 
 
0.01 0.01 0.99 
  
F statistics 12.18 
 
16.67 
 
15.54 
 
  
R-Squared 0.14   0.19   0.18 
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Table 2.5: Advertising intensity vs. price-to-book ratios 
 
Dependent variable 
 
P0/Bt 
 
Pt/Bt 
 
P3m/Bt 
 
  
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity 1.24 2.45 0.01 
 
1.30 2.49 0.01 
 
1.43 2.65 0.01 
 
1.02 
Underwriter Reputation 0.12 0.92 0.36 
 
0.18 1.34 0.18 
 
0.19 1.42 0.16 
 
1.27 
In (Market Capitalization) 0.60 4.71 0.00 
 
0.52 3.85 0.00 
 
0.49 3.60 0.00 
 
1.56 
Price revision 1.50 1.90 0.06 
 
2.13 2.49 0.01 
 
1.82 2.17 0.03 
 
1.26 
VC-backed Dummy 0.97 3.09 0.00 
 
1.22 3.62 0.00 
 
1.17 3.50 0.00 
 
1.21 
NASDAQ Dummy -0.82 -2.13 0.03 
 
-0.49 -1.20 0.23 
 
-0.07 -0.18 0.86 
 
1.31 
Intercept 1.53 1.45 0.15 
 
0.96 0.86 0.39 
 
0.70 0.62 0.53 
  
F statistics 15.31 
 
14.67 
 
12.64 
 
  
R-Squared 0.14   0.14   0.12 
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Table 2.6: Industry-adjusted advertising intensity vs. price-to-book ratios 
 
  
Dependent variable 
 
P0/Bt 
 
Pt/Bt 
 
P3m/Bt 
 
  
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Industry-Adjusted 
Advertising intensity 0.11 2.00 0.05 
 
0.11 1.89 0.06 
 
0.15 2.43 0.02 
 
1.00 
Underwriter Reputation 0.12 0.90 0.37 
 
0.18 1.35 0.18 
 
0.19 1.41 0.16 
 
1.27 
In (Market Capitalization) 0.60 4.75 0.00 
 
0.53 3.90 0.00 
 
0.49 3.63 0.00 
 
1.55 
Price revision 1.49 1.89 0.06 
 
2.11 2.47 0.01 
 
1.81 2.15 0.03 
 
1.25 
VC-backed Dummy 0.99 3.14 0.00 
 
1.24 3.68 0.00 
 
1.19 3.55 0.00 
 
1.21 
NASDAQ Dummy -0.80 -2.08 0.04 
 
-0.48 -1.16 0.25 
 
-0.06 -0.14 0.89 
 
1.31 
Intercept 1.61 1.51 0.13 
 
1.00 0.89 0.37 
 
0.80 0.71 0.48 
  
F statistics 14.81 
 
14.17 
 
12.34 
 
  
R-Squared 0.13   0.14   0.11 
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Table 2.7: Robustness check against analysts’ forecasts error (Penman et al. (1997)  
  
Dependent variable 
 
P0/Vt 
 
Pt/Vt 
 
P3m/Vt 
 
  
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity 10.56 4.42 0.00 
 
8.40 4.15 0.00 
 
9.73 4.54 0.00 
 
1.02 
Underwriter Reputation 0.13 1.11 0.27 
 
0.14 1.35 0.18 
 
0.11 0.91 0.36 
 
1.27 
In (Market Capitalization) 0.16 1.31 0.19 
 
0.14 1.36 0.17 
 
0.10 0.80 0.42 
 
1.56 
Price revision 1.89 2.62 0.01 
 
2.46 4.01 0.00 
 
2.60 3.53 0.00 
 
1.26 
VC-backed Dummy 0.99 3.40 0.00 
 
0.93 3.76 0.00 
 
1.13 3.81 0.00 
 
1.21 
NASDAQ Dummy 0.37 1.07 0.28 
 
0.37 1.28 0.20 
 
0.48 1.36 0.17 
 
1.31 
Intercept -0.77 -0.77 0.44 
 
-0.72 -0.84 0.40 
 
-0.46 -0.45 0.65 
  
F statistics 11.00 
 
14.63 
 
13.23 
 
  
R-Squared 0.13   0.17   0.15 
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Table 2.8: Robustness check against analysts’ forecasts error, adjusted for industry (Penman et al., 1997) 
 
  
Dependent variable 
 
P0/Vt 
 
Pt/Vt 
 
P3m/Vt 
 
  
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Industry-Adjusted 
Advertising intensity 0.58 3.36 0.00 
 
0.48 3.26 0.00 
 
0.54 3.11 0.00 
 
1.00 
Underwriter Reputation 0.15 1.28 0.20 
 
0.15 1.52 0.13 
 
0.13 1.04 0.30 
 
1.27 
In (Market Capitalization) 0.13 1.11 0.27 
 
0.12 1.18 0.24 
 
0.07 0.58 0.56 
 
1.55 
Price revision 2.08 2.86 0.00 
 
2.60 4.23 0.00 
 
2.84 3.82 0.00 
 
1.25 
VC-backed Dummy 1.10 3.74 0.00 
 
1.01 4.08 0.00 
 
1.24 4.14 0.00 
 
1.21 
NASDAQ Dummy 0.36 1.04 0.30 
 
0.37 1.26 0.21 
 
0.47 1.33 0.19 
 
1.31 
Intercept -0.26 -0.26 0.80 
 
-0.30 -0.35 0.72 
 
0.07 0.06 0.95 
  
F statistics 9.48 
 
13.35 
 
11.27 
 
  
R-Squared 0.11   0.15   0.13 
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Table 2.9a: Poffer/Vt vs advertising intensity    Table 2.9b: Poffer/Vt vs Industry-adjusted advertising intensity 
 
  
Dependent variable 
 
  
Dependent variable 
 
Poffer/Vt 
 
 
Poffer/Vt 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value VIF 
 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value VIF 
Advertising intensity. 9.17 5.55 0.00 1.02 
 
Advertising intensity (adjusted) 0.65 5.47 0.00 1.00 
NASDAQ dummy 0.08 0.93 0.35 1.27 
 
NASDAQ dummy 0.10 1.24 0.22 1.27 
VC-backed Dummy 0.07 0.83 0.41 1.56 
 
VC-backed Dummy 0.05 0.60 0.55 1.55 
In (Proceeds) 1.15 2.31 0.02 1.26 
 
In (Proceeds) 1.32 2.65 0.01 1.25 
Price revision 0.47 2.34 0.02 1.21 
 
Price revision 0.56 2.80 0.01 1.21 
Underwriter Reputation 0.15 0.62 0.53 1.31 
 
Underwriter Reputation 0.17 0.71 0.48 1.31 
Intercept -0.07 -0.10 0.92 - 
 
Intercept 0.38 0.54 0.59 - 
F statistics 10.00 
 
F statistics 9.86 
R Square 0.12 
 
R Square 0.12 
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Table 2.10: Cumulative Abnormal Returns vs. advertising intensity 
  Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
Benchmark : Fama-French's 2*3 portfolios formed on size and book-to-market 
  
  12 months  24 months  36 months  48 months   
  Coeff t-stat p-value  Coeff t-stat p-value  Coeff t-stat p-value  Coeff t-stat p-value  VIF 
Industry adjusted 
Advertising Intensity 
 
-0.21 -2.42 0.02  -0.57 -2.90 0.00  -0.96 -4.72 0.00  -0.95 -3.65 0.00 
 
1.01 
Underwriter Rank  0.11 0.41 0.68  -0.31 -0.72 0.47  -0.71 -1.42 0.15  -1.29 -2.22 0.03  1.81 
In (Proceeds)  1.32 2.76 0.01  3.46 4.00 0.00  5.21 5.54 0.00  6.05 5.60 0.00  2.15 
NASDAQ Dummy   3.52 2.89 0.00  6.14 2.99 0.00  7.06 3.10 0.00  2.88 0.98 0.33  1.51 
Price revision   -0.72 -0.33 0.74  -6.82 -2.07 0.04  -3.34 -0.80 0.42  -10.26 -1.94 0.05  1.12 
VC-backed Dummy  0.57 0.62 0.53  2.43 1.82 0.07  2.08 1.47 0.14  0.26 0.15 0.88  1.22 
Initial Return  -1.06 -0.82 0.41  -0.96 -0.53 0.60  -0.12 -0.03 0.98  3.87 0.59 0.55  1.08 
Intercept  -12.35 -5.50 0.00  -29.40 -7.59 0.00  -44.20 -10.45 0.00  -49.18 -8.97 0.00   
R-Squared  0.014  0.033  0.061  0.055   
Observations  1254   
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Table 2.11: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns vs. Advertising intensity 
  Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) 
Benchmark : Fama-French's 2*3 portfolios formed on size and book-to-market 
  
  12 months  24 months  36 months  48 months   
  Coeff t-stat p-value  Coeff t-stat p-value  Coeff t-stat p-value  Coeff t-stat p-value  VIF 
Industry adjusted 
Advertising Intensity 
 
-0.01 -2.51 0.01  -0.01 -0.61 0.54  -0.01 -0.23 0.82  -0.01 -0.78 0.44 
 
1.01 
Underwriter Rank  0.01 1.10 0.27  -0.03 -0.53 0.60  0.02 0.29 0.77  0.11 1.49 0.14  1.81 
In (Proceeds)  -0.01 -0.39 0.70  -0.05 -1.10 0.27  -0.14 -2.01 0.04  -0.31 -2.68 0.01  2.15 
NASDAQ Dummy   -0.04 -1.11 0.27  -0.05 -0.60 0.55  -0.22 -1.55 0.12  -0.52 -2.34 0.02  1.51 
Price revision   0.13 1.44 0.15  0.58 1.82 0.07  -0.30 -0.27 0.79  -1.37 -0.90 0.37  1.12 
VC-backed Dummy  0.02 0.81 0.42  0.31 3.44 0.00  0.52 2.82 0.00  0.68 3.63 0.00  1.22 
Initial Return  -0.03 -0.58 0.56  0.20 0.81 0.42  2.63 1.25 0.21  4.85 1.42 0.16  1.08 
Intercept  -0.05 -0.70 0.48  0.43 1.18 0.24  0.31 0.63 0.53  0.15 0.28 0.78   
R-Squared  0.012  0.016  0.041  0.085   
Observations  1254   
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Table 2.12: Fama-French calendar time portfolio regression (equally-weighted returns, monthly) 
  tttftmtiftpt ehHMLsSMBRRbRR  ][  
  Low-advertising intensity portfolio (n= 417)  High-advertising intensity portfolio (n= 417) 
Holding  α b s H R2  α b s h R2 
(months)  (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)   (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)  
12  -0.003 1.04 1.38 -1.01 0.37  -0.006 0.91 1.03 -0.28 0.37 
  -0.42 7.08*** 5.78*** -3.98***   -1.32$ 8.52*** 5.96*** -1.53$  
24  0.005 1.23 1.13 -0.49 0.43  -0.005 1.14 0.79 0.14 0.50 
  0.88 9.93*** 6.30*** -2.48**   -1.28 13.73*** 6.57*** 1.07  
36  0.004 1.18 1.06 -0.27 0.58  -0.003 1.14 0.83 0.15 0.63 
  0.99 14.21*** 8.90*** -2.13*   -0.96 17.77*** 9.03*** 1.57$  
48  0.004 1.20 1.00 -0.11 0.78  -0.002 1.11 0.80 0.27 0.66 
  1.71* 23.73*** 13.86*** -1.48$   -0.87 19.56*** 9.80*** 3.07**  
   The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.13: Carhart's calendar time portfolio regression (equally-weighted returns, monthly) 
    tttftmtiftpt emMOMhHMLsSMBRRbRR  ][  
  Low-Advertising intensity Portfolio (n= 417)  High-Advertising intensity Portfolio (n= 417) 
Holding  α b s H m R2  α b s h m R2 
(months)  (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)   (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)  
12  0.001 0.94 1.30 -1.20 -0.51 0.39  -0.008 0.95 1.06 -0.19 0.20 0.38 
  0.19 6.33*** 5.53*** -4.72*** -3.45***   -1.60$ 8.73*** 6.14*** -1.03 1.78*  
24  0.011 1.07 1.19 -0.85 -0.72 0.49  -0.003 1.09 0.81 0.04 -0.22 0.51 
  1.97* 8.87*** 7.02*** -4.32*** -5.95***   -0.81 12.88*** 6.80*** 0.26 -2.59**  
36  0.007 1.08 1.09 -0.41 -0.42 0.62  -0.000 1.05 0.85 0.04 -0.34 0.67 
  1.91* 13.15*** 9.61*** -3.27*** -5.54***   -0.06 16.78*** 9.82*** 0.47 -5.92***  
48  0.006 1.13 1.02 -0.19 -0.25 0.80  0.000 1.03 0.82 0.17 -0.31 0.70 
  2.62** 22.81*** 14.78*** -2.56** -5.42***   0.07 18.65*** 10.71*** 1.97* -6.22***  
    The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.14: Effect of voluntary disclosure of advertising: Fama-French calendar time portfolio regression (equally-weighted 
portfolio returns, monthly) 
  tttftmtiftpt ehHMLsSMBRRbRR  ][  
  Advertising not disclosed portfolio (n= 3257)  Advertising voluntarily disclosed portfolio (n= 866) 
Holding  α b s h R2  α b s h R2 
(months)  (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)   (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)  
12  -0.0014 1.14 0.82 -0.67 0.78  -0.0026 1.12 1.05 -0.51 0.65 
  -0.49 15.73*** 6.35*** -6.30***   -0.72 15.11*** 5.74*** -2.52**  
24  -0.0024 1.20 0.88 -0.57 0.82  -0.0006 1.24 0.62 -0.23 0.68 
  -0.95 19.75*** 7.65*** -5.11***   -0.17 17.64*** 3.77*** -1.50$  
36  -0.0007 1.25 0.88 -0.41 0.83  0.0030 1.17 0.77 -0.04 0.73 
  -0.31 22.18*** 8.02*** -4.16***   1.08 21.45*** 5.32*** 0.32  
48  0.0004 1.26 0.92 -0.30 0.83  0.0042 1.16 0.78 0.04 0.78 
  0.17 21.43*** 9.28*** -3.22***   1.77$ 22.87*** 6.65*** 0.41  
    The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.15: Effect of voluntary disclosure of advertising: Carhart's calendar time portfolio regression (equally-weighted portfolio 
returns, monthly) 
    tttftmtiftpt emMOMhHMLsSMBRRbRR  ][  
  Advertising not disclosed Portfolio (n= 3257)  Advertising voluntarily disclosed Portfolio (n= 866) 
Holding  α b s h m R2  α B s h m R2 
(months)  (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)   (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)  
12  -0.0009 1.12 0.83 -0.69 -0.07 0.77  -0.0007 1.02 1.03 -0.57 -0.23 0.66 
  -0.29 16.97*** 6.76*** -6.45*** -0.81   -0.18 10.89*** 5.98*** -3.08** -2.09*  
24  -0.0004 1.08 0.91 -0.66 -0.29 0.85  0.0031 1.06 0.71 -0.39 -0.44 0.74 
  -0.15 18.13*** 9.82*** -6.29*** -3.62***   0.97 15.94*** 5.21*** -2.90** -4.07**  
36  0.0020 1.09 0.94 -0.53 -0.438 0.87  0.0061 0.99 0.84 -0.17 -0.43 0.81 
  0.87 20.91*** 10.82*** -6.05*** -4.22***   2.35** 16.63*** 7.89*** -1.52$ -4.19***  
48  0.0031 1.11 0.98 -0.42 -0.38 0.88  0.0068 1.02 0.84 -0.07 -0.35 0.83 
  1.40 21.48*** 12.62*** -4.97** -4.54***   3.02** 19.20*** 9.58*** -0.69 -4.31***  
    The symbols $,*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.16: Robustness check: Heckman two-step regressions of IPO-year advertising intensity vs. price-to-valuation ratios 
 
  Dependent variable 
 
P0/Vt 
 
Pt/Vt 
 
P3m/Vt 
 
  
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
Coeff. t-stat p-value 
 
VIF 
Advertising intensity 2.58 3.13 0.00 
 
3.02 4.31 0.00 
 
3.09 3.45 0.00 
 
1.02 
Underwriter Reputation 0.09 1.03 0.30 
 
0.13 1.24 0.22 
 
0.10 1.09 0.28 
 
1.31 
In (Market Capitalization) 0.15 1.53 0.13 
 
0.12 1.05 0.29 
 
0.09 0.94 0.35 
 
1.58 
Price revision 2.91 4.45 0.00 
 
3.21 4.91 0.00 
 
2.95 5.20 0.00 
 
1.27 
VC-backed Dummy 0.78 3.13 0.00 
 
0.93 3.25 0.00 
 
0.81 3.37 0.00 
 
1.20 
NASDAQ Dummy 0.29 1.01 0.31 
 
0.41 1.26 0.20 
 
0.45 1.54 0.12 
 
1.15 
Intercept -0.29 -0.35 0.73 
 
-0.50 -0.61 0.54 
 
-0.41 -0.49 0.62 
  
Estimation Method Heckman Two-Step 
Observations 6541 
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Chapter 4 Value relevance of R&D and advertising in newly listed firms 
4.1 Introduction 
 Over the last decade, a growing body of literature has suggested that intangible assets 
are important determinants of a firm’s value. Examples of important intangible assets include 
innovation, technology, brands, and commitment of employees. Despite the fact that these 
intangible assets are important for many firms, the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) does not properly recognise them as accounting assets. This is presumably because the 
values of such ‘assets’ are very difficult to accurately estimate and thus it is impossible to 
precisely record their intrinsic value in financial statements. As a result, when a firm invests 
large amounts of its resources in these intangible assets, the absence of the relevant accounting 
information generally complicates the process of the valuation of the firm. 
 It has been argued that the value of intangible assets can significantly affect a firm’s 
value. For example, Barth, Clement, Foster and Kasznik (1998) suggest that brand value 
(advertising) relates significantly and positively to stock prices and returns. They also point out 
that brand value is relevant to investors as it is sufficiently reliable to be reflected in share 
prices. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) also report a 
positive association between the level of Research and Development (R&D) and subsequent 
excess risk-adjusted returns (see also Guo et al. 2006; and Franzen and Radhakrishnan, 2009 for 
work on R&D). Similar research regarding the value of other forms of these intangible assets 
also exists. For instance, corporate governance and corporate social responsibility is known to 
be positively related to a firm’s returns/value (see Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003, among 
others). Common conjecture among these studies is the notion that, on average, these 
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intangibles relate positively to a firm’s returns/value. However, it is worth mentioning here that 
most of these aforementioned studies focused primarily on a general sample of firms (the 
majority of which were non-IPO firms), and that little is known about the value relevance of 
intangible assets in the case of start-up firms such as IPOs. Indeed, it can be hypothesised that 
the value relevance of these intangibles is similar to those found in the sample of general firms. 
However, it is not known whether the trend observable from non-IPO firms is the same for 
newly listed firms (IPOs). In this context, Hand (2005) has noted that the value relevance of 
financial statement data and non-financial statement information are quite different at the IPO 
compared to the trend observed from matured firms31. According to Hand (2005) the IPO event 
may cause the difference of value relevance of the financial data at the IPO: “Consistent with 
arguments made by finance research into other IPO pricing anomalies, I attribute this to the 
notion that IPOs are sold by sophisticated underwriters to unsophisticated retail investors who 
underweight the value relevance of financial statement data and overweight the value 
relevance of non-financial statement information”, Hand (2005, pp.617). Accordingly, it is logical 
to include the discussion about the value relevance of the intangibles in the IPO context.  
 The aim of the research reported in this chapter is to shed some light on the value 
relevance of the two most common intangibles among a sample of start-up firms (IPOs). In 
particular, the significance of innovation and technology (in terms of research and development 
- R&D) and brand equity (advertising) for the value of newly-listed firms are investigated. The 
focus is on these two areas because they are the most common type of intangibles that are not 
                                                     
31
 “At the IPO, the value relevance of financial statement data dips temporarily below the maturity trend line while 
the value relevance of non-financial statement information rises temporarily.” Hand (2005, p.617). 
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recognised as assets but are instead reported as expenses when they are included in a 
company’s financial report32.   It is known that both R&D and advertising are relevant to a firm’s 
value. Most of the existing literature suggests that, while R&D generates some long-term value 
(and can therefore be included in stock value), advertising generates intangible assets with very 
short useful lives (see Bublitz and Ettredge, 1989; Rayvenscraft and Scherer, 1982). There thus 
seems to be a consensus that advertising is short lived while R&D is long lived. However, in the 
case of IPOs, some emerging evidences seems to suggest that advertising does have significant 
importance for stock returns of newly-listed firms in the early days following IPO (see 
Chemmanur and Yan,2009a). In other words, it is plausible that apart from R&D, advertising 
may also be an intangible asset that is useful in the valuation of start-ups, or can cause a 
misprice that drives the stock price up. Accordingly, both R&D and advertising are included in 
the analysis as it is interesting to see the value relevance of both intangibles in the case of newly 
listed firms. 
 Estimated coefficients of earnings and book values may be biased, given that the market 
is not perfectly efficient (including IPO markets).  Aboody, Hughes and Liu (2002) discussed the 
impact of market inefficiencies on the estimation of coefficients in value relevance regressions. 
They compared coefficient estimates obtained from conventional value relevance regressions 
with those from regressions employing their adjustment procedure, and found statistically 
significant differences in both level and return regression coefficient estimates. However, while 
                                                     
32
 GAAP requires that both R&D and advertising are recorded as expenses. In accordance with AICPA Statement of 
Position (SOP) 93-7, the advertising cost is recorded as expense when it incurred or on the first occasion of 
advertising. Similar codification can be found in Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) #2: R&D costs 
are charged to expenses when incurred because future economic benefits are uncertain. 
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the magnitude of differences in coefficient estimates for return regressions is large enough to 
affect economic inferences, Aboody et al. (2002)'s adjustment procedure did not yield 
economically important differences in estimated value relevance coefficients using price level 
regressions33. According to Aboody et al. (2002), the potential error of coefficient estimates are 
very small and not economically significant in the case of price level regressions:  
Overall, the changes in levels regression coefficient estimates, although 
highly significant in the statistical sense, are less likely to be significant in an 
economic sense because of the modest magnitudes. Consistent with the 
resolution of measurement errors in one to three years, a plausible 
explanation for the modest magnitudes is that market inefficiencies are 
more likely to pertain to “new information.” Since levels regressions 
inherently pick up information accumulated since the inception of the firm, 
market inefficiency is less likely to play a large role. (Aboody et al., 2002, 
p.978)  
 
Since the analysis in this chapter focuses on the price level regressions (the dependent variables 
are stock prices), the inferences from this chapter are unlikely to be biased by the error of 
coefficients. Nevertheless, the contribution of Aboody et al. (2002) is relevant to this chapter.    
 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 The relevance of R&D and advertising to a firm’s value 
 Over the last decade, the importance of intangible assets has increasingly caught the 
attention of scholars in this field. The question of whether or not the stock prices fully value a 
firm’s intangible assets has raised concerns among researchers and inspired many value-
                                                     
33
 “Our adjustment procedure does not yield economically important differences in estimated value relevance 
coefficients using price level regressions” and “while return regressions pick up new information, level regressions 
reflect an accumulation of information since the inception of the firm”, Aboody et al. (2002) p.984. 
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relevant research studies.  Examples of these intangibles include, but are not limited to, 
research and development (technology-driven firms), brand names (advertising-intensive firms), 
social recognitions (socially-responsible firms), and corporate governance (good governance 
firms). According to accounting theory, the market value of a firm’s share should ultimately 
reflect the value of all its net assets. When most of the assets are physical, such as equipment, 
plant and land, the linkage between stock prices and asset values is relatively obvious. However, 
in modern economies, many firms rely significantly on various types of intangible assets to 
generate revenues. That is, in the modern economies, a large part of a firm’s value may reflect 
its intangible assets, such as innovations, patent or brand names. In other words, these 
intangibles contain some value-relevant information. However, under GAAP, intangibles such as 
R&D and advertising are not correctly recorded as assets, instead they are recorded as expenses 
incurred. Because of this, when a company possesses large amounts of such intangibles, the lack 
of the relevant accounting information generally complicates the process of equity valuation. 
Further adding to the complication of this matter is the practice of reporting these intangibles in 
company’s financial reports: the codification of these intangibles not as assets but as expenses 
incurred raises serious questions about whether or not markets take into account these 
intangibles and to what extent the stock price reflects them. 
Intangibles assets are known to be relevant to the value of a firm and two intangibles in 
particular, R&D and advertising, have been the focus of much attention among value-relevance 
scholars. For example, Barth et al. (1998) examined a sample of 595 firm-year observations 
observed from Financial World brand value estimates. They noted that brand value estimates 
capture information that is relevant to investors and are sufficiently reliable to be reflected in 
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share prices and returns. They also found that brand value estimates are related strongly to 
advertising expenditure. Thus, advertising expenditure is examined in this chapter. Consistent 
with the findings of Barth et al. (1998), Kallapur and Kwan (2004) found from their analysis of a 
sample of 33 UK firms that brand assets were value relevant. They also found that the stock 
price reaction during the 21 days surrounding the first announcement of brand recognition was 
positively related to the announced brand amount. Although the relevance of advertising is 
extensively documented in the US, little is known about other financial markets, presumably 
due to the lack of advertising information from other countries. 
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) examined a sample of US data from 1975 to 1991 and found 
that the corrections to reported earnings and book values for R&D capitalisation were strongly 
related to stock value and returns. Their results indicate that the R&D capitalisations generate 
information that is value-relevant to investors. Chan et al. (2001) have reported that firms with 
high R&D to equity market value earn larger excess returns. They also note that, apart from 
R&D, a similar relationship exists between stock returns and advertising. Similar evidence of the 
importance of R&D has emerged from various capital markets around the world. Zhao (2002) 
examined the value relevance of R&D from samples drawn from the US, UK, Germany and 
France stock markets and reported that R&D is valued by investors, regardless of what 
accounting policy is used to report (either partly capitalisation in the case of France and UK, or 
fully expensed as in Germany and US). In short, there seems to be a consensus among scholars 
that R&D is value relevant and that the evidence of increases in R&D spending among US firms 
over the last decade suggests that full expensing of R&D expenditures for financial reporting 
purposes severely distorts the earnings and book values of R&D intensive firms (Chambers, 
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Jennings and Thompson, 2002; Franzen and Radhakrishnan, 2009 among others). It is worth 
noting that apart from R&D and advertising, there is some evidence that other forms of 
intangibles also affect stock value. For instance, Gompers et al. (2003) demonstrate that firms 
with stronger shareholder rights (that is, better corporate governance) had higher profits, were 
valued higher, and had higher sales growth. Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2006) 
found similar evidence that the quality of corporate governance positively related to a firms 
valuation (see also Ammann, Oesch and Schmid, 2011, among others).  
 Whilst the value-relevance of these intangible assets has been extensively documented 
in the case of non-issuing firms, little is known about the value of these intangibles in case of 
newly listed firms such as IPOs. In particular, it is uncertain to what extent market participants 
value these intangibles in the short time period after the company has gone public (that is, after 
the IPO event). According to Hand (2005), the value relevance of financial statement data and 
non-financial statement information are quite different at the IPO compared to the trend 
observed from matured firms. To the best of our knowledge, no prior literature seems to 
simultaneously analyse both R&D and advertising in a valuation context, following an IPO event. 
To address this gap, a sample of IPOs was examined in order to assess the value relevance of the 
two most common intangibles: advertising and R&D. The focus was primarily on these two 
intangibles for two reasons: first, these intangibles are among the most commonly found in 
companies’ financial reports that are reported as fully expensed in the US. These two 
intangibles are known to be the major subjects in the ongoing debate among scholars: there are 
arguments that R&D and advertising play a significant role in the revenue generation of many 
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firms and that these items should be recognised as investments rather than as expenses34. 
Second, since the market value of start-up firms is examined rather than the market value of 
non-issuing firms, it is possible that the stock price is sensitive to both R&D and advertising in 
the short term. Advertising is known to generate short-lived intangible assets, whereas, in 
general, R&D has a long-term impact (see Bublitz and Ettredge, 1989). However, the primary 
focus was on the sample of newly listed firms a short time after IPO event, thus, it would be 
illogical to disregard the information content of advertising (see Chemmanur et al., 2009a on 
the relationship between the IPO event and advertising). In addition, Franzen and 
Radhakrishnan, (2009) noted that R&D is particularly useful to value start-ups firms (IPOs). 
Accordingly, it was necessary to include both R&D and advertising in the valuation model. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no prior literature that simultaneously addresses both of the 
aforementioned intangibles in an IPO context. This study will close this research gap and shed 
some light on the relevance of these intangibles to post-IPO stock price. 
 
4.2.2 Profit vs. loss firms: the importance of book value in the residual income valuation (RIV) 
model 
 The valuation models used in the current study are consistent with the RIV framework of 
Peasnell (1982) and Ohlson (1995). Peasnell (1982) first introduced the RIV model, while Ohlson 
incorporated the concept of linear information dynamics into the model. Ohlson (1995) 
documented a valuation model that relates accounting information to a firm’s value, which is 
                                                     
34
 The US GAAP requires both R&D and advertising to be fully expensed. The only exception is codified in SFAS No. 
86: software companies may capitalise software development costs after establishing the technological feasibility 
of the software. Some countries (such as the UK and France) allow for partial capitalisation of R&D expense.   
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particularly useful to value a firm based on accounting data. His model explains a firm’s value as 
a function of earnings and other information. According to Peasnell (1982), in general, stock 
price and earnings are positively related. However, the same trend does not hold in the case of 
loss-making firms (that is, firms with negative earnings). To address this anomaly, Collins, Pincus 
and Xie (1999) further conjecture that, apart from earnings alone, the book value of equity 
should be presented in any valuation model that examines the value of loss-making firms. They 
found that including equity book value in the valuation model eliminates the odd negative 
relation between price and earnings. As noted by Collins et al., their results do not support the 
notion that the importance of book value in cross-sectional valuation primarily stems from its 
role as a control for scale differences. Rather, their study seems to suggest that book value is an 
important variable that explains a firm’s value. In addition, the model of Collins et al. (1999) is 
also consistent with the methodology of Ohlson (1995). Thus, the valuation model of Collins et 
al. (1999) is useful to value both profitable and loss-making firms. A further study, conducted by 
Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009), found that the valuation multiplier of intangibles (such as 
R&D) is significantly different from zero for both profit and loss firms.  However, the sign of the 
multiplier is different across the two sub samples. As noted by Franzen and Radhakrishnan, the 
valuation multiplier on R&D expenditures is likely to be negative (positive) for profit (loss) firms. 
In the light of this contribution, the current study will simultaneously examine both R&D and 
advertising in an IPO context.  
Since the research focused on a sample of newly listed firms (IPOs), which contain both 
profit and loss making firms, the valuation model was specified in a way that is consistent with 
Ohlson (1995) and Collins et al. (1999). Specifically, earnings, book value of equity, R&D and 
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advertising were included in the model. The inclusion of book value of equity is primarily to 
ensure that the sign of the valuation multiplier is correctly identified and consistent across both 
profit-making and loss-making firms. It is worth noting that the methodology of Collins et al. is 
consistent with the residual valuation framework of Ohlson (1995). This notion is highlighted by 
Collins et al., who note that,  “The value relevance of book value in the Ohlson model rests on 
its role as a proxy for the present value of expected future normal earnings” (1999, pp. 39). 
Hypothetically, it can be predicted that advertising and R&D expenditure also contain 
information regarding the future earnings since the two items can be considered as intangibles 
that could generate revenue. Therefore, it was predicted that both variables will appear in the 
valuation regression. Accordingly, the valuation model used here extends the work of Collins et 
al. and reveals the relative importance of these intangibles.  
  
4.3 Data and methodology 
4.3.1 Valuation model 
 A simple residual-income based valuation model similar to Peasnell (1982) and the 
methodology of Ohlson (1995) was employed to derive the relation between R&D, advertising, 
earnings, book value of equity and stock value of newly listed firms. Both profit and loss-making 
firms were included in the analysis. As previously mentioned, since the sample contained loss-
making firms, the book value of equity had to be present in the regression in order to ensure 
that the valuation model was robust and reliable to value loss-making firms (see Collins et al. 
1999 for further explanation). The methodology employed was consistent with the version 
developed by Collins et al. (1999) of the RIV model of Ohlson (1995). To summarise, the basic 
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RIV model (Ohlson 1995) can be expressed as: 
 
 t
a
ttt vxbP 21          Equation 3.1 
 where; bt is the closing book value, 1tb  is the opening book value 
  tx  is the net income (earnings) in year t 
  atx is abnormal earnings (residual income) ; 1.  tt
a
t brxx  
  tv  is value of other value-relevant information 
  α1,α2 is parameter of abnormal earnings and other information, respectively. 
   
  Ohlson et al. (1995) postulated that the linear information dynamics are such that both 
abnormal earnings and ‘other information’ are assumed to follow an autoregressive process. In 
the linear information dynamics framework, the α1 and α2 parameters can be expressed as: 
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Where r = cost of capital, ω and γ are the autoregressive parameters on abnormal 
earnings and ‘other information’, respectively. Intuitively, ω and γ can assume values in the 
range of zero to one. This value range was later confirmed by empirical evidences shown by 
DeChow, Hutton and Sloan (1999). The RIV model (Ohlson 1995) (i.e., equation 3.1) was 
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rearranged by substituting a linear information dynamics equation 1.  tt
a
t brxx and 
expressing the closing book value as a function of opening book value, earnings and dividend, 
according to clean surplus relation tttt dxBB  1 . Following this procedure, Collins et al. 
(1999) show that cum-dividend stock price (Pt+dt) can be expressed as a function of current 
period earnings, lagged book value at t - 1 (Bt- 1), and other value-relevant information as: 
 
    ttttt vxBrdP 2111 1)1(        Equation 3.2 
 The above valuation function (Collins et al., 1999) provides the means to estimate the 
importance of other value-relevant information, as appears in equation 3.2. That is, one can 
investigate value relevance of intangible assets by examining whether the coefficient on other 
information parameters (for example, brands equity and Innovations in this study) is 
significantly different from zero. Alternatively, the linear information dynamics of Ohlson (1995) 
can be dropped and a model based on assumed growth rates in book values and earnings used 
instead (Rees, 1997). Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001) conjecture that the linearity 
assumptions in the Ohlson (1995) model can be relaxed by estimating components of earnings, 
book value, and by allowing for industry effects. In the light of these contributions, a modified 
version of Collins et al. (1999) was employed in order to obtain a direct estimate of the value 
the market credits to brands and innovations ‘assets’. In this case, the brands (advertising) and 
innovations (R&D) in question were recognised as the other value-relevant information 
parameter in the Ohlson (1995)’s framework. Ultimately, this chapter involves testing for the 
significance of the coefficients (β3, β4) on the brands and innovations parameters in the 
following valuation model: 
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 where; Vit is the cum dividend market value (Pt+dt) of firm i at time t.  
Bit-1 is the opening book value.  
INDJ is a Fama-French 49 industry dummy variables equal to one if firm i belongs 
to industry j and zero otherwise.   
Eit is the earnings 
Brandsit and Innovationsit are the indicators of interest (measured by advertising 
expenditures and R&D expenditures, respectively). All of the accounting-related 
variables are expressed in per share basis. 
 
 The above equation (equation 3.3) is consistent with the methodology of Collins et al. 
(1999) and can be considered as an augmented version of the model of Barth et al. (1998). The 
model employed in this study is consistent with Collins et al. (1999) as the IPO samples include 
those that contain both profit-making and loss-making firms (the methodology of Collins et al. 
eliminates the odd negative price-earnings relation observable from loss-making firms). 
Alternatively, a similar model, documented by Franzen et al. (2009, Equation 1a, p. 21), which 
disaggregates earnings into two components could have been employed. The model of Franzen 
and Radhakrishnan (2009) can be described by equation 3.4 below, 
 
 itititititit RDEBRDBdP    32110     Equation 3.4 
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 In the light of the contribution of Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009), the concept of 
components of earnings (i.e., earnings before R&D and advertising) was employed and equation 
3.4 was augmented to include advertising as a right-hand side variable along-side R&D35 . The 
result is a variant of Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009)’s model which can be described as: 
 ititititititit ADRDEBRDADBdP    332110   Equation 3.4a 
 Where Pit is price per share three months after the fiscal year end for firm i in year t. dit 
is dividends per share for firm i in year t. RDit is research and development expense for firm i in 
year t. ADit is advertising, media, and promotional expenses  for firm i in year t. Eit is the 
earnings. EBRDADit is earnings before R&D and advertising expense (Eit plus RDit plus ADit). Bit-1 
is book value of equity for firm i at the end of year t -1. Equation 3.4 could also be augmented 
with industries dummies to control for industry-clustering of the sample. That is, 
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 Equation 3.5 is the augmented specification that disaggregates earnings into earnings 
before R&D and advertising expense (EBRDADit), advertising expense (ADit) and R&D expense 
(RDit). Earnings before R&D and advertising expense (EBRDADit) can be computed as earnings 
plus advertising expenditures plus research and development expenditures. As noted by 
Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009), one advantage of this approach is that it should increase the 
explanatory power of the model: “we expect that disaggregating R&D expense from earnings 
                                                     
35
 It is plausible that the stock price of newly listed firms varies significantly according to a firm’s level of 
advertising. Although it is unclear if the effect would continue to hold a year later after the IPO event, there is no 
prior evidence suggesting otherwise. See Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) for further explanation.  
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will improve the explanatory power of the model” (Franzen and Radhakrishnan, 2009, p.21). 
Regardless of the claim’s validity, running this model still provides the means to check for 
robustness. 
It was hypothesised that for the sample of newly listed firms, components of earnings, 
such as research and development as well as advertising expenditures, should be value-relevant 
because investors may recognise such intangibles as a form of a firm’s assets that might 
generate future revenue. With this insight, a testable hypothesis based on observable 
market/accounting data could be developed. The empirical specifications of this paper are 
stated in such a way as to examine whether the coefficients of R&D and advertising 
expenditures (β3 and β4, respectively) are significantly different from zero. If the coefficient of 
the advertising (β4) and the coefficient of R&D (β3) are found to be zero, then it can be inferred 
that the intangible in question is irrelevant to firm’s value. In contrast, if the mentioned 
coefficients (β3 and β4) are positive and statistically significant then it can be inferred that the 
intangible in question (advertising, R&D or both items) is value relevant.  
The above model (equation 3.5) is derived based on industry clustering. The equation is 
similar to Barth et al. (1998)’s model, but the above model considers industry-dummies whereas 
Barth et al. (1998)’s model utilises the concept of time-clustering. However, the possibility was 
recognised that the observed stock price of newly listed firms may vary according to the timing 
of its IPO (see the hot market hypothesis of Schultz, 2003 for further explanation). Whilst it is 
unclear whether a firm’s level of advertising/R&D varies according to its IPO timing, the year-
dummies based models are still useful to check for robustness. Accordingly, as a test for 
robustness, a time-clustering model was included in the analysis to see if the results remained 
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consistent. Interestingly, while it was hypothesised that industry dummies should better explain 
the sample’s stock price, it was found empirically that year-dummies models are equally as good 
as models based on industry-dummies. The results yielded from models based on either 
approach exhibit similar regression explanatory power (R2). 
 Intuitively, choosing the correct approach (either industry-clustering or time-clustering) 
depends upon the likely form of dependence in the data. Theoretically, one could utilise Barth 
et al. (1998)-style tests to examine the effect of time variation in market reaction to branding 
and innovations parameters. This involves utilising year-dummies in the regression to see if the 
effect of time-clustering is present. Empirically, it was found that the year-dummies based 
model provided similar explanatory power to explain the cross-sectional variation of the 
sample’s stock price. However, the data in this study were comprised of advertising and R&D 
among a sample of newly listed firms. Both of the mentioned parameters are also dependent on 
industry-clustering. Accordingly, both approaches were considered in the analysis, for 
robustness. The Fama French’s 49 industries dummies were utilised in equations 3.3 and 3.5 
while the year-dummies approach was employed in equations 3.7 and 3.8. To explain the model 
development, equation 3.6 rewrites Barth et al. (1998)'s model. 
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where; MV is share price at fiscal year end 
B is book value of equity per share 
E is earnings per share 
Brands is the total of the firm’s FW’s brand value estimates per share, (i.e., the 
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sum of the individual brand value estimates, deflated by number of shares 
outstanding) 
YRJ is an indicator variable that equals one if the observation is from fiscal year J , 
and zero otherwise. i and t denote firms and years, respectively. 
  
Whilst the model of Barth et al. (1998) includes the brand equity value estimates in the 
RHS, the model used in the current study also includes the research and development as 
another explanatory variable in the RHS. Thus, the model can be considered to be an 
augmented version of Barth et al.’s. Also, this version of the model utilises advertising 
expenditures instead of direct brands value estimates. Specifically, the following cross-sectional 
regression was estimated: 
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  Equation 3.7 
Alternatively, the concept of disaggregate earnings similar to those found in Franzen and 
Radhakrishnan (2009) could have been utilised, thus earnings in equation 3.7 were 
disaggregated into earnings before R&D and advertising, advertising expenditures and R&D 
expenditures. As a result, the following valuation equation was formulated: 
ititititit
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Where Pit is price per share three months after the fiscal year end for firm i in year t. dit 
is dividends per share for firm i in year t. RDit is research and development expense for firm i in 
year t. ADit is advertising, media, and promotional expenses  for firm i in year t. Eit is the 
earnings. EBRDADit is earnings before R&D and Advertising expense (Eit plus RDit plus ADit). Bit-1 
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is book value of equity for firm i at the end of year t -1. 
In this chapter, the methodology of Barth et al. (1998) and Collins (1999) is preferred 
because the forecasted ROE ,which is required in Lee et al. (1999) ’s valuation model, are known 
to exhibit upward bias (see Rajan and Servaes, 1997, and Hou, van Dijk and Zhang, 2010, among 
others for biases in the forecasts of analysts). In addition, brand and innovations are known to 
affect not only the cost of capital but also cash flows as well. Therefore, the Ohlson-Peasnell 
framework is more flexible in this case as it allows the control for possible confounding effects 
in the Lee at al. (1999) model. That is, by treating Brand and Innovations as ’other information’ 
parameters in Ohlson framework, the coefficients of these parameters will reflect both discount 
rate and cash flow effects. Regardless, the results from Lee et al. (1999)’s model provided 
valuable information about the linkage between advertising/R&D and the degree of stock 
overvaluation. For robustness, the results from all mentioned methods were included in the 
analysis. The Lee et al. (1999) valuation was examined in Chapter 3, while this chapter focuses 
upon the valuation frameworks of Barth et al. (1998) and Collins et al. (1999). 
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4.3.2 Ohlson’s 1999 transitory earnings framework (Hand and Landsman (2005)’s regression 
model) 
 Alternatively, advertising and R&D can be considered as components of earnings, and a 
generalised version of Ohlson (1999) model employed. The model consist of four equations as 
follows: 
  1113212111   tttt
a
t
a bxxx      Equation 3.9.1 
 122322212   tttt bxx       Equation 3.9.2 
 13331   ttt bb        Equation 3.9.3 
 ttt
a
tt xxbMVE   221     Equation 3.9.4 
  
Abnormal earnings equation 
 Equation 3.9.1 is the abnormal earnings prediction equation, where abnormal earnings 
xt
a are defined as net earnings minus a normal return on equity book value. Although Ohlson 
(1999) model x2 as transitory earnings, the model applies to any earnings component. For 
example, Barth et al. (1999) model x2 as accruals or cash flows. In this study, x2 is either 
advertising or research and development.  
The coefficient on the earnings component x2 (ω12), represents the incremental effect on 
the forecast of abnormal earnings of knowing x2. If all earnings components have equal ability 
to forecast abnormal earnings, ω12 will equal to zero, and thus knowing that component of 
earnings does not provide any information regarding the future abnormal earnings. Accordingly, 
it was predicted that the ω12 will not be zero because both advertising and R&D can be 
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considered as intangible assets which can generate future earnings. Thus, ω12 should be positive 
for both earnings components. This chapter reports on the test to see if advertising and 
research and development are informative about future earnings.   
 In equation 3.9.1, ω11 reflects the persistence of abnormal earnings. Existing research 
(Dechow et al. 1999; Hand and Landsman, 2005) would lead one to predict that ω11 is positive. 
In equation 3.9.4, the coefficient of x2 (α2, the coefficient of the earning component in question) 
represents the value relevance of x2; accordingly, if α2 =0 then x2 is irrelevant to firm’s value.  In 
contrast, if α2 ≠ 0, then it can be inferred that x2 have firm’s value ‘relevance’. Because it was not 
expected that either advertising or research and development are entirely considered as 
‘expenses’ (as they are recorded in financial statements, according to GAAP), it was predicted 
that each component has value relevance. That is, if advertising and R&D is value relevant, then 
α2≠ 0 should be observed. Thus, the null hypothesis, that H0: α2 = 0, was tested against the 
alternative hypothesis, that Ha: α2 ≠ 0. 
 
Earnings component and equity book value autoregressive equations 
 Equation 3.9.2 represents the autocorrelation (i.e., persistence) of each earnings 
component, which Ohlson labels ‘predictability’. Transitory earnings can be characterised as a 
process in which ω22 is equal to zero. For earnings components that are not perfectly transitory, 
the higher is ω22, the more predictable the component.  
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Equity market value equation 
 Equation 3.9.4 is an equation derived from information dynamics of equations 3.9.1, 
3.9.2 and 3.9.3. α2 is the valuation multiple on earnings component x2 (i.e., advertising or R&D 
in this case). α2 reflects the incremental effect on valuation from knowing x2. If both earnings 
components have the same relation with equity value, α2 will equal zero, and knowing that 
component of earnings does not provide any information regarding the equity value. If R&D and 
advertising explain equity value, then α2≠ 0 should be observed. Thus, to address the research 
question, the null hypothesis that α2 = 0 was tested against the alternative hypothesis that α2 ≠ 
0. If α2= 0, then x2 is irrelevant for valuation; Ohlson labels this condition ’value irrelevance’. In 
contrast, if α2≠ 0, then x2 is ’value relevant’. Thus, the research question was addressed by 
testing the null hypothesis that α2= 0 against the alternative hypothesis that α2≠ 0.  
 
Estimating equations 
 For each earnings component separately, equations 3.9.1 to 3.9.4 can be estimated as a 
system using seemingly unrelated regressions, permitting regression errors to be correlated 
across equations. This methodology is specified according to Barth et al (1999)’s method, and 
closely adheres to Ohlson (1999)’s transitory earnings framework. To rewrite Barth et al.’s model 
(1999, p. 210), the two systems of equations can be expressed as: 
     Accrual system 
 Eait = ω10 + ω11E
a
it-1+ω12ACCit-1+ω13Bit-1+ε1it    Equation 3.10.1 
 ACCit = ω20+ω22ACCit-1+ω23Bit-1+ε2it     Equation 3.10.2 
 Bit = ω30+ω33Bit-1+ε3it       Equation 3.10.3 
237 
 
 MVEit = i0 + i1Bit+α1E
a
it+α2ACCit+uit     Equation 3.10.4 
     Cash flow systems 
 Eait = ω10 + ω11E
a
it-1+ω12CFOt-1+ω13Bit-1+ε1it                      Equation 3.10.5 
 CFOit = ω20+ω22CFOit-1+ω23Bit-1+ε2it     Equation 3.10.6 
 Bit = ω30+ω33Bit-1+ε3it       Equation 3.10.7 
 MVEit = i0 + i1Bit+α1E
a
it+α2CFOit+uit     Equation 3.10.8 
 where; E
a
t is abnormal earnings 
  B is equity book value 
ACC is Net accruals, the difference between net income and cash from 
operations, (ACC=NI-CFO) 
CFO is cash flows from operations 
   
4.3.3 Empirical models 
 While the model of Barth et al. (1999) views earning components as accrual or cash 
flows, the model used here considers advertising and R&D as earning components. Although 
the US GAAP record both intangibles as expenses, specifying the model this way is economically 
meaningful because both intangibles are potentially able to generate earnings.  
Since the main focus of this literature is the relative importance of advertising and R&D, 
the primary focus was on the last equation (equation 3.10.4). Equations 3.10.1 to 3.10.3 were 
not directly relevant to the testing of the hypothesis. However, equation 3.10.1 is useful in order 
to examine the persistence of abnormal earnings (and can be found later in this chapter). The 
earning components in question, in this case, are advertising and R&D. Accordingly, the testable 
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equations can be expressed as the two following valuation functions: 
 
 MVEit = i0 + i1Bit+α1E
a
it+α2ADit+uit     Equation 3.11a 
 MVEit = i0 + i1Bit+α1E
a
it+α2RDit+uit     Equation 3.11b 
 
Equations 3.11a and 3.11b are economically meaningful as they express firm value as a 
function of current value (book value) plus the abnormal earnings plus other earning 
components (advertising and R&D, which are recorded as expenses in accounting reports under 
the US GAAP). The intercept (i0) was included in the regression to allow for the valuation effects 
of other information. The above equation was estimated cross-sectionally, firm by firm for two 
reasons. First, separate firm estimation permitted the coefficients to reflect the variation in 
advertising and R&D. Second, the sample size was relatively limited, and some IPOs are delisted 
after a few years after trading, making firm by firm time series regression impracticable. 
 The above valuation functions describe stock value as a function of book value, 
abnormal earnings and two intangibles. Although equation 3.11 seems to be similar to the 
models based on the work of Barth et al. (1998), examined earlier, the two models are different 
and not econometrically equivalent to each other. For example, dividend paying firms may yield 
different results. Thus, the above abnormal earnings models (equations 3.11a and 3.11b) differ 
from the model described in equation 3.3. In summary, whilst equation 3.3 specifies firm value 
as a function of net income, the model derived from Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1999), 
explains stock value as a function of abnormal earnings. Since equation 3.11 and equation 3.3 
are not econometrically equivalent, it was logical to include both models in the analysis. 
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It is important to note that most IPOs in the sample spend their capital on either 
advertising or R&D, exclusively. In general, most firms choose to focus their investment on 
either advertising or R&D but not both at the same time. This is presumably a consequence of 
the nature of the business (i.e., the industry sector) that each company operates within. For 
example, the sample showed that firms in the entertainment sector spend a lot on advertising 
but invest little to nothing on research and development. The situation was reversed when firms 
in the technology sector were considered: these invest heavily in their research and 
development and spend less on advertising. On a rare occasion, however, some firms (such as 
firms in the pharmaceutical industry) do invest in both advertising and R&D. Considering 
advertising and R&D independently would thus be impractical and therefore the model that 
includes both variables in the same regression was employed to see if the results were robust. 
Accordingly, equations 3.11a and 3.11b could be augmented with advertising and R&D. Thus, 
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itit RDADEBMVE   4321    Equation 3.12 
 
Equation 3.12 describes stock value as a function of book value, abnormal earnings, 
advertising and R&D. However, it still lacks the controls for the differences across industries and 
timing of IPOs. Some may argue that it is uncertain if the differences in timing of IPO or the 
difference across various industries may result in a difference in a firm’s value (see Schultz, 2003 
among others). This issue may cause the estimate of coefficients to be unreliable. Without 
these controls, the coefficient estimate may contain information regarding the effect of timing 
or industry differences, rather than the actual relative importance of the intangibles in question. 
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Although it was found that these controls are not statistically different from zero, they were still 
included in order to see if the results were robust. Therefore, to ensure that the estimate of 
coefficients was not inappropriately affected by these issues, control for the industry and time 
of these IPOs was included in the analysis. Thus, the final testable valuation function can be 
described as: 
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Alternatively, differences across industries could be controlled. Although there is no 
prior evidence suggesting that the differences in industries affect the estimates of the efficient 
of earnings components in question (advertising and R&D), it was recognised that industry 
differences may have the potential to bias the coefficient estimates. As one may consider 
intuitively that firms in different industries invest differently in advertising and R&D, including 
controls from industry clustering was therefore logical. Specifying the regression this way, 
eliminated the potential problem that the coefficient estimates may capture the information 
regarding the industry clustering rather than the relative relevance of the earnings components 
in question.  
Each IPO in the sample was assigned into one of 49 industry portfolios according to 
Fama-French 49 industry classification. The industry dummies (INDj) is a Fama-French 49 
industry dummy variables equal to one, if firm i belongs to industry j and zero otherwise. Thus, 
the augmented model can be expressed as, 
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 where; MVEit is the market value of firm i at time t. (in millions) 
Bit is the book value of equity.  
INDJ is a Fama-French 49 industry dummy variables equal to one if firm i belongs 
to industry j and zero otherwise.   
YRJit is an indicator variable that equals one if the observation is from fiscal year 
j , and zero otherwise. i and t denote firms and years, respectively. 
Eait is the abnormal earnings if firm i at time t. 
ADit and RDit are the indicators of interest (measured by advertising expenditures 
and R&D expenditures, respectively). All of the accounting variables are reported 
according to Compustat, in millions.  
αi is the intercept. 
 
 The abnormal earnings (Eat ) equals to net earnings minus normal earnings Et – r Bt-1. 
The ’normal’ earnings are computed by the normal rate of return (r) times the opening book 
value. The normal rate of return (r) is derived from the rate of return on equity, which is 
computed using CAPM model (described below). 
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4.3.4 Rate of return on equity (r) 
The ‘normal’ rate of return on equity (r) is calculated using the CAPM framework. Since 
the historical value of IPO’s price at the time of IPO (at time t) were not observable (the IPO had 
not yet traded in the open market, hence there was no past information regarding its price), the 
industry beta’s were used as a proxy for company beta to calculate rate of return on equity (r).  
This variable was computed by grouping the sample into 49 industries, according to 
Fama French industry grouping (the detail of the industry grouping are provided in the 
appendix). Then, for each IPO in our sample, three pieces of data were collected, namely: 10 
years historical monthly market risk premium data, monthly risk-free rate, and monthly industry 
returns from Fama French data library (the observation period was January 1976-November 
2010, as all of the IPO samples were issued between January 1986 and December 2010). All of 
these data were observed 120 months (10 years) before the IPO month, excluding the month of 
IPO event. This process yielded the required data to be used to compute equity’s beta at time of 
IPO (βit).  
For each IPO, the CAPM equation was regressed using the monthly data to estimate the 
industry beta (βit). The beta of each IPO i issued at time t was computed by solving the following 
regression equation: (Rit-Rft) = βit (Market risk premiumt) + ci, ignoring the error term ci. This 
process yielded observations of 10 years’ historical rolling beta of each IPO in the sample. These 
industry-year beta observations were used to calculate the company’s cost of capital. The return 
on equity (r) was estimated using CAPM framework. The CAPM model can be written as, 
 
rt = Rft + βit*[E(Rmt)-Rft]       Equation 3.15 
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 where Rft = average risk-free rate 
[E(Rmt)-Rft] = market risk premium 
 
Ten years’ forward-looking T-bond rate was used as a proxy for ex ante expectation of 
risk-free rate (Rft) at the time of IPO. This variable was observed from the US department of the 
Treasury. The market risk premium was assumed to be constant at 4 per cent36. Other means of 
estimating the variable (for example, one can use Fama-French 3-factor model methods) could 
have been used. However, Frankel and Lee (1998), have argued that the choice of methods used 
to compute cost of equity have little effect on their analysis. Consistent with Frankel and Lee 
(1998), it was found that utilising a constant rate of return on equity r= 12 percent37 following 
Dechow et al. (1999)’s methodology, instead of estimating r by CAPM, did not affect the 
hypothesis testing. 
As noted by Barth et al. (1999), although defining net income in the above way may 
violate the clean surplus assumption of Ohlson (1995), it eliminated potentially confounding 
effects of large one-time items and is consistent with prior research (e.g., Dechow et al., 1999). 
In addition, existing findings in Hand and Landsman (2005) suggest that violating clean surplus 
should have little effect on the findings.  
                                                     
36
 There is no consensus about the correct value of market risk premium. We estimated the value at 4 per cent 
because the US historical premium for the 1928-2013 time period is averaged at 4.20 per cent, if computed as the 
difference in compounded returns on US stocks and on the 10-year US Treasury bond. However, the value of 
market risk premium is a matter of ongoing debates: different estimation techniques and estimation periods lead 
to different value estimates.  Also, it is worth noting that the long-term US Treasury bond is not entirely risk free. 
37
 The constant rate of return r=12% was used following Dechow et al. (1999)’s methodology. "Attempts to 
document predictable variation in expected returns that are consistent with the predictions of asset pricing models 
have met with limited success. Thus, we use a discount rate of 12%, which approximates the long-run average 
realized return on US equities", Dechow et al. (1999) p.14.  
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4.3.5 Sample selection 
 New offering data on the US IPOs of ordinary common shares were collected during the 
period from January 1986 to December 2009 from the Thomson Financial Securities Data 
Company (SDC Platinum)’s new issues database. Following Loughran and Ritter (1995), closed-
end funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and unit 
IPOs were excluded from the sample. To ensure that the results were not disproportionately 
affected by extremely small firms, the analyses restricted the sample to firms with an offer price 
of at least $5. (Stocks with share price of less than $5 were omitted in order to ensure that the 
results were not driven by small, illiquid stocks or by bid-ask bounce). All samples with missing 
first day and 90 days after-IPO market price from CRSP were also excluded from the analysis. In 
summary, the IPO data collected from SDC Platinum had to satisfy at least the three following 
criteria: 
 
- The IPO should issue ordinary common shares and should not be investment 
trust offering, closed-end funds or ADRs. 
- The IPO should have a value of $5 or more (smaller price per share have poor 
market liquidity and are usually short lived; prior IPO literature usually excluded 
IPOs valued at less than $5). 
- Stock price data had to be available on the Centre for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) database. 
   
There were 6,541 IPOs that satisfied the above three criteria. It was required that each 
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IPO-year observation must contain the following information: opening equity book value; post-
IPO stock price; dividend per share (necessary to compute cum-dividend stock price); earnings 
per share; advertising expenditures, and research and development expenditures. The 
requirements, that each firm-year observation in the sample must have advertising and R&D 
expenditure data in the IPO year available from Compustat, significantly reduced the sample 
size. However, this requirement was strictly essential in order to examine the value relevance of 
R&D and advertising. The final sample consisted of 484 IPO observations that satisfied all of the 
above criteria. 
Financial statement information of newly listed firms in the sample was observed from 
Standard & Poor’s Compustat fundamental annual files. Market stock prices were obtained from 
the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). The cum-dividend 
stock prices are the stock price observed 90 days after the fiscal year end plus dividend per 
share. Advertising expenditures are the cost of advertising, media, and promotional expenses 
from Compustat item #45. Research and Development (R&D) expenditures are the costs 
incurred during the year that relate to the development of new products or services. Earnings 
per share are calculated by net income divided by common shares outstanding. In a similar way, 
the dividend per share is computed by the dividend divided by common shares outstanding. 
R&D expenditures and advertising expenditures are expressed in per share basis. These 
accounting variables were observed from Compustat fundamental annual file. It is worth noting 
here that observations observed during the internet bubble period (1999-2000) mostly contain 
negative opening book value. Finally, the stock price at 90 days after the first fiscal year end and 
the dividend per share of these IPO sample at the first, second and third fiscal year end 
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following the IPO event were observed. These variables formed the basis of cum-dividend price 
on the LHS of the regression model. It is also worth mentioning here that most IPOs in our 
sample did not pay dividends.  
 
4.3.6 Variable construction 
 Advertising expenditures, Research and Development expenditures, book value of 
equity, dividend and net income were obtained from Compustat fundamental annual file. All 
accounting data were divided by common shares outstanding, thus they are reported in per 
share basis. Following Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009), all of the observed accounting data 
were winsorised at 1 per cent in order to ensure that the accounting variables were not biased 
by outliers. The accounting data were observed at the first fiscal year end following an IPO 
event. Industry specifications are defined according to its SIC codes, as defined in Fama-French 
49 industry classifications. The industry specifications were observed from French’s website (the 
detail of the 49 industry categories and its relevant SIC codes can be found in appendix section). 
Stock prices were observed from CRSP. To allow for the effect of dividend towards stock prices 
(cum-dividend price), this variable was observed 90 days after the first fiscal year end date 
following an IPO event. Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of the explanatory variables.  
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4.4 Results and analysis 
4.4.1 Correlations between explanatory variables 
 The correlation between the explanatory variables was investigated to ensure that the 
cross-correlation among the RHS variables was at an acceptable level. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients between the explanatory variables are reported in Table 3.2.  
 Table 3.2a shows Pearson’s correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables. The 
sample showed positive but weak correlation between cum-dividend price, earnings and 
opening book value. The opening book value of equity exhibited positive correlation with 
earnings (r=0.14). This is economically meaningful because earnings should vary accordingly to 
invested capital (i.e., opening book value of equity). Table 3.2a also shows that the extent of 
advertising expenditures (AD) and R&D expenditures (RD) in the IPO year was positively 
correlated with a company’s post IPO cum-dividend stock price (r=0.09 and r=0.17, 
respectively).  
Overall, the explanatory variables exhibit relatively weak cross-correlation among 
independent variables (-0.3 < r < 0.3). This specification suggests that the valuation models were 
orthogonal. The only exception is the correlation between earnings before R&D and advertising 
(EBRDAD) and advertising expenditures per share (AD), which was found to be relatively high at 
r=0.61 (this is discussed in detail later in this chapter).   
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4.4.2 Results from models based on earnings (Barth et al. 1998) 
Industry dummies approach 
The knowledge about the value relevance of advertising and R&D is not new. Existing 
research suggests that both R&D expenditure and advertising expenditure are value relevant. 
Hence, it was hypothesised that both variables should exhibit positive explanatory power 
towards a firm’s value. Studies based on non-issuing firms indicate that both advertising and 
R&D are value relevant to a firm’s value. Since both variables exhibit strong explanatory power 
toward stock price, it is inappropriate to consider these variables independently. If either of 
these variables alone are considered, then it is plausible that the slope coefficients of the 
variable in question might be overstated due to the absence of the other parameter in the 
model, and that the observed significant results might be biased by the overstated coefficients 
rather than the actual relative relevance of the variable in question. As can be seen in Table 
3.2a, the correlation between advertising and R&D expenditure is relatively low at r=0.19 (t-stat 
3.71). Accordingly, the value relevance of the R&D and advertising in the sample of newly-listed 
firms (IPO) were examined simultaneously in a unified model. The value-relevant results could 
then be viewed to see if they were still consistent and eliminated the possibility of overly 
estimated coefficients. 
For comparability, Barth et al (1998)’s style regression employed earlier was augmented 
with R&D expenditures in the RHS of the equation without changing any sample size. 
Specifically, regression equation 3.3 (described above) was estimated, hence both R&D and 
advertising expenditures were considered as ’other information’ in Ohlson’s framework. 
Essentially, the valuation regression was run in order to test the hypothesis that the coefficients 
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of advertising expenditures (β3) and coefficient of R&D expenditures (β4) were statistically 
different from zero. According to Peasnell (1982)’s framework, it can be predicted that the 
coefficients of book value (β1) and coefficient of net earnings (β2) will be positive. Table 3.3 
reports the regression results. 
 It can be seen from Table 3.3 that the cum-dividend price of newly listed firms can be 
explained by earnings, advertising expense and R&D expenditures. In general, positive 
coefficients on both opening book value of equity (B) and earnings (E) were found. However, 
only earnings coefficient was statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 
0.00) whilst book value coefficient was found to be insignificant. Thus, we can infer that 
earnings are a more reliable predictor of stock price in the case of newly listed IPOs. Earning 
multiplier (β2) was found to be around five times (β2=4.59), which is in line with prior findings 
documented by Barth et al. (1998, p.55). In short, the results showed that earnings are value 
relevant (β2≠0). The results were consistent with Peasnell (1982) valuation framework. 
The main area of interest here is the importance of advertising and R&D to the stock 
price of firms. Both coefficients of advertising and R&D expenditures were found to be positive, 
and statistically significant at 1 per cent (p-value 0.00) and 1 per cent (p-value 0.01) significance 
levels, respectively. It is worth noting that both variables were considered simultaneously in the 
same model. The coefficient of advertising (β3) and the coefficient of R&D (β4) suggests that the 
stock price of newly listed firms can be increased by spending more on either advertising or 
R&D in the IPO year. In particular, the stock price varied significantly and positively according to 
the R&D and advertising expenditures. The magnitude of R&D coefficient (β4) implies that a 
current R&D expenditure increases market value by a multiple of more than five times current 
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expenditure. This finding is in line with the existing literature by Green, Stark and Thomas 
(1996). Similarly, each unit of dollar invested in advertising expenditures increased cum-
dividend stock price by 2.19 dollars. It is well known that expenditure on intangible assets, in 
the form of R&D and advertising expenditures, is associated with an increase in a firm’s value. 
The results, in general, are thus consistent with earlier findings. In short, it was found that R&D 
and advertising are value relevant, and that therefore both items can be considered to be a 
form of a company’s intangible assets. 
The value relevance of R&D and advertising, as shown in the Table 3.3, are consistent 
with earlier work by Chan et al. (2001) and Barth et al. (1998), respectively. Barth et al. (1998) 
documented the relevance of advertising to the stock price of non-issuing firms. Similar 
research conducted by Chan et al. (2001) also suggested that the stock returns of non-issuing 
firms positively correlated with the level of R&D expenditures. However, the current piece of 
research is different from those aforementioned studies as it focused primarily on the relative 
importance of both variables simultaneously in the same valuation model rather than inspecting 
each variable individually. This approach provided superior explanatory power as well as 
eliminating the potential to overstate the slope coefficient. An increase in R2 was observed in 
every multivariate model tested. The advertising-R&D unified model increased regression 
explanatory power (R2) by 11 per cent, relative to the explanatory power of univariate models 
(univariate analysis is not shown in this chapter). In a similar way, year-dummies single factor 
models exhibit R2 of 0.145. The year-dummies multivariate model uniformly increased the 
equation explanatory power to 0.165 (an increase of 14 per cent). While the equation 
explanatory power (R2) increased, the significant level of the coefficient of advertising and R&D 
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remained positive and statistically significant regardless of whether univariate or multivariate 
models were used. To some extent, the superior explanatory power provided by unified 
multivariate models suggests that both advertising and R&D are value relevant.  
It is worth noting here that the results were based exclusively on newly-listed firms 
whereas prior research focused primarily on non-issuing firms (presumably due to limited data 
availability). Since this study focused on a sample of IPOs rather than on non-issuing firms, the 
model’s R2 are adversely affected from the significantly smaller sample size compared to the 
sample size of non-issuing firms. The observable smaller R2 (compared to the results from 
samples of non-issuing firms) are, it can be strongly asserted, due to the smaller sample size 
rather than model mis-specification. This is clear from the consistency with Peasnell (1982)’s 
framework as well as the consistency of these results observed from various approaches. More 
importantly, however, is that the results were highly significant and remained consistent 
throughout. The significant value relevance of advertising and R&D to the stock price of newly 
listed firms is one of the main contributions to the subject made in this paper. 
 The above valuation model (equation 3.3) considers the industry clustering as it includes 
49 industry dummies in the RHS. Apart from models based on industry dummies described 
earlier, the year-dummies based model could also have been employed to investigate the 
relationship between a firm’s value and advertising/R&D expenditures. This approach closely 
adheres to the approach employed by Barth et al. (1998) to the extent that this valuation model 
could be considered to be an augmented version of it. Table 3.4 reports the regression results. 
 Consistent with prior findings, the results from the time-clustering model revealed that 
earnings and book value are positively associated with a firm’s value. The earnings coefficient 
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(β2) was positive (β2=4.20) and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 
0.00). This result is consistent with Ohlson/Peasnell’s framework which states a positive 
relationship between a firm’s value and earnings. The coefficient of book value was found to be 
positive but insignificant at 10 per cent significance level (p-value 0.35), suggesting that 
investors pay less attention to the relative importance of opening book value and pay more 
attention to earnings. This is presumably due to investors not recognising the significance of the 
information regarding book value in the case of newly listed firms. The correlation between 
earnings and book value was also checked and was found to be relatively low at r=0.21 (t-stat 
4.11). Therefore, it is unlikely that the inference regarding the coefficients of earnings and book 
value was biased by the correlation of independent variables. However, the findings imply that 
the coefficient of book value is positive and significantly less than unity, which is in line with 
prior findings by Collins et al. (1999). Thus, a conclusive inference can be made that earnings are 
a more reliable predictor of stock price. 
In general, the time-clustering regression model (equation 3.7) yielded similar results to 
those obtained from industry-clustering regression (equation 3.3). The coefficients of earnings, 
advertising expenditures and R&D expenditures were found to be similar to those yielded from 
industry-clustering models: all of the mentioned variables were positive and statistically 
significant. In particular, the advertising expenditure and R&D expenditure were strong 
determinants of a firm’s value. The coefficients of both variables (β3 and β4) were found to be 
positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent (p-value 0.01) for advertising expenditure and 1 
per cent (p-value 0.00) for R&D expenditure, respectively. The results were also in line with prior 
results yielded from industry-clustering models, that R&D expenditure increases market value 
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by a multiple of more than five times current expenditure. Similarly, advertising expenditure 
also contributes significantly to a firm’s value: every dollar invested in advertising increases cum-
dividend price by 1.79 dollars. More importantly, the results remained consistent that earnings, 
advertising and R&D are value-relevant: this inference is robust, regardless of which dummies 
were included in the valuation model. Thus, the null hypothesis that β3 and β4 = 0 was rejected 
and the alternative hypothesis that advertising and R&D are value relevant was accepted.  
 
4.4.3 Disaggregated earnings model (Franzen and Radhakrishnan, 2009) 
Industry dummies approach 
An alternative approach would be to disaggregate earnings into three components and 
utilise earnings before R&D and advertising expense (EBRDAD) instead of total earnings in the 
RHS. This approach is similar to that found in the work of Franzen and Radhakrishnan  (2009, 
pp.21). The industry dummies variable is presented on the right-hand side of the equation to 
account for the effect of industry-clustering. The regression model is described above in 
equation 3.5. Table 3.5 reports the regression results. 
 Table 3.5 shows the results from equation 3.5 (which express the regression equation in 
the style of Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009)).The coefficients of earnings before advertising 
and R&D (β2) were found to be positive (β2=0.89) and statistically significant at 5 per cent 
significance level (p-value 0.04). This result confirms that earnings are value relevant. In similar, 
the coefficient of opening book value (β1) was found to be positive and statistically significant at 
1 per cent significance level (p-value 0.01). The book value coefficient (β1) was found to be 
significantly less than one (β1=0.45), and is in line with prior findings by Barth et al. (1998, p. 
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55). Thus, the null hypothesis that β1=0 and β2=0 was rejected. In general, the results are 
consistent with Peasnell (1982)'s framework:  earnings before advertising and R&D and book 
value of equity are value relevant to a firm’s value. 
  As expected, once the two intangibles were considered as a component of earnings, it 
could be seen that the coefficient of earnings before advertising and R&D (β2 from equation 3.5 
= 0.89) were significantly smaller than the coefficient of net earnings (β2 from equation 3.3 = 
4.59).  The results, shown in Table 3.5, were consistent with prior findings that R&D explains the 
cross-sectional variation of cum-dividend stock price of newly listed firms. The R&D coefficient 
(β4) was found to be positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 
0.01). These results consistently suggest that R&D can be considered to be a form of a 
company’s intangible asset, and value relevant.  
One important side note is the value relevance of advertising expenditure. Since all 
models tested explicitly indicated that R&D and advertising are value relevant, it was expected 
that the advertising coefficient (β3) would be positive and statistically significant. The results 
indicated that the advertising coefficient was indeed positive (β3=0.70). However, Table 3.5 
shows an insignificant advertising coefficient at 10 per cent significance level (p-value 0.43). 
Initially, this led to the inference that advertising expenditures was an insignificant predictor of 
stock price. However, further investigation revealed that this result was misleading due to the 
high cross correlation between advertising expenditures and earnings before advertising and 
R&D. The two variables were found to be correlated (correlation r=0.61), and thus the 
correlation caused unreliable β3 estimates. This evidence is presented in Table 3.2b, which 
shows the Pearson’s correlation between variables. Due to this complication, the Barth et al. 
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(1998) model was preferred over the disaggregate earnings approach of Franzen and 
Radhakrishnan (2009) to examine the sample. However, both models suggested the same 
inference that earnings, book value and intangibles are value relevant; thus both approaches 
are reported in this chapter for robustness. 
It is arguable that the Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009)'s disaggregate earnings 
approach may overstate the relative importance of the two intangibles in question. This is 
because both variables in this style of regression can be a proxy for components of earnings as 
well as representing the ‘other information’ parameter in Ohlson/Peasnell’s framework. In other 
words, the slope coefficients observed from Franzen and Radhakrishnan ’s approach may reflect 
both ‘other information’ in Ohlson/Peasnell’s frameworks as well as earnings itself. However, 
the results observed from Collins et al. (1999)’s-consistent models (Table 3.4) do confirm that 
the two variables contain ‘other information’ not presented in earnings or book value.  
Year dummies approach 
The investigation was continued by disaggregating earnings into components of earnings 
before advertising and R&D, advertising expenditures and R&D expenditure, similar to those 
found in the model of Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009).  The year dummies variable is 
presented on the right-hand side to account for time-clustering effect.  
 Table 3.6 shows the results from the time-clustering model of Franzen and 
Radhakrishnan (2009)’s style regression. Equation 3.8 was regressed to test the hypothesis that 
earnings, book value, advertising and R&D are significant predictors of newly-listed firm value. It 
is apparent from Table 3.6 that the coefficient of book value, earnings before R&D and 
advertising and R&D expenditure were found to be positive and statistically significant. This 
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suggests that these variables are positively related to a firm’s value. Specifically, the coefficient 
of earnings before R&D and advertising (β2) was found to be positive (β2 = 1.01) and statistically 
significant at 2 per cent significance level (p-value 0.02). Similarly, the coefficient of book value 
(β1) was also positive (β1 = 0.30) and statistically significant at 10 per cent significance level (p-
value 0.07). This suggests that earnings and book value are value relevant, and the findings are 
consistent with Peasnell (1982), Ohlson (1995) and Collins (1999). The coefficient of R&D 
expenditures (β4) was found to be positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance 
level (p-value 0.00). Thus, it can be inferred that R&D is value relevant. An important note here 
is the value relevance of advertising.  The coefficient of advertising (β3) was found to be positive 
but statistically insignificant. This is due to the aforementioned correlation between advertising 
expenditure and earnings before advertising and R&D; the correlation between these two 
variables caused the estimate of advertising coefficient (β3) to be unreliable.  
So far, the results have implied that earnings and book value are value relevant. Also, it 
can be observed that earnings have more predictive power than the book value of equity. As for 
the intangibles in question, namely advertising and R&D, it can be inferred that both variables 
contain value-relevant information not contained in earnings and book value. It was found that 
both variables are value relevant and positively relate to a firm’s value. This result is consistent 
with prior research conducted by Barth et al. (1998) and Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009). The 
results remain consistent whether time-clustering models or industry-clustering models are 
used. In short, the results so far from all models tested led to the rejection of the null hypothesis 
that advertising and R&D are irrelevant to a firm’s value, and the acceptance of the alternative 
hypothesis that advertising and R&D contain non-accounting value-relevant information that is 
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not contained in earnings or book value.  
4.4.4 Abnormal earnings model (Hand and Landsman, 2005). 
Alternatively, the model based on abnormal earnings could be employed. This approach 
is similar to the approach of Hand and Landsman (2005). The valuation function was described 
earlier in equation 3.12. Table 3.7 reports the regression results. 
 In general, Table 3.7 shows that a firm’s value can be explained by equity book value, 
abnormal earnings, advertising and R&D. Consistent with the framework of Peasnell (1982) and 
Ohlson (1995), the abnormal earnings and book value of equity are value relevant. The 
coefficient of book value (β1) and the coefficient of abnormal earnings (β2) were found to be 
positive and statistically significant at 2 per cent significance level (p-value 0.02) and 1 per cent 
significance level (p-value 0.00), respectively. Thus, the null hypothesis that β1 and β2 = 0 was 
rejected. Advertising and R&D also held predictive power towards a firm’s value. The coefficient 
of R&D (β4) was found to be positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level 
(p-value 0.00). Similarly, the coefficient of advertising (β3) was also positive and statistically 
significant at 10 per cent significance level (p-value 0.07). Since both coefficients (β3 and. β4) 
were significantly different from zero, the null hypothesis, that advertising and R&D are 
irrelevant to a firm’s value, was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis, that advertising and 
R&D are value relevant, was accepted.  
Controls for industry and timing of IPOs 
The results shown in Table 3.7 suggest that a firm’s value can be explained by abnormal 
earnings, equity book value, advertising and R&D. Although Equation 3.12 is consistent with 
Peasnell (182) and Ohlson (1995), it is acknowledged that it still lacked controls for the 
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industry/timing of IPO differences.  Accordingly, these concerns were addressed by augmenting 
the IPO year dummies and industry dummies in the RHS of Equation 3.12. Thus, the final 
valuation function can be expressed as Equation 3.13 and Equation 3.14 (described above). The 
normal rate of return (r) was computed in the same way as Equation 3.12 was computed, for 
easier comparison. That is, the abnormal earnings estimates were unchanged from those 
employed in Equation 3.12. Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 report regression results (regression 
equation 3.13 and equation 3.14, respectively). 
It can be seen from Table 3.8, that the inclusion of year dummies did not affect the 
testing of the hypothesis. All inferences were consistent with prior findings. The coefficient of 
book value was found to be positive (β1=0.67) and statistically significant at 2 per cent 
significance level (p-value 0.02).  Consistently, the abnormal earnings coefficient was also found 
to be positive (β2=5.03), and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 
0.00). Thus the null hypothesis, that abnormal earnings and book value are not value relevant, 
was rejected and the alternative hypothesis, that book value and abnormal earnings are value 
relevant, was accepted. The results were consistent with the framework of Ohlson (1995) and in 
line with prior findings.  The intercept (α) was found to be insignificant when year-dummies 
were included in the analysis.  
Advertising and R&D continued to be reliable predictors of a firm’s value. The coefficient 
of R&D was positive (β4=14.07), and statistically significant at 1 per cent level of significance (p-
value 0.00). A similar trend can be found in the case of advertising, in which case the advertising 
coefficient (β3) was found to be positive and statistically significant at 10 per cent significance 
level (p-value 0.07). Since both coefficients were significantly different from zero, the null 
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hypothesis, that advertising and R&D are not relevant to firm’s value, was rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis, that advertising and R&D are value relevant, was accepted. Overall, the 
inclusion of year dummies (timing of IPO) slightly increased regression explanatory power (R2) 
but did not affect the hypothesis testing. The results obtained are consistent with the 
framework of Ohlson (1995) and are in line with prior findings. Accordingly, it can be inferred 
that the timing of IPO does not significantly affect the hypothesis testing. It is worth noting here 
that the coefficients of year dummies were found to be statistically insignificant (p-value of 0.29 
to 0.98). Therefore, for the purpose of illustration, the coefficients of these dummies are not 
presented in Table 3.8.   
Next, the results were investigated as to whether they were robust against the inclusion 
of industry-clustering dummies. Accordingly, the analysis continued by the augmentation of 
Equation 3.12 with industries dummies in the RHS. The regression results are reported in Table 
3.9.  
Overall, it can be seen from Table 3.9 that the results are in line with prior findings. The 
results remain consistent - that the book value and abnormal earnings are value relevant - 
whether the firm is listed in the open market at a specific timing, or if the firm operates in a 
specific industry sector. The coefficient of book value (β1) and abnormal earnings (β2) were 
found to be positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent (p-value 0.01) and 1 per cent (p-
value 0.00) significance level, respectively. Thus, the null hypothesis, that the abnormal earnings 
and book value are value irrelevant, was rejected and the alternative hypothesis, that abnormal 
earnings and equity book value are relevant to a firm’s value, was accepted. The results are 
economically meaningful and consistent with the Ohlson/Peasnell framework. The intercept 
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was found to be statistically insignificant (t-stat 0.11) when industry clustering dummies (INDj) 
are included for in the RHS. The regression’s explanatory power (R2) was found to be 35 per 
cent, which is similar to those figures yielded from Equation 3.13. This evidence suggests that 
neither the timing of IPO nor industry clustering is a superior control variable.  
The same trend persisted when advertising and R&D, were considered. The coefficient of 
R&D was found to be positive (β4) and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-
value 0.00). Similarly, the coefficient of advertising was found to be positive (β3) and statistically 
significant at 2 per cent level of significance (p-value 0.02). Since the coefficients were 
significantly different from zero (β3≠0 and β4≠0), the null hypothesis, that advertising and R&D 
are not relevant to a firm’s value, was rejected and the alternative hypothesis, that advertising 
and R&D are value relevant, was accepted. The results were found to be robust against various 
controls (either industry clustering or timing of IPO), and are consistent with prior findings 
reported by Barth et al. (1998) and Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009).  
 
4.4.5 Sensitivity analysis: The ‘normal’ rate of return estimates  
 Valuation models based on abnormal earnings (Hand et al. 2005) provide good 
explanatory power to explain the variation of a firm’s value. However, it has the disadvantage 
that abnormal earnings estimate is sensitive to the choice of ‘normal’ earnings. Since equations 
3.12, 3.13 and 3.14 rely on abnormal earnings estimates (which are estimated based on 
‘normal’ earnings), it is possible that the choice of ‘normal’ earnings may affect the estimate of 
the abnormal earnings as well as its relevant coefficient estimates. To address the possibility 
that the estimates of ‘normal’ earnings may bias the results, a sensitivity analysis was conducted 
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to let the expected rate of return assume different values. The model was sensitised using Hand 
and Landsman’s constant long-term rate of return on equities r=12 per cent (Dechow et al, 
1999; Hand and Landsman, 2005, p.458) to see if the results were robust.  Equations 3.13 and 
3.14 were estimated using r=12 per cent following Dechow et al. (1999), as mentioned above. 
Table 3.10 and Table 3.11 report the regression results. 
In general, the results presented in Table 3.10 suggest that the method used to compute 
normal earnings are unlikely to affect the hypothesis testing. All inferences are in line with prior 
findings that equity book value, abnormal earnings, advertising and R&D are significant 
predictors of a firm’s value. The coefficient of book value (β1) was found to be positive and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 0.01). Consistently, the abnormal 
earnings coefficient (β2) was found to be positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent 
significance level (p-value 0.00).  The results, that abnormal earnings and book value are value 
relevant, remained consistent whether the rate of return (r) assumed a value computed by 
CAPM or if it was set at r=12 per cent according to Dechow et al. (1999) and Hand and 
Landsman (2005). The coefficients of advertising and R&D, were also found to be consistent 
with prior findings that both coefficients were positive and statistically different from zero. The 
coefficient of advertising was found to be positive (β3>0) and statistically significant at 10 per 
cent level of significance (p-value 0.07). Similarly, the coefficient of R&D was found to be 
positive (β4>0) and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 0.00). This 
evidence confirmed the inference that advertising and R&D are value relevant, and that the 
results are robust against methodologies to compute ‘normal’ earnings.  
The results presented in Table 3.11 confirm the earlier finding that the ‘normal’ earnings 
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estimates (r) are unlikely to affect the hypothesis testing. In general, the inference is insensitive 
to the change in normal rate of returns.  Consistent with prior findings, the coefficients of 
abnormal earnings, book value, advertising and R&D were found be positive, and statistically 
significant throughout all four variables. The coefficient of book value (β1) was found to be 
positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p=value 0.00). Similarly, the 
coefficient of abnormal earnings (β2) was found to be positive and statistically significant at 1 
per cent significance level (p-value 0.00). Thus, the null hypothesis, that abnormal earnings and 
book value are not relevant to firm’s value, was rejected and the alternative hypothesis, that 
they are value relevant, was accepted. The regression explanatory power (R2) remained 
relatively unchanged at 36 per cent. The intercept was found to be statistically insignificant (p-
value 0.85), suggesting that there is no significant other information regarding the firm’s value 
apart from the variables included in the RHS. The intangibles in question (advertising and R&D) 
were found to be significant predictors of a firm’s value. The coefficient of advertising (β3) was 
found to be positive and statistically significant at 2 per cent significance level (p-value 0.02). 
The coefficient of R&D (β4) was also positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance 
level (p-value 0.00). Since both coefficients (β3 and β4) are statistically different from zero, the 
null hypothesis, that advertising and R&D are not relevant to firm’s value, was rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis, that advertising and R&D are value relevant, was accepted. Overall, the 
results from Tables 3.8, 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 are consistent. Thus, it can be inferred that the results 
were robust against the methodologies used to estimate normal earnings.  
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4.4.6 Persistence of abnormal earnings and forecasting relevance of advertising and R&D 
In equation 3.10.1, 
itttt
a
t
a BxEE    113112111 , ω11 reflects the persistence of 
abnormal earnings. Prior research (Dechow et al, 1999; Barth, Beaver, Hand and Landsman, 
1999) led to the prediction that ω11 is positive. Thus, the null hypothesis, that ω11=0, was tested 
against the alternative hypothesis, that ω11≠ 0. Neither the sign nor magnitude of ω13 was 
predicted because this coefficient is sensitive to the method used to estimate normal earnings. 
Although conservatism could lead one to the belief that ω13>0, prior research has shown that 
ω13 is significantly negative (see Barth, Beaver, Hand and Landsman, 1999, p.214). 
The coefficient on x (ω12, the coefficient of earnings component of interest) represents 
the forecasting relevance of future abnormal earnings by knowing x. Thus, if ω12=0, x is 
irrelevant for forecasting abnormal earnings.  Ohlson (1995) labelled this condition abnormal 
earnings ‘forecasting irrelevancy’. Conversely, if ω12 ≠ 0, then it can be said that x has abnormal 
earnings ‘forecasting relevance’. Since it was expected that advertising and R&D are informative 
regarding future earnings (thus, future abnormal earnings), it was predicted that each 
component has forecasting relevance. Thus the null hypothesis, that ω12=0, was tested against 
the alternative hypothesis, that ω12≠ 0. Table 3.12 and 3.13 report the regression results. 
 Consistent with prior research (Dechow et al., 1999; Barth, Beaver, Hand and Landsman, 
1999), the coefficient on lagged abnormal earnings (ω11) was found to be positive and 
statistically significant for both Tables. Table 3.12 shows that the mean abnormal earnings 
coefficient of less than one (ω11=0.81) are reported, which is similar to the figure reported in 
prior research (Barth et al. (1999) report ω11 = 0.62), indicating that the abnormal earnings are 
persistent. Consistent results can be observed from Table 3.13, which show that the mean 
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estimated persistence of abnormal earnings (ω11) was positive and less than one (ω11 = 0.82). 
The advertising coefficient (ω12, Table 3.13) revealed inferences consistent with the 
inference from R&D in Table 3.12. In particular, Table 3.13 showed that advertising (ω12=0.32) 
was significantly and incrementally informative regarding future abnormal earnings. Similarly, 
Table 3.12 revealed similar results: that R&D is informative regarding future abnormal earnings 
(ω12=0.11). The tables shows that the sign of the coefficient of R&D (ω12 Table 3.12) and the sign 
of the advertising coefficient (ω12 Table 3.13) is positive (ω12>0) and statistically significant 
(ω12≠0 : t-stat=1.70, t-stat=2.95 in Tables 3.12 and 3.13, respectively). That is, the more that the 
company invests in advertising or R&D, the higher the future abnormal earnings generated.  
Since the coefficient of advertising and R&D was statistically different from zero (ω12≠0), 
forecasting irrelevance for advertising and R&D was rejected. In other words, the null 
hypothesis, that ω12=0, was rejected and the alternative hypothesis, that ω12≠0, was accepted. 
Finally, the coefficient on lagged equity book value (ω13) was significantly negative in both 
panels suggesting inconsistency with conservatism, but consistent with prior findings by Barth, 
Beaver, Hand and Landsman (1999)38. 
 
                                                     
38
 Barth, Beaver, Hand and Landsman (1999) report significantly negative ω13 throughout all industries studied, 
which is consistent with this research. They interpret their findings as a result of high estimates of cost of capital: 
“Finally, ω13 is always significantly negative, which is inconsistent with conservatism, but consistent with the cost 
of capital being less than 12%” (p.214). 
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4.4.7 The persistence of the value relevance of advertising and R&D 
 So far, the evidence suggests that the book value, abnormal earnings, advertising and 
R&D are value relevant to firm’s value. While the inference is economically meaningful in the 
first year following IPO, it is uncertain if the relevance of advertising and R&D persists a few 
years after IPO event. In this section, whether the value relevance of advertising and R&D 
persists more than a year after IPO event is examined. This can be achieved by estimating the 
coefficient of advertising and R&D for the years following the IPO event using equations 3.16 
and 3.17, 
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   Equation 3.16 
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 where; MVEi,t is the market value of firm i at time t. (in millions) 
Bi,t is the book value of equity.  
INDJ is a Fama-French 49 industry dummy variables equal to one if firm i belongs 
to industry j and zero otherwise.   
YRJ are indicator variables that equals one if the observation is from fiscal year J, 
and zero otherwise. 
Eai,t is the abnormal earnings if firm i at time t 
ADit  and RDit are the indicators of interest, observed at IPO year (measured by 
advertising and R&D expenditures, respectively). All of the accounting variables 
are reported according to Compustat, in millions.  
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 The above two equations are estimated using the stock market value two years and 
three years after the IPO event. Prior research (Ohlson, 1995 among others) led to the 
prediction that the coefficient of book value (β1) and abnormal earnings (β2) would be positive 
and statistically significant. Accordingly, the null hypothesis, that β1=0, was tested against the 
alternative hypothesis, that β1≠ 0. Whilst there is no prior evidence suggesting either the sign or 
the magnitude of R&D, conservatism expects the magnitude of the coefficient of advertising (β3) 
in a few years after IPO event to be very marginal. Most prior studies documented the short-
lived effect of advertising expenditures (see Sougiannis, 1994, and Bublitz and Ettredge, 1989). 
Thus, prior research has led to the belief that β3=0. Accordingly the null hypothesis, H0 that β3 = 
0 the value relevance of advertising is not persistent, was tested against the alternative 
hypothesis, Ha that β3 ≠ 0: the value relevance of advertising is persistent. The model was 
sensitised using a firm’s value two years and three years after IPO event. Following Franzen and 
Radhakrishnan (1999), the book value and abnormal earnings were winsorised at 1 per cent, to 
minimise the influence of outliers. Tables 3.14 and Table 3.15 report the regression results (two 
years and three years after IPO, respectively).  
 As predicted, Tables 3.14 and 3.15 show that book value and abnormal earnings are 
incrementally informative regarding the firm’s value. Both Tables reveal statistics consistent with 
predictions based on Ohlson (1995). The coefficient of book value, β1 was positive (β1>0) and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 0.00) for all models tested, 
suggesting that the equity book value is relevant to firm’s value. Similarly, the coefficient of 
abnormal earnings (β2) was significantly positive (β2>0), and statistically significant at 1 per cent 
significance level (p-value 0.00) for all models tested. Thus, the hypothesis that abnormal 
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earnings are value relevant was accepted.  
 Consistent with the conservative view that the effect of advertising is short lived 
(Sougiannis, 1994; Bublitz and Ettredge 1989), the coefficient on advertising (β3) was found to 
be statistically insignificant for all models tested. The p-value of the β3 coefficient was found to 
be larger than 0.10 (lowest significant level) for all models tested (minimum p-value 0.18). Thus, 
the null hypothesis, that β3=0, was accepted and the alternative hypothesis, that β3≠0, was 
rejected. This inference indicates that the value relevance of advertising is not persistent: the 
amount of advertising invested in the IPO year is not relevant to a firm’s value a few years later. 
The findings relating to R&D in both tables reveal inferences consistent with those for 
advertising. The coefficient on R&D (β4) was found to be statistically insignificant. The p-value of 
β4 was found to be more than 0.10 for all for all periods tested (minimum p-value 0.15). The null 
hypothesis, that β4=0, was accepted and the alternative hypothesis, that β4≠0, was rejected. The 
amount invested in R&D in the IPO year was not found to be relevant to a firm’s value a few 
years after the IPO event. Overall, the test statistics obtained from two-year test (Table 3.14) 
and three-year test (Table 3.15) revealed consistent results: that book value and abnormal 
earnings are value relevant and that the amount of advertising and R&D invested in the IPO year 
are irrelevant to firm’s value within a few years. This evidence suggests that the value relevance 
of advertising and R&D is short-lived.  
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4.4.8 Robustness check: Heckman selection model 
Advertising intensity is observable when firms disclose their advertising figure, and not 
observable otherwise. Therefore our analysis was limited to the advertising sample (firms that 
report their advertising). This raises the concern that the observed results may be biased by the 
sample selection. We ran the Heckman (1979) selection model in order to test if sample 
selection affected our inference regarding advertising and its value relevance39.  
Since the results from the first-stage selection equation is similar to those presented in 
Table 1.14, only the results from the second-stage value relevance equation (the response 
equation) are presented here. Accordingly, the following regression (equation 3.1840) was run 
using Heckman (1979) selection model.  
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  Equation 3.18
 
 where; Pit + dit is the cum dividend market value of firm i at time t.  
Bit-1 is the opening book value.  
INDJ is a Fama-French 49 industry dummy variables equal to one if firm i belongs 
to industry j and zero otherwise.   
Eit is the earnings 
                                                     
39
 In this section, we analysed the model based on advertising in order to see if the sample selection affected our 
inference regarding the value relevance of advertising. We did not focus on R&D because a number of prior studies 
had already established that R&D is relevant to firm’s value (see Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan, Lakonishok, 
Sougiannis, 2001; Franzen and Radhakrishnan, 2009 among others).  
40
 Equation 3.18 is consistent with Barth et al. (1998)’s model, which describes the market value as a function of 
opening book value, earnings and advertising.  
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ADit is the indicators of interest (measured by advertising expenditure) 
  It can be seen from Table 3.16 that the cum-dividend price of newly listed firms can be 
explained by earnings, opening book values and advertising expenditure. In general, positive 
coefficients on both opening book value of equity and earnings were found. The coefficient of 
earnings was positive (β2>0) and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 
0.00). Similarly, the book value coefficient (β1) was found to be positive (β1>0) and statistically 
significant. Thus, we can infer that earnings and book values are predictors of stock price. These 
results are consistent with Peasnell (1982) valuation framework, which suggested that earnings 
and book value are value relevant. The earning coefficient (β2) was found to be larger than one 
(β2=1.96) and the book value coefficient (β1) was found to be significantly less than one 
(β1=0.26), which are in line with prior findings documented by Barth et al. (1998, p.55). To 
summarise, the results showed that earnings and book values are value relevant.  
The main area of interest here is the importance of advertising to the stock price of 
firms, after controlling for the sample selection. The coefficient of advertising was found to be 
positive, and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (p-value 0.00). The coefficient 
of advertising (β3) suggests that the cum-dividend stock price can be increased by spending 
more on advertising in the IPO year. In particular, the cum-dividend stock price varied 
significantly and positively according to advertising expenditure. The magnitude of advertising 
coefficient (β3) implies that each unit of dollar invested in advertising expenditure increased 
cum-dividend stock price by 2.05 dollars (VIF=1.15). Overall, the results from the Heckman 
selection model are consistent with prior research (see Barth et al. (1998) among others) and 
are in line with our prior finding that advertising is value relevant; this finding holds true, even 
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when controlled for the sample selection. Thus, we can infer that that the observed value 
relevance of advertising is unlikely to be biased by the sample selection.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter has provided insights into the characteristics of the advertising and R&D 
components of earnings that affect a firm’s value. The analysis was based on the valuation 
framework of Peasnell (1982), in which the value relevance of an earnings component depends 
on its ability to predict a firm’s value. Using a sample of IPO firms with available annual data 
between 1986 and 2009, the model was implemented by estimating the value relevance of 
advertising and R&D. Based on these valuation equations, three research questions were 
addressed relating to the advertising and R&D components of earnings. First, as predicted, it 
was found that, controlled for industry clustering and timing of IPOs, the equity book value, 
abnormal earnings, advertising and R&D each have significant explanatory power in explaining a 
firm’s value in the IPO year. Whilst the magnitude of the coefficient of these components was 
different, the sign of all coefficients was consistently positive, indicating that all four 
components contribute to a firm’s value. Second, it was found that advertising, R&D, equity 
book value and lagged abnormal earnings have forecasting relevance, in that each has a 
significant relation with future abnormal earnings. That is, knowing the advertising and R&D 
helps explain market value of equity, incremental to knowing equity book value and abnormal 
earnings. As to the third research question, evidence was found that the relative importance of 
advertising and R&D significantly reduced a few years after IPO event. In particular, the 
valuation coefficients on advertising expenditures (and R&D expenditures) in the IPO year were 
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found to be zero when the dependent variables are market value two and three years after the 
IPO event; both variables are unable to explain a firm’s value two years and three years after the 
IPO event. This indicates that the value relevance of advertising and R&D are not persistent. In 
summary, the findings suggest inferences consistent with the accounting-based valuation model 
of Peasnell (1982): the book value, abnormal earnings as well as advertising and R&D help to 
explain a firm’s current value.  
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4.6 Tables of Chapter 4 
Table 3.1 Summary statistics 
 
Mean Median Max Min 
Standard 
Deviation 
Earnings per share (E) 0.02 0.00 1.92 -3.11 0.84 
Opening Book value per share (Bt-1) -0.78 0.07 9.70 -29.10 5.22 
Advertising expense per share (AD) 0.44 0.04 8.87 0.00 1.27 
R&D expense per share (RD) 0.23 0.08 1.64 0.00 0.34 
Cum-dividend Price 16.77 11.43 207.13 0.23 18.91 
 *The data covers a 24-year period between 1986 and 2009 (inclusive) and consists of 483 IPO-year observations.  The 
variables are: Cum dividend stock price in $ (per share); Bt-1, the opening net book value per share; E, earnings per share; AD, 
advertising expenditure per share; and RD, Research and Development expenditure per share. 
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Table 3.2a Correlations between explanatory variables (expressed in per share basis) 
 
 Cum-dividend Price 
(t-stat) 
Bt-1 
(t-stat) 
E 
(t-stat) 
AD 
(t-stat) 
RD 
(t-stat) 
Cum-dividend Price 
1.00 
- 
    
Bt-1 0.15 
(2.75) 
1.00 
- 
   
E 0.14 
(2.55) 
0.21 
(4.11) 
1.00 
- 
  
AD 0.09 
(1.75) 
0.19 
(3.60) 
-0.10 
(-2.03) 
1.00 
- 
 
RD 0.17 
(3.28) 
0.24 
(4.70) 
-0.04 
(0.78) 
0.19 
(3.71) 
1.00 
- 
*Bt-1 is the opening book value, EPS is earnings per share, AD is advertising expenditures per share, and RD is R&D expenditures per share.  
All variable are expressed in per share basis. 
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Table 3.2b Correlations between explanatory variables (disaggregated earnings model) 
 
 Cum-dividend Price Bt-1 EBRDAD AD RD 
Cum-dividend price 
1.00 
-     
Bt-1 
0.15 
(2.75) 
1.00 
-    
EBRDAD 
0.11 
(2.01) 
0.07 
(1.44) 
1.00 
-   
AD 
0.09 
(1.75) 
0.18 
(3.60) 
0.61 
(14.90) 
1.00 
-  
RD 
0.17 
(3.28) 
0.24 
(4.70) 
0.11 
(2.08) 
0.19 
(3.71) 
1.00 
- 
 *Bt-1 is the opening book value, EBRDAD is earnings before R&D and advertising expense, AD is advertising expenditures per   
 share, RD is R&D expenditures per share. All variable are expressed in per share basis. 
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Table 3.3 Barth et al. (1998)’s style regression results (equation 3.3) 
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 Coefficient t-stat p-value           VIF 
Opening Book value of Equity  0.24 1.35 0.17 1.27 
Earnings per share 4.59 4.01 0.00 1.32 
Advertising expenditures 2.19 3.13 0.00 1.13 
R&D expenditures 6.93 2.50 0.01 1.29 
Explanatory power (R2) 0.12 
*For the purpose of illustration, the industry dummies are included in the regression but not  
shown in this Table because the coefficients of the dummies are not statistically different from zero. 
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Table 3.4 Barth et al. (1998)’s style regression results (equation 3.7) 
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 Coefficient t-stat p-value VIF 
Opening Book value of Equity  0.16 0.93 0.35 1.25 
Earnings per share 4.20 2.51 0.00 1.54 
Advertising expenditures 1.79 2.64 0.01 1.13 
R&D expenditures 8.29 3.23 0.00 1.18 
Explanatory power (R2) 0.16 
*For the purpose of illustration, the year dummies are included in the regression but not shown in this Table 
because the coefficients of the dummies are not statistically different from zero. 
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Table 3.5 Franzen and Radhakrishnan (2009)’s style regression results (equation 3.5)   
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 Coefficient t-stat p-value VIF 
Opening Book value of Equity 0.45 2.56 0.01 1.15 
Earnings before R&D and advertising 0.89 2.06 0.04 1.78 
Advertising expenditures 0.70 0.79 0.43 1.78 
R&D expenditures 6.95 2.48 0.01 1.29 
Explanatory power (R2) 0.10 
*For the purpose of illustration, the industry dummies are included in the regression but not  
shown in this Table because the coefficients of the dummies are not statistically different from zero. 
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Table 3.6 Results: disaggregated earnings model (equation 3.8) 
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 Coefficient t-stat p-value VIF 
Opening Book value of Equity 0.30 1.79 0.07 1.19 
Earnings before R&D and advertising 1.01 2.31 0.02 2.00 
Advertising expenditures 0.23 0.27 0.79 1.73 
R&D expenditures 7.81 3.03 0.00 1.18 
Explanatory power (R2) 0.15 
*For the purpose of illustration, the year dummies are included in the regression but not shown in this 
Table because the coefficients of the dummies are not statistically different from zero. 
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Table 3.7 Results: abnormal earnings model (equation 3.12) 
iititit
a
itit RDADEBMVE   4321  
 Coefficient t-stat p-value VIF 
Book value of Equity 0.69 2.41 0.02 2.56 
Abnormal earnings (Ea) 5.05 3.88 0.00 1.09 
Advertising expenditures 6.55 1.86 0.06 1.13 
R&D expenditures 14.08 6.77 0.00 2.49 
Intercept (α) 346.88 4.34 0.00  
Explanatory power (R2) 0.33 
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Table 3.8 Results: abnormal earnings model (equation 3.13) 
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 Coefficient t-stat p-value VIF 
Book value of Equity 0.67 2.29 0.02 2.66 
Abnormal earnings (Ea) 5.03 3.72 0.00 1.17 
Advertising expenditures 6.63 1.84 0.07 1.18 
R&D expenditures 14.07 6.60 0.00 2.61 
Intercept (α) 17.75 0.02 0.98  
Explanatory power (R2) 0.36 
*For the purpose of illustration, the year dummies are included in the regression but not shown in this 
Table because the coefficients of the dummies are not statistically different from zero. 
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Table 3.9 Results: abnormal earnings model (equation 3.14) 
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 Coefficient t-stat p-value VIF 
Book value of Equity 0.86 2.67 0.01 3.15 
Abnormal earnings (Ea) 5.72 4.17 0.00 1.17 
Advertising expenditures 9.03 2.26 0.02 1.41 
R&D expenditures 13.26 5.78 0.00 2.93 
Intercept (α) 126.25 0.11 0.91  
Explanatory power (R2) 0.35 
*For the purpose of illustration, the industry dummies are included in regression but not shown in this  
Table because the coefficients of the dummies are not statistically different from zero. 
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Table 3.10 Sensitivity analysis: abnormal earnings model (equation 3.13, r=12%) 
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 Coefficient t-stat p-value VIF 
Book value of Equity 0.78 2.61 0.01 2.80 
Abnormal earnings (Ea) 5.37 3.97 0.00 1.23 
Advertising expenditures 6.63 1.84 0.07 1.18 
R&D expenditures 13.91 6.53 0.00 2.61 
Intercept (α) 10.52 0.01 0.99  
Explanatory power (R2) 0.36 
*For the purpose of illustration, the year dummies are included in regression but not shown in this Table because 
the coefficients of the dummies are not statistically different from zero. 
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Table 3.11 Sensitivity analysis: abnormal earnings model (equation 3.14, r=12%) 
tiititit
a
it
j
j
JitJit RDADEBINDMVE   


4321
48
1
0
 
 Coefficient t-stat p-value VIF 
Book value of Equity 0.98 2.98 0.00 3.30 
Abnormal earnings (Ea) 6.03 4.40 0.00 1.23 
Advertising expenditures 9.06 2.27 0.02 1.41 
R&D expenditures 13.10 5.72 0.00 2.93 
Intercept (α) 307.03 0.19 0.85  
Explanatory power (R2) 0.36 
*For the purpose of illustration, the industry dummies are included in the regression but not shown in this Table 
because the coefficients of the dummies are not statistically different from zero. 
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Table 3.12 Summary statistics from regressions of abnormal earnings on lagged abnormal earnings and R&D 
 
Research and Development: 
itttt
a
t
a BRDEE    113112111  
ω11 ω12 ω13 αit ω11=0 ω12=0 R
2 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat p-value p-value  
0.81 14.95 0.11 1.70 -0.02 2.45 -13.36 5.54 0.00 0.09 0.35 
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Table 3.13 Summary statistics from regressions of abnormal earnings on lagged abnormal earnings and advertising  
 
Advertising : 
itttt
a
t
a BADEE    113112111  
ω11 ω12 ω13 αit ω11=0 ω12=0 R
2 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat p-value p-value  
0.82 14.95 0.32 2.95 -0.02 2.68 -15.48 6.24 0.00 0.00 0.35 
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Table 3.14 Summary statistics from regressions of firm’s value two years after IPO event on book value, abnormal earnings, 
advertising and R&D.  
Panel A: Control for industry clustering: 
ititi
a
titi
j
ij
JitJti RDADEBINDMVE   


  ,4,32,22,1
48
02,
 
β1 β 2 β3 β 4 β1=0 β2=0 β3=0 β4=0 
R2 
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat p-value p-value p-value p-value 
3.52 9.78 8.98 6.12 2.08 0.48 -0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.96 0.32 
 
Panel B: Control for timing of IPO:  
ititi,
a
titi
kj
ij
JitJti RDADEBYRMVE   


  ,432,22,102,  
β1 β 2 β3 β 4 β1=0 β2=0 β3=0 β4=0 
R2 
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat p-value p-value p-value p-value 
3.31 9.42 8.23 5.41 -1.24 -0.31 0.80 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.65 0.31 
*For the purpose of illustration, the industry dummies and year dummies are included in the regression but not shown in this Table  
because the coefficients of industry and years dummies are not statistically different from zero.
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Table 3.15 Summary statistics from regressions of firm’s value three years after IPO event on book value, abnormal earnings and 
advertising and R&D. 
 
Panel A: Control for industry clustering: 
ititi
a
titi
j
ij
JitJti RDADEBINDMVE   


  ,4,33,23,1
48
03,
 
β1 β 2 β3 β 4 β1=0 β2=0 β3=0 β4=0 
R2 
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat p-value p-value p-value p-value 
6.40 10.19 6.09 3.37 -5.70 -0.77 -4.70 -1.46 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.15 0.28 
 
Panel B: Control for timing of IPO:  
iitti,
a
tiit
kj
ij
JitJit RDADEBYRMVE   


  ,433,23103,  
β1 β 2 β3 β 4 β1=0 β2=0 β3=0 β4=0 
R2 
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat p-value p-value p-value p-value 
6.27 10.41 6.10 3.43 -8.72 -1.33 -3.62 -1.23 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.22 0.30 
*For the purpose of illustration, the industry dummies and year dummies are included in the regression but not shown in this Table  
because the coefficients of industry and years dummies are not statistically different from zero. 
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Table 3.16 Robustness check: Heckman two-step regressions of Barth et al. (1998)’s style regression. 
 
 
 
itititit
j
j
JitJitit ADEBINDdP   


 3211
48
1
0
 
 Coefficient t-stat p-value           VIF 
Opening Book value of Equity  0.26 4.46 0.00 1.03 
Earnings per share 1.96 6.84 0.00 1.18 
Advertising expenditures 2.05 3.29 0.00 1.15 
Intercept 34.66 3.06 0.00  
Estimation Method Heckman Two-Step Model 
Observations 6541 
*For the purpose of illustration, the industry dummies are included in the regression but not  
shown in this Table because the coefficients of the dummies are not statistically different from zero. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
 This thesis consisted of three main empirical chapters based on data from the USA that 
illustrate different aspects of IPO advertising and the IPO event. This conclusion is organized into 
five parts: 1) IPO underpricing, initial return dispersion and its relationship to IPO advertising; 2) 
the intrinsic value of advertised IPO and its subsequent long-run stock performance; 3) value 
relevance and forecasting relevance of advertising and R&D; 4) Conclusion, and 5) limitations of 
the study and suggestions for future research. 
 Supporting evidence was found that IPO advertising drives stock to be overvalued in the 
early days post IPO. The stock price tends to revert back to its fundamental value in the long 
run. It was shown, in Chapter 2, that advertising causes higher initial return dispersion. Since 
the initial return dispersion reflects the uncertainty of stock prices, the suggestion that 
advertising intensity serves primarily as a mechanism to convey a firm's true value to investors 
was rejected. An alternative hypothesis that advertising causes overvaluation was proposed. 
Further evidence that strengthen the reliability of the overvaluation scenario was presented in 
Chapter 3.  Based on the residual-income-valuation model, supporting evidence was found that 
advertising causes a higher degree of post-IPO stock overvaluation relative to its theoretical 
intrinsic value. The investigation into the long-term performance of the advertised IPOs also 
showed that IPO advertising negatively affected a firm's performance a few years after IPO. The 
examination of the value relevance of advertising found that the information content of 
advertising in the IPO year was irrelevant to the stock value two and three years after IPO. The 
view that IPO underpricing can be explained by the economic value added generated by 
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advertising is thus inconsistent with the market observations. Rather, it was found that 
advertising causes lower performance in the long run, and IPO advertising is irrelevant to a 
firm's future value. Accordingly, an alternative hypothesis, that advertising inflates the short-run 
stock price was accepted. This research examined advertising intensity around IPO events and 
indentified it as a possible source of stock overvaluation. The results arising from this study are 
consistent with the view of Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), that the stock price of 
newly listed firms can be overvalued.  
 In closing, this study raises a serious question as to the necessity of regulating 
advertising around an IPO event. However, IPO advertising is a relatively new research area. 
Further investigation is to be expected in the near future and the theoretical underpinning and 
economic reasons behind this phenomenon are likely to remain a matter for debate for some 
time. 
 
5.2 IPO underpricing, initial return dispersion and its relationship to IPO advertising. 
 Based on data on the US stock market, Chapter 2 presented empirical results about the 
relation between advertising and IPO underpricing. In order to draw a clearer understanding 
about the role of advertising in the IPO event, the initial-returns volatility was also discussed. 
The findings were largely consistent with the overvaluation theory proposed by Miller (1977) 
and also complement earlier empirical research undertaken by Purnanandam and Swaminathan 
(2004). Based on cross-sectional regression, advertising intensity in the IPO year showed a 
positive and significant relation with the degree of IPO underpricing, in two-tailed tests, in all 
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models tested over the initial returns41. To further study whether the inference incorrectly 
captures the industry-level advertising intensity rather than the firm-level property, the 
industry-adjusted advertising intensity was examined. This confirmed that advertising in the IPO 
year was positively related to IPO underpricing. To further examine whether the inference based 
on the study of initial returns was adversely biased by price stabilisation, the same model was 
also used to test the 14-day buy-and-hold-return (BHR). While this produced somewhat weaker 
test statistics compared to the model tested over initial return (Table 1.8:p-value of advertising 
increase from 0.01 to 0.08), the inference obtained remain consistent - that advertising causes 
higher initial returns. Thus, the results were consistent with the view of Chemmanur and Yan 
(2009a) that advertising relates directly to the decision to go public. However, although the 
existence of a relationship between advertising and IPO event was confirmed, the true reason 
behind this phenomenon still remained unclear. Consequently, a study into the relationship 
between advertising and initial return dispersion was also conducted. 
 Whist it is tempting to conclude that advertising serves primarily as a carrier to convey 
information about a firm's intrinsic value to market participants, this explanation is sharply 
inconsistent with the empirical finding that higher levels of advertising are associated with 
higher uncertainty of stock prices (measured by initial returns dispersion). The initial return 
dispersion was found by computing the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the early 
days post IPOs. This method is similar to that employed by Lowry et al. (2010). Based on the 
cross-sectional regression, evidence was found that a higher level of advertising was associated 
                                                     
41
 This is robust against the inclusion of popular IPO control variables such as underwriter reputation, issue size, 
VC-backed dummy, NASDAQ dummy and offer price revision. 
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with a higher degree of initial return dispersion and, in particular, that advertising around an 
IPO event caused higher initial-return volatility observable in the first 14, 21 and 28 days post 
market. The relationship was statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level, in all models 
tested over 14, 21 and 28 days return dispersion (Table 1.9: maximum p-value=0.01) and robust 
against the inclusion of the aforementioned IPO controls. It is of interest to note that an 
increase in industry-adjusted advertising intensity by 1 per cent increased the initial return 
dispersion by 0.1 per cent (Table 1.9: β1=0.001). Since the initial return dispersion is a proxy of 
the uncertainty of stock prices, as Lowry et al. (2010) have pointed out, the notion that 
advertising serves primarily as a carrier to convey information about a firm's intrinsic value to 
market participants was rejected. Thus, an alternative scenario, that advertising inflates the 
stock price, was proposed. Last but not least, with the application of both t-tests (equal variance 
assumed) and Satterthwaite-Welch t-test (unequal variance assumed: Welch, 1947) on the sub-
sample of customer-facing IPOs and the sub-sample of non-customer-facing IPOs, no evidence 
was found to support the view that the average level of advertising intensity in the IPO year is 
higher among customer-facing IPOs than among non-customer-facing IPOs: both sub-samples 
exhibited about the same level of advertising around the IPO event. The mean difference of 
advertising intensity between the two sub-samples was not statistically different from zero at 
any meaningful level (p-value > 0.10, on both tests). Thus the null hypothesis, that the mean 
advertising intensity was the same in the two sub-samples, was accepted. To some extent, this 
result supports the notion that the primary force that drives the peak level of advertising in the 
IPO year is the incentive to maximise share price, and that the incentive is the same for both 
subsamples.  
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5.3 The intrinsic value of advertised IPO and its subsequent long-run stock performance 
  In examining the theoretical value of IPOs, the Peasnell (1982)'s RIV framework was 
employed, as can be seen in chapter 3. Specifically, the approach of Lee et al. (1999) was used 
to examine the theoretical intrinsic value of advertised IPOs. This was for two main reasons. 
First, this approach relies solely on the publicly available information such as consensus 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and avoids the use of ex post realisation of earnings (which are not 
observable in the early days post IPO). Second, this approach provides superior ability to explain 
cross-sectional variation of US stock prices. Based on this implementation of the RIV, it is 
evident that the share price of IPOs exhibits a significant degree of overvaluation relative to its 
theoretical intrinsic value, if advertising intensity is increased in the IPO year. Additionally, with 
the application of both parametric tests (t-test) and nonparametric tests (Wilcoxon-signed-rank 
test) on average level of price-to-valuation ratio, evidence was found to support the view that 
the average price-to-valuation ratio of advertised IPOs is significantly more than one. This result 
suggested that IPO can be overvalued and it complemented earlier research conducted by 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004). 
 Furthermore, based on cross-sectional examination, there appeared to be a positive 
relationship between advertising intensity and the price-to-valuation ratio. This relationship, 
statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level (Table 2.3: p-value 0.00), was observable 
within the first three months post IPO. The result was robust against the inclusion of popular 
IPO control variables such as underwriter reputation, firm size, VC-backed dummy, NASDAQ 
dummy and offer price revision. In addition, the results were consistent, regardless of when the 
stock price was observed. Advertising appeared to be a strong determinant of stock 
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overvaluation whether the observation took place immediately after trading, at the time of 
earnings announcement (sometime between day one to three months following IPO - this 
varied for each IPO) or at three months following the IPO event. To address the concern that the 
analyst's earning forecasts may be biased upwards by over optimism (see Rajan and Servaes, 
1997, and Easterwood and Nutt, 1999 for upward bias in analysts’ forecasts), an alternative 
implementation of RIV was also provided as a robustness check. Specifically, Penman and 
Sougiannis (1997)’s version of RIV was implemented by substituting analyst's forecasts with ex 
post realisation of earnings. Effectively, this assumed 100 per cent analyst's cognitive ability and 
eliminated the potential problem arising from analysts’ forecast bias. No evidence was found to 
indicate that analysts’ forecast errors jeopardised our results. In particular, the results were 
consistent with those yielded from the approach of Lee et al.(1999), that advertising intensity 
increases the degree of stock overvaluation within the first three months post-IPO, relative to its 
theoretical intrinsic value. This inference was drawn with 1 per cent level of significance (Table 
2.8: p-value 0.00). The inclusion of an alternative measure such as P/B ratio also revealed the 
same trend. Accordingly, these results confirmed the inference yielded from Lee et al (1999)'s 
approach.   
 The evidence obtained from the long-run return study also complemented the view of 
overvaluation.  Long-run performance measures such as Cumulative-Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
and Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) yielded the consistent inference that industry-
adjusted advertising intensity causes lower long-run performance. Alternative measures of long-
run performance such as the Fama French 3-factor model and Carhart’s 4-factor model were 
also investigated. To summarise, all four methods tested (the CAR, the BHAR, Fama French 3-
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factor model and Carhart’s 4-factor model) indicated that advertising intensity in the IPO year, 
relative to its industry peers, caused lower long-run abnormal returns. Accordingly, based on the 
residual income-valuation and long-run abnormal returns study, the suggestion that IPO 
underpricing is driven by systematic underpricing was rejected, and an alternative hypothesis - 
that IPO advertising causes stock to be more overvalued - was accepted. The results, which were 
consistent with the view of stock over valuation, complement the findings of Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2004).  
 
5.4 Value relevance of advertising and R&D 
 A further study into the value relevance of advertising was conducted. In order to do 
this, both advertising and R&D were examined, because R&D is also an important variable that 
is relevant to a firm's value (Barth et al. 1998; Franzen and Radhakrishnan 2009, among others). 
Based on a modified version of the valuation model of Barth et al. (1998), with the R&D 
augmented as an additional variable on the right-hand side, it appeared that earnings and book 
value are relevant to a firm's value.  The earning multiplier of more than four times reported 
(Table 3.3: β2=4.59), was in line with prior research (Barth et al., 1998, p.55). The coefficient of 
book value was positive and significantly less than unity, which is consistent with prior empirical 
evidence presented by Collins et al. (1999). The results also suggested that advertising and R&D 
are relevant to a firm's value in the first fiscal year that they are reported (i.e., the IPO year). The 
industry-clustering and time-clustering were controlled in the tests.  
 In addition, alternative valuation models based on abnormal earnings (Hand and 
Landsman, 2005) were tested. Consistent with the framework of Peasnell (1982) and Ohlson 
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(1995), the abnormal earnings, the book value of equity, advertising, and R&D were found to be 
value relevant. The results (Table 3.7) confirmed that these four variables are positive and 
statistically significant. Consequently, the null hypothesis, that advertising and R&D are 
irrelevant to a firm’s value, was rejected, and an alternative hypothesis, that advertising and 
R&D are value relevant, was accepted. However, the value relevance of advertising was found 
not to persist beyond the first year following the IPO event: the degree of IPO advertising (and 
R&D) are irrelevant to a firm's future value, two and three years after the IPO event. This result 
is consistent with the view that the extent of stock overvaluation, which is caused by 
advertising, exists only in the short term following the IPO event.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 The evidence presented has shown that IPO advertising significantly increases the initial 
return and that the price inflation caused by advertising is a result of stock overvaluation. 
Although earlier research has suggested that advertising is a mechanism that conveys 
information about a firm's intrinsic value to market participants, such an explanation is 
inconsistent with the observed empirical results, specifically that an increase in advertising 
intensity around an IPO event increases the initial-return uncertainty. Therefore, an alternative 
hypothesis, that advertising causes stock price inflation, was accepted. In order to confirm that 
the results were robust, the degree of stock overvaluation, the long-term abnormal returns and 
the value relevance of advertising were examined. These areas were found to consistently 
support the suggestion that advertising around an IPO event causes short-term stock 
overvaluation. Based on cross-sectional examination (using Peasnell (1982)'s RIV framework), 
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there appeared to be a positive relationship between advertising intensity and the price-to-
value ratio. This relationship was observable within the first three months post IPO.  The result 
was robust against the inclusion of popular IPO control variables such as underwriter 
reputation, firm size, VC-backed dummy, NASDAQ dummy and offer price revision.      
The results from long-term abnormal returns also support the overvaluation hypothesis: 
the results indicate that firms in the high-advertising portfolio earned significantly less than 
those in the low-advertising portfolio in the long-run, regardless of whether the Fama French 3-
factor model or the Carhart 4-factor model was applied. The cross- sectional examination of 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) and Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) also revealed 
the same trend. The value relevance of advertising and R&D were also investigated. Based on a 
modified version of the valuation model of Barth et al. (1998), with R&D augmented as an 
additional variable on the right-hand side, it appeared that earnings and book value are relevant 
to a firm's value. The results also suggested that advertising and R&D are relevant to a firm's 
value in the first fiscal year that they are reported (i.e., the IPO year). However, the value 
relevance of advertising was found not to persist beyond the first year following the IPO event: 
it was found that the degree of IPO advertising is irrelevant to a firm's future value, two and 
three years after the IPO event. This result is consistent with the view that stock overvaluation, 
which is caused by advertising, exists only in the short term following the IPO event. 
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5.6 Limitations of the study and implication for future regulations 
The association between advertising and financial markets is a relatively new area of 
research. This study examined the US data and found that advertising around IPO events 
affected stock prices. One way of shedding further light on this issue would be by investigating 
whether similar phenomena are observed in other stock markets outside of the US, provided 
that the advertising data could be obtained. Such a study would provide invaluable information 
that would extend our knowledge about the role of advertising in financial markets. 
Furthermore, as noted, Lee et al. (1999)'s version of residual-income-valuation method requires 
analysts’ forecasts. These forecasts are sensitive to an upward bias due to over-optimism. There 
was an attempt to mitigate this in this study by substituting analysts’ forecasts with ex post 
realisation of earnings to ensure that the inference was not adversely biased by forecast 
estimates. Although no evidence was found that the analysts’ forecasts adversely affected the 
inference, future research based on alternative approaches would be valuable (see, for example, 
the work of Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004).   
Throughout this investigation, the focus was upon the effect of advertising in the 
financial market. The analysis was based on the work of Chemmanur and Yan (2009a) that had 
established that the observed peaked level of advertising in the IPO year was directly related to 
the IPO event. In addition, the measurement of advertising was employed in such a way as to 
minimise the effect of advertising in the product market (see section 2.3.12 for the discussion 
about the dual role of advertising). Altogether, this led us to infer that the empirical evidence 
was consistent with the notion that the peaked level of advertising in the IPO year is related to 
the effect of advertising in the financial market. While prior research based on empirical 
299 
 
evidence indeed suggested that the observed results were primarily driven by the effect of 
advertising in the financial market, it is nevertheless possible that the observed results were 
partially driven by the effect of advertising in the product market. However, given the findings of 
earlier research (see Chemmanur and Yan 2009a) and the way the advertising measurements 
were constructed, it is unlikely that the effect of advertising in the product market would be 
significant enough to bias the results. However, although the effect of advertising in the product 
market is likely to be small, the existence of such an effect cannot be entirely ruled out. This 
issue is acknowledged as a possible limitation of the study. Further study into the effect of 
advertising in the product market, in the IPO context, would enhance the knowledge of this 
field. 
 Earlier research has established that that advertising, media bias and stock prices are 
related. The research conducted by Gurun and Butler (2012) supports the notion that 
advertising affects media bias, which in turn affects stock prices. Accordingly, we assume that 
advertising and the media in general are related and based our analysis on this notion. However, 
it is important to note that the relationship between advertising and media is not directly tested 
in this study. Thus, this limitation is acknowledged as a possible limitation to the research. 
Further research into the association between advertising and publicity would greatly enhance 
our knowledge of this topic. In terms of investor recognition, Grullon et al. (2004) have observed 
that advertising attracts a significantly larger number of both individual and institutional 
investors (see also Merton 1987 and Chemmanur and Yan 2011, among others). These earlier 
studies significantly contributed to the development of our hypothesis. However, further 
knowledge about the association between advertising and media would be valuable: an 
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example of a useful topic for future research includes, but is not limited to, the association 
between advertising and media attention/media coverage.  
 Since advertising around the IPO event has been found to have the potential to affect 
stock prices, it is important to discuss the necessity to regulate such activities. Unlike the 
analysts’ forecasts, which are prohibited during the quiet period, advertising activities are not 
subject to the same legal prohibition. The current legal regimes, such as the Blue Sky Law and 
the 1933 Securities Act, partially regulate the promotion of new issues by underwriters; these 
are designed to “to assure the availability of adequate reliable information about securities 
which are offered to the public“. However, such statements are inadequate to prevent the 
misuse of advertising (as a mechanism to manipulate stock prices). This warrants the need for 
future amendment of the relevant market regulations in order to regulate the activities of 
advertising around the IPO event. Future regulations should prevent advertising from 
generating media bias while still allowing the dissemination of adequate and reliable 
information about the securities being offered to the public.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Industry grouping based on Fama French 49 industry classification and customer-
facing dummy42  
 
                                                     
42
 For the purpose of illustration, this data is represented in terms of industry groupings. Some industries contain both 
customer-facing firms and non-customer-facing firms. Thus, information in the above table may differ slightly from actual data 
employed in this research. Whilst the above table presents industry level categorization, the actual data used in this research is 
categorised based on firm-level 4-digic SIC code. The table is presented as a guide line to give some insight about the customer-
facing category. 
Business Type 
Customer facing 
dummy 
Aircraft Manufacture 0 
Agriculture 0 
Vehicle Parts & Automobiles 0 
Banking 1 
Beer & Liquor 1 
Construction Materials 0 
Printing and Publishing 1 
Business Services 1 
Chemicals 0 
Electronic Equipment Manufacture 0 
Apparel and Clothing 1 
Construction 0 
Pharmaceutical 1 
Electrical Equipment 0 
Fabricated Products 0 
Financial Trading 1 
Food Products 1 
Entertainment 1 
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Computer hardware manufacturer 0 
Healthcare 0 
Household goods 1 
Insurance 1 
Measuring and control equipment 0 
Machinery 0 
Restaurants & Hotels 1 
Medical Equipment 0 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 1 
Other 0 
Business supplies 0 
Personal services 1 
Real estate 1 
Retail 1 
Soda & Candy 1 
Software 0 
Steel 0 
Telecommunication 1 
Toys & recreation 1 
Transportation 0 
Textiles 0 
Utilities 0 
Wholesale 0 
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Appendix B 
 
French 49 industries definition 
# Industry SIC Codes 
1 Agriculture 0100-0199, 0200-0299, 0700-0799, 0910-0919, 2048 
2 Food Products 2000-2046, 2050-2063, 2070-2079, 2090-2092, 2095, 2098-2099 
3 Candy & Soda 2064-2068, 2086-2087, 2096-2097 
4 Beer & Liquor 2080, 2082-2085 
5 Tobacco Products 2100-2199 
6 Toys 0920-0999, 3650-3652, 3732, 3930-3931, 3940-3949 
7 Entertainment 7800-7833, 7840-7841, 7900, 7910-7911, 7920-7929, 7930-7933, 7940-7949, 7980, 7990-
7999 
8 Printing and Publishing 2700-2749, 2770-2771, 2780-2789, 2790-2799 
9 Consumer Goods 2047, 2391-2392, 2510-2519, 2590-2599,2840-2844, 3160-3161, 3170-3172, 3190-3199, 
3229, 3260, 3262-3263, 3269, 3230-3231,3630-3639, 3750-3751, 3800, 3860-3861, 3870-
3873,3910-3911, 3914-3915,3960-3962, 3991, 3995 
10 Apparel 2300-2390, 3020-3021, 3100-3111, 3130-3131, 3140-3149, 3150-3151, 3963-3965 
11 Health Care 8000-8099 
12 Medical Equipment 3963, 3840-3849, 3850-3851 
13 Pharmaceutical 2830, 2831, 2833-2836 
14 Chemicals 2800-2829, 2850-2879, 2890-2899 
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15 Rubber and Plastic 3031,3041, 3053, 3060-3069, 3070-3099 
16 Textiles 2200-2279, 2280-2284, 2290-2295, 2297-2299, 2393-2395, 2397-2399 
17 Construction Materials 0800-0899, 2400-2439, 2450-2459, 2490-2499, 2660-2661, 2950-2952, 3200, 3210-3211, 
3240-3241, 3250-3259, 3261, 3264, 3270-3275, 3280-3281, 3290-3293, 3295-3299, 3420-
3429, 3430-3433, 3440-3442, 3446, 3448-3452, 3490-3499, 3996 
18 Construction 1500-1511,1520-1549, 1600-1699, 1700-1799 
19 Steel Works 3300,3310-3317,3320-3325,3330-3341, 3350-3357, 3360-3379, 3390-3399 
20 Fabricated Products 3400, 3443-3444, 3460-3479 
21 Machinery 3510-3538, 3540-3569, 3580-3582, 3585-3586, 3589-3599 
22 Electrical Equipment 3600, 3610-3613, 3620-3621, 3623-3629, 3640-3646, 3648-3649, 3660, 3690-3692, 3699 
23 Automobiles 2296,2396, 3010-3011, 3537, 3647, 3694, 3700, 3710-3716, 3790-3792, 3799 
24 Aircraft 3720-3721, 3723-3725, 3728-3729 
25 Shipbuilding, Railroad 3730-3731, 3740-3743 
26 Defense 3760-3763, 3795, 3480-3489 
27 Precious Metals 1040-1049 
28 Industrial metal mining 1000-1039, 1050-1099, 1100-1119, 1400-1499 
29 Coal 1200-1299 
30 Petroleum& Natural Gas 1300,1310-1339, 1370-1382, 1389, 2900-2912, 2990-2999 
31 Utilities 4900, 4910-4911, 4920-4925, 4930-4932, 4939-4942 
32 Communication 4800, 4810-4813, 4820-4823, 4830-4841, 4880-4892, 4899 
33 Personal Services 7020-7021, 7030-7033, 7200, 7210-7212, 7214-7217, 7219-7221, 7230-7231, 7240-7241, 
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7250-7251, 7260-7269, 7270-7299, 7395, 7500, 7520-7549, 7600, 7620, 7622-7623, 7629-
7631, 7640-7641, 7690-7699, 8100-8499, 8600-8899, 7510-7515 
34 Business Services 2750-2759, 3993, 7218, 7300, 7310-7342, 7349-7353, 7359-7369, 7374, 7376-7385, 7389-
7394, 7396-7397, 7399, 7519, 8700, 8710-8713, 8720-8721, 8730-8734, 8740-8748, 8900-
8910, 8911, 8920-8999, 4220-4299 
35 Computers 3570-3579, 3680-3689, 3695 
36 Computer Software 3622, 3661-3666, 3669-3679, 3810, 3812 
37 Electric Equipment 3622, 3661-3666, 3669-3679, 3810, 3812 
38 Measuring and Control 
Equipment 
3811, 3820-3827, 3829, 3830-3839 
39 Business Supplies 2520,2549, 2600-2639, 2670-2699, 2760-2761, 3950-3955 
40 Shipping Containers 2440-2449, 2640-2659, 3220-3221, 3410-3412 
41 Transportation 4000-4013, 4040-4049, 4100, 4110-4121, 4130-4131, 4140-4142, 4150-4151, 4170-4173, 
4190-4199, 4200, 4210-4219, 4230-4231, 4240-4249, 4400-4700, 4710-4712, 4720-4749, 
4780, 4782-4785, 4789 
42 Wholesale 5000, 5010-5015, 5020-5023, 5030-5060, 5063-5065, 5070-5078, 5080-5088, 5090-5094, 
5099-5100, 5110-5113, 5120-5122, 5130-5172, 5180-5182, 5190-5199 
43 Retail 5200, 5210-5231, 5250-5251, 5261-5261, 5271-5271, 5300, 5310-5311, 5320-5330-5331, 
5334, 5340-5349, 5390-5399, 5400, 5410-5412, 5420-5469, 5490-5499, 5500, 5510-5579, 
5590-5599, 5700, 5710-5722, 5730-5736, 5750-5799, 5900, 5910-5912, 5920-5932, 5940-
5990, 5992-5999 
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44 Restaurants and Hotels 5800-5829, 5890-5899, 7000, 7010-7019, 7040-7049, 7213 
45 Banking 6000, 6010-6036, 6040-6062, 6080-6082, 6090-6100, 6110-6113, 6120-6179, 6190-6199 
46 Insurance 6300, 6310-6331, 6350-6351, 6360-6361, 6370-6379, 6390-6399, 6400-6411 
47 Real Estate 6500, 6510, 6512-6515, 6517-6532, 6540-6541, 6550-6553, 6590-6599, 6610-6611 
48 Trading 6200-6299, 6700, 6710-6726, 6730-6733, 6740-6779, 6790-6795, 6798-6799 
49 Other 4950-4959, 4960-4961, 4970-4971, 4990-4991 
 
307 
 
Appendix C 
Justification of empirical specifications 
 This appendix demonstrates that Ohlson’s (1995) model can be expressed as a function 
of earnings and opening book value of equity. For easier comparison, the notation used 
corresponds to that used in Ohlson (1995).  
 This is begun by stating the clean surplus relation, where the difference in book value is 
equal to net earnings minus dividend. 
 tttt dxyy  1         Equation A1 
 where yt = book value of equity at time t, dt = dividends in period t and xt = earnings for period t 
 The definition of abnormal earnings (Ohlson, 1995) is  
 11 
 tft
a
t yrxx       Equation A2 
 
  tt
a
t xx 1       Equation A3 
where xt+1
a is abnormal earnings , rf is risk free rate and vt is other non-accounting value-
relevant information (“other information”) 
 Ohlson (1995, pp. 669) states that with the standard assumptions underlying the 
dividend discount model together with equations A1 and A3, his equation can be rewritten as: 
 t
a
ttt vxyP 21          
 By substituting the clan surplus relation (equation A1) and abnormal earnings equation 
(equation A2) into equation A3 yields the following, 
 ttfttttt
vyrxdxyP 21111     
 Re-arrange to get, 
 ttfttt
vyrxdP 2111 )1()1(      
 The above equation can be expressed as a non-zero intercept equation; where intercept 
contains other information parameters 
   1210 tttt yxdP   
 which express price as a function of opening book value and current earnings. 
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